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Direct Democracy In and Between the EU and UK: a Legal Analysis of the 
European Citizens' Initiative and the European Union Act 2011 
James Brian Organ 
Abstract 
Participation is an important theme in current democratic theory and there is burgeoning use of its 
institutional form, direct democracy, to legitimise political bodies and their decision-making. This 
thesis analyses the legislative design and implementation of two recent direct democracy 
innovations: the European Citizens Initiative (ECI) and the referenda in the European Union Act 
(EUA). The agenda setting ECI, which gives EU citizens the chance to propose legal acts of the Union, 
is the first supranational instrument of direct democracy, and the EUA contains the UK’s first 
ongoing legislative criteria that trigger a referendum. The duality of EU democracy is an essential 
aspect of its legitimisation. Two dichotomies are therefore used to frame the analysis of direct 
democracy in the EU: the supranational (direct) and intergovernmental (indirect) routes of EU 
legitimisation and the legitimisation of the EU’s constitutional framework and its daily authority. 
These dichotomies, and democratic criteria focussed on citizen participation and influence over the 
political agenda, support the analysis of the likely combined impact of the ECI and EUA on the dual 
EU democracy. 
The critical assessment of the legislative design of the ECI and of the Commission’s decision-making 
in relation to the ECI shows that institutional mediation and the EU’s duality have a significant 
impact on the potential to increase the influence of EU citizens on the EU political agenda, and to 
facilitate a challenge to established policy preferences. Similarly the critical analysis of the EUA 
referenda provisions indicate that the apparently strong opportunity to vote on the UK’s EU policy in 
a referendum is qualified in a number of respects by institutional control reflected in the legislation 
itself, and that the chance of citizen-led policy preferences is diminished. The thesis concludes with a 
combined analysis of the ECI and EUA to assess the joint impact of direct democracy on dual EU 
democracy through answering two questions: ‘What are their implications for the EU democratic 
paradigm?’, and ‘What is their influence together on EU democratic legitimacy?’. The overall findings 
are that the impact of the ECI and EUA, despite posing some challenges and despite their democratic 
potential, is likely to be heavily restricted as a result of institutional control and the EU’s political 
framework. 
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Introduction 
Following the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union (EU) sought to bolster its 
democratic legitimacy, by supplementing its existing representative basis with the first instrument of 
direct democracy at a supranational level: the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI).1 The potential, 
theoretical significance of the ECI for the democratic legitimacy of the EU is widely recognised,2 and 
the Commission itself expected it to be ‘a significant step forward in the democratic life of the 
Union’ that would add a ‘whole new dimension of participatory democracy’.3 This thesis examines 
the potential of the ECI legislative design to meet these high expectations, and also whether this 
new facet of EU citizenship is starting to provide a strong opportunity for citizen-led democratic 
participation in the EU.  
In the same year as the Regulation for the ECI was adopted,4 the UK Parliament passed the European 
Union Act 2011 (EUA) to fulfil a commitment in the Programme for Government 2010 that “no 
further powers should be transferred to Brussels without a referendum”.5 The EUA introduces on-
going legislative criteria that trigger a referendum for the first time in the UK, and this requirement 
for approval through a referendum is a fundamental alteration to the UK legislative process for 
certain specified areas of the UK’s EU policy.6 The statutory provisions for direct democracy, 
according to the then Foreign Secretary William Hague, will ‘lock’ government policy to the wishes of 
the UK people and ensure “a fundamental shift in power from Ministers of the Crown to parliament 
                                                          
1
 For discussion of the development and limitations of European Union democracy see for example B Kohler- 
Koch and B Rittberger (eds), Debating the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, (Rowman and 
Littlefield 2007); J Weiler and others, ‘European Democracy and its Critique’, [1995] West European Politics 4; 
S Hix, What is wrong with the European Union and How to Fix it, (Polity 2008); D Beetham and C Lord, 
Legitimacy and the European Union, (Longman 1998). For alternative views on democracy in the EU see for 
example, A Moravscik, ‘In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’ 
[2002] JCMS 603; A Moravscik, ‘The Myth of Europe’s Democratic Deficit’ [2008] Intereconomics: Journal of 
European Public Policy 331; and G Majone et al., ‘Europe’s Democratic Deficit: The Question of Standards’ 
[1998] European Law Journal (1998) 5. 
2
 See for example A Warleigh, ‘On the Path to Legitimacy? The EU Citizens Initiative Right from a Critical 
Deliberativist Perspective’ in C Ruzza and V Della Sala (eds), Governance and civil society in the European 
Union, (Manchester University Press 2007) 55. 
3
 Quoted from speech by Vice President of the European Commission Maros Sefcovic, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: 
Enhancing Democracy’on Sept 30th 2010, pg 2. Available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-
502_en.htm, accessed 13 Apr 2015. 
4
 Regulation (EU) No. 211/2011 of 16 Feb 2011 on the citizens’ initiative [2011] OJ L 65/1. The Regulation is 
referred to subsequently as Reg. 211/2011. 
5
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_programm
e_for_government.pdf 19 
6
 There could also be significant implications for the UK’s constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
For discussion see M Gordon, Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK constitution, process, politics and 
democracy (Hart 2015). 
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and the voters themselves”.7 The analysis of the EUA presented in this thesis is of the legislative 
design for the referenda in the EUA, and the likelihood of these so called ‘referendum locks’ passing 
influence over EU policy decisions from the UK government to its citizens. 
The extensive democratic benefits that the political actors have indicated they expect from the ECI 
and the EUA rest on a presumption of the value of increased citizen participation, and increased 
citizen influence over the political agenda and its outcomes. The importance given to participation is 
underpinned by the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, the belief that ‘important public 
decisions ... depend, directly or indirectly upon public opinion’, which is central to almost all 
concepts of democracy.8 Participation in EU democracy is of course already provided through 
existing representative democratic mechanisms, principally through elections to the European 
Parliament and the Westminster Parliament for the UK citizen, but recent years participatory 
democracy has risen to prominence to supplement this more indirect representative democracy, 
which is commonly practiced in the liberal democratic states of the EU.9 Participatory democratic 
theory, as the name suggests, strongly emphasises the importance of participation, and the need for 
citizen engagement beyond voting at election time. The value attached to participation has grown 
considerably and direct democratic instruments, particularly the referendum, have increased in use 
to provide participation outside the usual representative elections.10  
The ECI and the referenda of the EUA are part of this increasing trend towards supplementing 
representative democratic processes with instruments of direct democracy; a trend that is 
particularly noticeable in relation to the EU.11 They both provide citizens an opportunity to support 
or vote on a specific policy issue rather than the usual democratic participation of selecting a 
political representative, but they do so in a contrasting manner. The ECI is an agenda setting 
instrument whose democratic benefit is derived largely from the formal opportunity it gives citizens 
to influence which issues are part of the EU’s political agenda. To take up this opportunity seven 
citizens from different Member States register a proposal for a legal act with the Commission and 
then, if they gather one million statements of support from a quarter of the EU Member States, they 
can present their proposal to the Commission, who will consider turning it in to a proposal for a legal 
                                                          
7
 HC Debate 7 Dec 2010 vol 520 col 193. 
8
 A Weale, Democracy (Macmillan 1999) 14. See also C Lord and E Harris, Democracy in the New Europe 
(Macmillan 2006) and R Dahl, On Democracy (YUP 2000). 
9
 The 1970s onwards has seen strong development in theories of participatory democracy. For a classic text on 
participatory democracy see C Pateman Participation and Democratic theory (CUP 1970). 
10
 ‘Arguably the dominant current within contemporary democratic theory is one that places a premium on 
increasing and deepening citizen participation’, G Smith, Democratic Innovations - Designing Institutions for 
Citizen Participation (CUP 2009) 6. 
11
 See inter alia, Mendez, Mendez and Triga, ‘Referendums and the European Union, A Comparative Enquiry’, 
(CUP 2014), for a recent analysis of the use of referenda in relation to the EU. 
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act of the Union.12 This means that citizens can use the ECI to generate public debate and formally 
engage with the EU institutions, but there is no guarantee of a legal outcome. The EUA referenda, on 
the other hand, give citizens no formal means of selecting the issues that will be discussed as part of 
the political agenda, but when UK citizens get a chance to vote in a referendum triggered by the 
EUA, there is far greater certainty of legal impact. This legal impact is generated by the requirement 
for a positive referendum result that the EUA introduces in to the UK for the ratification of treaty 
amendments and the approval of a range of Council decisions that transfer powers to the EU.  
If citizen participation is recognised as important in political decision-making and necessary for an 
instrument of direct democracy to enhance democratic legitimacy, ‘the crucial normative question is 
then the extent to which there should be an institutional capacity for the public at large to have a 
final say on issues of public policy’ - a final say that includes not just influence over legal outcomes 
but also the ability to influence what is discussed in the first place.13 Although the direct engagement 
of citizens with issues of public policy is unlikely to ever replace representative democracy, or even 
challenge its pre-eminence in the near future, this thesis operates on the premise that direct 
democratic instruments are considered to have greater democratic potential the more they give 
citizens a final say over the political agenda and over its policy and legislative outcomes. The 
democratic potential of the ECI and EUA is therefore analysed from this perspective of the strength 
of citizen influence over the political agenda.  
The corollary of the position in the previous paragraph is that the greater the degree of control that 
remains in the hands of the existing institutions, the greater is the potential for citizen participation 
through direct democracy to be ignored or to fail to instigate meaningful change. This is one of the 
most common objections raised by those who are critical of the value of citizen participation 
through any form of democracy. As Mark Twain is reputed to have said: ‘If voting made any 
difference, they wouldn’t let us do it’.14 The control of existing institutions or the political elite is a 
criticism, though, that is particularly aimed at direct democracy, in part because of the history of 
abuse of referenda by dictators to support authoritarian regimes.15 It is perhaps inevitable, however, 
that the extent to which the ‘final say’ on the policy agenda falls to citizens depends in large part on 
                                                          
12
 This outline of the ECI is established in Art 11(4) TEU. 
13
  A Weale, Democracy (Macmillan 1999) 85. 
14
 This quote is attributed to Mark Twain but its provenance is not certain. 
15
  G Smith, Democratic Innovations - Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (CUP 2009).  For discussion 
of elite control in relation to the use of direct democracy more generally see S Tierney, Constitutional 
Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (OUP 2012). For discussion of the 
importance of challenging established policy preferences see R Blaug, ‘Engineering Democracy’ [2002] Political 
Studies 102. For discussion of bureaucratic interference in participatory democracy see D Held, Models of 
Democracy, (Polity 2006) 209-216. 
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institutional mediation because of the control that existing institutions will continue to have over the 
legislative design of democratic instruments and their implementation.16 The ECI and the EUA 
referenda certainly indicate the significance of this institutional mediation. That institutions are 
inclined to exercise their ability to control the impact of direct democracy should also come as no 
surprise. To think otherwise, to think that “incumbent bureaucracies and critical networks are 
compatible ... is to assume that struggle for power [is] at an end”.17 Although institutional mediation 
of direct democracy may be inevitable, it must not completely throttle the opportunity of increasing 
citizen influence or the potential democratic impact that the political actors spoke of in relation to 
the ECI and EUA will be negligible. The legal analysis of the ECI and EUA presented in this thesis 
assesses the extent of institutional mediation and the corresponding potential for citizens to be able 
to exercise extra power as a result of extending the use of direct democracy in the EU democratic 
framework. 
The analysis in this thesis of the potential for the ECI and EUA to increase citizen influence by passing 
power over the political agenda to citizens away from the existing institutions focuses on three 
aspects.18 The first is the extent to which they provide an effective and equal opportunity for citizens 
to participate in the political agenda. This rests on the presumption that the greater the inequality in 
the participation of citizens resulting from issues such as the electoral franchise criteria and access 
to information, the less democratic potential the ECI and EUA will have.19 The opportunity to 
participate must also be effective in the sense that any barriers are minimised and proportionate to 
the aim of ensuring fair and secure participation. There will always, for example, be a need to 
identify citizens to avoid abuse of the system, but if procedural or identification requirements 
become so onerous that citizens are blocked from taking up the opportunity to participate, its 
democratic benefit is severely reduced. The second consideration is the extent that there is 
increased citizen influence over the issues discussed as part of the political agenda. The opportunity 
to formally place issues on the public agenda and to generate debate about those issues is one of 
the democratic benefits of direct democracy, particularly an instrument such as the ECI. The third 
consideration is the strength of citizen influence over the outcomes of the political agenda. This 
                                                          
16
 See A Gross, ‘The Design determines the quality – some criteria for determining the design and quality of 
direct democracy’ in Z T Pallinger and others (eds), Direct Democracy in Europe: Developments and 
Prospects,(VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2007); G Smith, Democratic Innovations - Designing Institutions 
for Citizen Participation (CUP 2009). 
17
 R Blaug, ‘Engineering Democracy’ [2002] Political Studies 102, 113. In particular this contrasts with the 
argument put forward by Fukuyama that we have reached a position of liberal democratic consensus in F 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin 1992). 
18
 These reflect the well known five democratic criteria Dahl describes in R Dahl, On Democracy, (YUP 2000). 
19
 Art 9 TEU states the importance of the principle of equality: “In all its activities, the Union shall observe the 
principle of equality”. 
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criterion rests on the presumption that the more legal acts and policy decisions that are initiated as 
a result of direct citizen participation, the stronger the democratic potential of the democratic 
instrument. This is a particular strength of referenda because of the strong expectation that the 
political authorities will implement the citizen preference expressed through a referendum vote. The 
three criteria I use to assess the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA are therefore ‘effective 
participative opportunity’, ‘citizen agenda influence’, and ‘citizen outcome influence’. 
The evolution of EU democracy towards increased direct democracy at both Member State and EU 
level may have provided an apparent increase in opportunities for democratic participation and 
citizen influence over the EU policy agenda and its outcomes, but in practice the existing institutions 
have retained a high degree of control. The legislative design of the ECI was strongly criticised at the 
outset because of the control that the Commission retains over the impact that an ECI proposal 
might have.20 The Commission is only required to consider initiating a legal act in response to an ECI 
proposal that reaches the necessary levels of support so any legal or policy outcomes that might 
occur because of direct citizen participation through the ECI are entirely at the discretion of the 
Commission.21 Less obvious was the ability of the Commission to restrict public debate and citizen 
influence over the political agenda as a result of its role in registering ECIs at the outset of the 
process.22 The EUA referenda, in contrast, give no extra formal opportunity to place topics on the 
political agenda, as the ECI does, but when triggered they will give citizens a specific policy vote and 
it will be expected that the result of the referendum is implemented. To this extent citizens have 
significant influence over a policy outcome when voting in a referendum, but the findings from the 
analysis of the legislative design of the EUA show that the institutional controls over the drafting of 
the legislation and the political motivation behind its implementation have limited its democratic 
potential. 
An important indicator of the strength of the institutional mediation of democratic instruments is 
the extent to which citizens are able to use them to challenge established policy preferences.23 If 
democratic instruments are only able to support the existing status quo, then the extent to which 
citizens are able to use them to influence policy and decision-making will inevitably be limited. 
Without any element of ‘critical’ democracy, in other words any challenge to the existing institutions 
                                                          
20
 M Dougan, ‘What are we to make of the Citizens' Initiative?’ [2011] CML Rev 1807; B Kaufmann, 
‘Transnational Babystep: The European Citizens Initiative’ in M Setala and T Schiller (eds) Citizen's initiatives in 
Europe; procedures and consequences of agenda-setting by citizens, (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 229. 
21
 Art 11(4) TEU states that the Commission is invited to propose a legal act. So far the Commission has 
decided not to initiate any legal acts in response to successful ECI proposals. 
22
 J Organ, ‘Decommissioning Direct Democracy? A critical analysis of Commission decision making on the legal 
admissibility of European Citizens Initiative proposals’, [2014] EU Const 422. 
23
 R Blaug, ‘Engineering Democracy’ [2002] Political Studies 102. 
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or the political elite they represent and their policy preferences, the democratic instrument would 
act only as a democratic gloss and pass no real influence to citizens. Conversely, the more citizens 
are able to use a democratic instrument to introduce new policy ideas to the political agenda, 
generate public debate about these ideas and to lead to them being concretised in a legal act, the 
more this democratic instrument will facilitate a tangible impact on the power and control of the 
existing institutions over the political agenda. The ability to challenge established policy preferences, 
to some degree, is therefore necessary for a democratic instrument to increase the correlation 
between policy and citizen preferences and influence democratic legitimacy.  
As well as the potential to influence the democratic legitimacy of the EU, this thesis also explores the 
implications of the ECI and EUA for the EU’s democratic framework. The characterisation of the EU 
democratic framework that is used in this thesis is based on two dichotomies: the distinction 
between the EU legitimisation via supranational level institutions and via Member State level 
institutions, and between the legitimisation of the EU constitutional framework and its daily political 
authority.24 The first of these dichotomies recognises the unusual combination in the EU of 
democratic legitimacy derived from Member State level democratic processes, which indirectly 
legitimise the Council and European Council and directly legitimise the role that Member State level 
institutions play in the EU, and from supranational democratic processes, which legitimise the 
European Parliament.25 This duality reflects that the EU is in part an intergovernmental organisation, 
which would usually be indirectly legitimised through the legitimacy of the Member State, but that it 
also has the sort of direct legitimisation that would usually be associated with a nation state.26 The 
democratic legitimisation processes of the EU remain founded on representative democracy, but 
they are now supplemented, at the Member State level in respect of the UK, by the possibility of 
voting on specific policy issues in the referenda of the EUA and, at the EU level, by the agenda 
setting instrument of the ECI. 
The second dichotomy used that is a defining feature of the EU democratic paradigm is the 
distinction between the democratic legitimisation of the EU treaties, its constitutional framework, 
                                                          
24
 The term constitutional framework or constitutional order is used in a broad sense to indicate the 
fundamental nature of the treaties, but recognises the debate about whether the EU has constitutional law, 
particularly due to the EU not being a nation state to which a constitution is usually attached. See comment in  
B Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision 
Process’ in P Beaumont, C Lyons and N Walker (eds), ‘Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law’ 
(Hart 2002) 39; see N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and nation in the European 
Commonwealth (OUP 1999) 103-4 for example of broad understanding of constitution. For a full investigation 
of the viability of identifying European primary law as European constitutional law see A von Bogdandy and J 
Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart 2010). 
25
 See Art 10(2) TEU. 
26
 Dashwood first used his well known description of the EU as a ‘constitutional order of states’ in A Dashwood, 
Reviewing Maastricht, Issues for the 1996 IGC, (London, Sweet and Maxwell 1996) 7. 
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and of the daily law and policy making authority of the EU. The Member State level democratic 
processes in the EU are used almost exclusively to legitimise the constitutional framework of the EU, 
and the EU level democratic instruments are predominantly used to legitimise the daily authority of 
the EU. To fit this standard paradigm the ECI would be mainly used to legitimise EU law and policy 
making and the referenda of the EUA would be mainly used to legitimise EU treaties. The distinction 
within these dichotomies is not always clearly drawn and there are exceptions to the way that they 
interact, such as the supranational Commission being able to propose treaty amendment.27 
Generally it will be shown that the ECI and EUA do fit within the existing EU democratic paradigm, 
but they also pose some questions about how the two dichotomies outlined above interact and the 
limitations on direct democracy of the EU political framework. 
The examination that is presented in this thesis of the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA and 
their possible impact on the EU democratic paradigm is organised in to four chapters. The first 
chapter provides the theoretical context of the thesis. The starting point for this is empirical, 
sociological legitimacy, which is based on the fundamental principle for all functioning polities that 
political authority is accepted.28 Sociological legitimacy is the consideration of why there is state 
legitimacy, but does not define any preconditions that validate a state’s legitimacy. The study of 
political legitimacy, on the other hand, establishes criteria that can be used to identify whether the 
political authority of a state is legitimate or not. A definition of political legitimacy is provided based 
on Beetham and Lord’s threefold definition that an authority, to be legitimate, must be lawful, 
normatively justified, and recognised by other states.29 Having given broad definitions of these two 
concepts of sociological and political legitimacy, the rest of the discussion in chapter one focuses on 
the second of these criteria: the normative justification of political legitimacy. Beethan and Lord 
identify three normative requirements for political legitimacy in the liberal democracies of the EU 
Member States: identity, performance and democracy.30 These three concepts are discussed in turn 
in chapter one, with the majority of the discussion focussed on democracy, which is the normative 
principle that the ECI and EUA are expected to have most influence on.  
The first normative justification for political legitimacy, identity, is particularly problematic for the EU 
because it is not a nation state and lacks a single definable people or demos.31 The position that is 
defended in this thesis is that although it is important to recognise the difficulties, in terms of 
                                                          
27
 Art 48(2) TEU. 
28
 Max Weber provides a classic examination of sociological legitimacy in M Weber, Economy and society: an 
outline of interpretative sociology (University of California Press 1978). 
29
 D Beetham and C Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Longman 1998). 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 One suggestion is that the EU has multiple peoples or demos instead. See for example K Nikolaidis, ‘The New 
Constitution as European Demoi-cracy?’ [2004] Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 
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political legitimacy, caused by the lack of a demos and limited identification with the EU by citizens, 
it is not an insurmountable failing that excludes the development of democratic legitimacy at the EU 
level. In the early days of “permissive consensus” the EU relied heavily on the second aspect of 
normative justification, performance, through successful outcomes such as peace and prosperity, for 
its political legitimacy.32 Some academics, such as Majone and Moravscik, have argued for a 
technocratic approach to EU legitimacy that relies mainly on performance outcomes and system 
effectiveness, only supported by indirect democratic legitimacy.33 This form of elite led, expertise 
based approach to political decision-making has long been the main rival to democracy.34 
Performance, though, is no longer a sufficient basis for the political legitimacy of an EU of liberal 
democratic Member states, if it ever was, and it is argued in chapter one that democracy is possible 
and necessary at the supranational EU level.35 
The final section of chapter one defines and discusses an understanding of democracy to support the 
assessment of the democratic potential of direct democracy in the EU. First, there is an outline of a 
working definition of democracy and an explanation of the criteria against which the democratic 
potential of the ECI and EUA are assessed. Secondly, the case is made for the importance of 
democracy at the supranational EU level.36 The third part of the chapter provides a typology of 
governance approaches based on the different institutional combinations of representative and 
direct democratic instruments prevalent in liberal democracies. This typology outlines a framework 
to contextualise the discussion of the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA. The fourth part of the 
chapter analyses the democratic provisions in the EU treaties, which are set out in Title II TEU, 
‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’. The main focus of the treaty provisions are on representative 
democracy, but the introduction of Art 11 TEU takes a more participative approach to democratic 
                                                          
32
 Auer comments on the move away from permissive consensus in S Auer, ‘New Europe: Between 
Cosmopolitan Dreams and Nationalist Nightmares’ [2010] JCMS 1179. 
33
 G Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth. (OUP 
2005). Or more recently G Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power – The European Union at fifty (CUP 
2009). For a critique of Majone’s position see M Dougan, ‘And Some Fell on Stony Ground... A Critical Reading 
of Giandomenico Majone's Dilemmas of European Integration’ [2006] EL Rev 865. A Moravscik, ‘In defence of 
the Democratic deficit: Reassessing the legitimacy of the European Union’ [2002] JCMS 603; and A Moravscik, 
‘The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy’, [2005] Journal European Public 
Policy 349. 
34
 Dahl clearly sets out the reasons for rejecting ‘Guardianship’ as an alternative to democracy in Ch 7 “Why 
Political equality II? Civic Competence” in R Dahl, On Democracy, (YUP 2000) 69 - 80.  
35
 The ‘democratic deficit’ debate, which has persisted ever since the phrase was first coined by David 
Marquand, is a reflection of the need for legitimacy that includes democracy at EU level. Even Majone and 
Moravscik have moved their position in recent years to recognise the changing political environment of the EU 
and the benefit of EU level democracy. In Art 10(1) TEU it is stated that the functioning of the Union is founded 
on representative democracy. 
36
 G de Búrca ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’, [2008] Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 221 
uses the same terminology of ‘striving’ for supranational democracy. 
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legitimisation and in Art 11(4) TEU has taken the innovative step of introducing the ECI and 
supranational direct democracy in to EU democracy. The final part of chapter one describes the EU 
democratic paradigm using the dichotomies defined at the start of the chapter. 
Chapter two contains the research analysis of the ECI. The first part of the chapter analyses the 
legislative design of the ECI in Art 11(4) TEU and the regulation that enacted the ECI, Reg. 211/2011, 
which establishes the five phases of the ECI process: the formation of the organising committee of 
the initiative, registration of the initiative and its proposal, the collection of support, the verification 
of the statements of support by Member States, and the submission and examination of the 
proposal by the Commission, which culminates in either a reasoned rejection of the initiative or a 
proposal for a legal act of the Union. These phases are outlined and then the substantive issues 
raised by the legislative design are discussed. First, the complexity and inequalities in the legislation, 
then the limitations on the scope of the ECI, and then the strength of the legal obligation it imposes 
on the Commission. The second part of the chapter examines the implementation of the legislative 
provisions of the ECI. A critical analysis is provided of the Commission’s interpretation of the criteria 
for registering ECI proposals, particularly focussing on the requirements that an ECI proposal is ‘not 
manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers’ and that it is ‘for the purpose of 
implementing the treaties’, which have led to a high number of refusals to register initiatives.37 
Although the structure and limited competences of the EU restrict the scope of ECI proposals and 
the public debate they can formally initiate to some degree, the findings are that the institutional 
mediation by the Commission has had a significant impact on the democratic potential of the ECI 
and the ability of citizens to use it to challenge established policy preferences. 
Chapter three moves from the supranational EU level use of direct democracy to the Member State 
level in the UK through an analysis of the legislative design of referenda in the EUA. The chapter is 
introduced first with an outline of the classification of referenda based on the manner in which they 
are initiated and the binding nature of the result, and secondly by commenting on how the issues of 
institutional mediation and challenging policy preferences specifically relate to referenda. In the 
second part of the chapter the mechanics of the complex legislative provisions relating to referenda 
in the EUA are described in detail. The third part comments on the questions of legal compatibility 
with EU and UK law that the EUA raises. The fourth part of the chapter assesses the democratic 
potential expected from the EUA provisions for direct democracy. First, this is done through 
analysing the political motivation behind the enactment of the EUA, and the criteria that trigger 
referenda and the scope of possible subject matter that reflect the prioritisation of politics over 
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 Art 4(2)(b) Reg. 211/2011. 
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participation. Secondly, there is analysis of the extent that citizen influence over the agenda content 
and its outcomes is likely to be facilitated by the EUA legislation, using the classification of 
referendum set out at the start of the chapter to structure the discussion. 
The final chapter of the thesis then brings together the separate analysis and conclusions in relation 
to the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA from chapters two and three, and uses the 
theoretical context and democratic criteria of chapter one, to assess their joint impact on EU 
democracy. My analysis in the final chapter addresses two central questions. The first question, 
‘What are the implications of the ECI and EUA for the existing EU democratic paradigm?’, specifically 
focuses on the two dichotomies set out in chapter one of constitutional/legislative legitimisation and 
supranational/national legitimisation to examine what we learn about the institutional framework of 
the EU and the tensions that arise due to the implementation of direct democracy. The second 
question addressed in this concluding chapter is ‘What is the potential influence of the ECI and EUA 
on the democratic legitimacy of the EU?’. In addressing this question, the findings from chapters two 
and three are brought together to comment on the overall implications of the ECI and EUA for the 
dual EU democratic legitimisation, which rests on the interaction between the EU and Member State 
political levels operating as complementary, overlapping polities.38 The contemporaneous 
introduction of the ECI and EUA at EU and Member State level, respectively, allows for this 
combined assessment of the potential impact of direct democracy on EU democracy, and its part in 
the dual democratization of the EU within the piecemeal evolution of its constitutional framework.39 
The conclusions drawn are that both these instruments of direct democracy are strongly mediated 
by existing institutions, only provide citizens with a limited opportunity to impose their own policy 
preferences in relation to the EU, and that direct democracy is limited by the very nature of the EU 
as a political entity. 
The ECI and the referenda of the EUA are very different forms of direct democracy, implemented at 
different levels in EU democracy and which meet democratic criteria in different ways, but there are 
strong commonalities in the restrictions on their democratic potential. Overall the thesis concludes 
that the introduction of the ECI and the EUA could, in principle, bring significant changes to the 
democratic paradigm of the EU. However, the analysis of the legislative design and implementation 
to date of the ECI and EUA show that, in practice, their challenges to the current dichotomies within 
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 For specific discussion of the dual democratisation of the EU see M Shu, ‘Referendums and Political 
Constitutionalisation of the EU’ [2008] European Law Journal 423.  
39
 ‘It is beyond doubt that the development of a European constitutional law is indeed a process, and even a 
very long drawn out process [and] ... has been developed in a piecemeal fashion over the past fifty years’, B 
Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision 
Process’ in P Beaumont, C Lyons and N Walker (eds), ‘Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law’ 
(Hart 2002) 39. 
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the dual framework of EU democracy are not extensive and unlikely to have a significant impact on 
the status quo in the short term. Direct democracy also has the potential to enhance EU democratic 
legitimacy through increasing citizen participation and influence over the EU political agenda and its 
outcomes, but the institutional mediation of these democratic instruments and the political 
framework of the EU, have limited the ability of citizens to challenge established, institutional policy 
preferences and have an influence on the EU’s political agenda. 
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Chapter One 
Legitimacy in the EU 
The European Citizens Initiative (ECI) and the referenda required by the European Union Act 2011 
(EUA) are new direct democratic instruments that could potentially increase the legitimacy of 
constitutional, policy and legislative decisions by European Union (EU) institutions and, through the 
EUA, by the UK government in relation to Europe, respectively.1  The discussion of legitimacy and 
democratic theory in this chapter is for the purpose of enriching and framing the later legal analysis 
of the ECI and EUA legislation. This thesis is a legal/constitutional examination of the recent changes 
to the democratic arrangements of the EU and UK, but it is recognised that democratic theory often 
sits more comfortably in political science and political philosophy. This chapter, therefore, draws 
significantly on political science in providing the theoretical background against which the legal 
implications of the new direct democracy instruments will be analysed in subsequent chapters.  
The argument developed in this chapter is that the EU has the potential to be politically legitimate, 
and therefore be influenced by the implementation of the ECI and EUA, and that this legitimacy 
must be viewed from the duality of EU level and Member State level legitimisation. This argument 
proceeds through the following stages. First, the key themes of the thesis and the methodological 
approach are outlined. The second stage is to provide a broad understanding of sociological, 
empirical legitimacy.2 The third stage is to provide an understanding of political legitimacy, which is 
prescriptive and provides a normative basis to assess the legitimacy of a political order. Finally, 
performance, identity and democracy, which are three criteria for the normative justification of 
political legitimacy in a liberal democracy, are then assessed in turn.3 Democratic legitimacy, which is 
                                                          
1
 A note on terminology: Direct democracy refers to a form of democracy that engages the citizen directly with 
the political process through supporting or voting for a policy position or proposal; as an alternative to 
representative democracy. The political or democratic engagement of EU citizens with the EU and its 
institutions, such as voting for MEPs, which is also usually referred to as direct, is referred to as supranational 
participation or democracy in this thesis. Legitimisation and engagement via Member State institutions or 
democratic processes is referred to as indirect. 
2
 Max Weber provides, for example, a seminal account of sociological legitimacy in M Weber, The theory of 
social and economic organization (Free Press New York 1964), translated [from the German] by A.M. 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons; edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons. 
3
 The use of these three criteria is based on the work of D Beetham and C Lord, Legitimacy and the European 
Union (Longman 1998). 
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the specific normative aspect of political legitimacy that the ECI and EUA have the greatest potential 
to influence in the EU, is dealt with in most detail in the second half of the chapter.4 
Duality of EU democracy 
Two important organisational dichotomies that frame the duality of EU democracy are used to 
underpin the analysis through this thesis:  
- the derivation of EU legitimacy via supranational EU level institutions and indirectly via 
member state institutions and citizenship; and 
- the distinction between the EU’s legitimacy when forming or amending the treaties and the 
legitimacy of its daily legislative and policy decision making.  
These dichotomies are central to the unusual constitutional characteristics of the EU and the 
interaction between them underpins the review of EU sociological and political legitimacy in this 
chapter and the analysis of the democratic potential of the ECI and the EUA in the subsequent two 
chapters. Due to their importance to the ideas developed throughout this thesis, these dichotomies 
are further outlined in the following paragraphs. 
One of the defining characteristics of the EU is that it combines the legitimisation processes of an 
intergovernmental organisation with processes more commonly associated with a federal state, 
whilst being neither of these.5 In democratic terms it means that there are both supranational 
processes, most notably the European Parliament elections, that legitimise the EU and would usually 
be associated with a federal state, and also Member State level processes that legitimise the EU in 
the manner of an intergovernmental organisation. This legitimisation occurs through the actions of 
the same set of individual citizens, acting as EU and Member State citizens, via a range of democratic 
mechanisms that legitimise complementary aspects of the political environment they live in. 
Member State citizens elect the national governments and parliaments, who can then exert, 
presumably legitimate, political authority on behalf of the citizens of their Member States at a 
supranational level in the Council of Ministers and European Council; and EU citizens are able to 
                                                          
4
 It is specifically the use of referenda introduced by the EUA that is analysed. When referring to the ECI and 
EUA it is the democratic instruments they implement that is being referred to. Specific European Citizens 
Initiatives are either referred to by name or as initiative(s). 
5
 Various attempts have been made to capture a concise description of the EU political construct; for example, 
the German Constitutional Court described the EU as an ‘association of sovereign states’, for discussion see F 
Schorkopf, ‘The European Union as an association of sovereign states: Karlsruhe’s ruling on the Lisbon Treaty’ 
[2009] German Law Journal 1219; or Alan Dashwood’s well known description of the EU as a ‘constitutional 
order of states’, which he first used in A Dashwood, Reviewing Maastricht, Issues for the 1996 IGC, (Sweet and 
Maxwell 1996) 7.  
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democratically legitimise supranational political authority through European parliamentary elections 
that legitimise the role of the European Parliament and, to a limited degree, the Commission.6  
The second dichotomy is the distinction between legitimacy at the point of treaty formation or 
amendment, and the legitimacy of the day to day exercising of legislative and policy making 
authority granted to the EU institutions. EU political authority is granted through treaties, which act 
as a form of constitutional framework that all Member States must agree to and ratify in accordance 
with their Member State level constitutional requirements.7 The treaties allocate competences 
within the EU and this political authority is then implemented through the EU institutions. Member 
State democratic processes, mainly the election of representatives and referenda, almost exclusively 
legitimise the EU treaties; but there are both supranational institutions, the Council and European 
Council which are indirectly legitimised, and also Member State level institutions, such as national 
governments, involved in the process of treaty amendment. Conversely, supranational democratic 
processes, such as the European Parliament elections, and indirect, Member State democratic 
processes legitimise the EU law and policy-making authority exercised by the supranational 
institutions of the EU. 
There are, of course, some challenges to this characterisation of EU democratic legitimisation. For 
example, there are questions about whether the message being communicated by citizens may 
relate to the polity other than the one apparently the subject of the election at hand, such as 
registering a protest vote against the incumbent national government in European Parliament 
elections.8 There is also the role of the European Parliament in monitoring subsidiarity in the EU, the 
so called yellow card process, which gives Member State level institutions a role in the EU legislative 
process;9 and the right of the supranational legitimised EU institutions of the European Parliament 
and Commission to propose treaty amendment in accordance with Art 48(2) TEU. The 
contemporaneous introduction of the ECI at supranational level and the EUA at Member State level 
provides an opportunity for a combined analysis of EU legitimisation of its constitutional framework 
                                                          
6
 The European Parliament must approve the candidates for the Commission and the president of the 
Commission was nominated by the political party group that won most seats in the European elections in 
2014, in accordance with Art 17(7) TEU. The European Parliament can also censure and ultimately dismiss the 
Commission in accordance with Art 17(8) TEU. The Santer Commission, for example, resigned before the 
European Parliament dismissed it in 1999. 
7
 Art 48 TEU. 
8
 This is an issue in other democratic situations, such as the use of local elections in the UK to protest against 
the incumbent national government, but it is noted as a particularly problematic issue for the EU. This 
question of second order voting is discussed as the third democratic deficit claim in S Hix, ‘What is Wrong with 
the European Union and how to fix it’, [2008] Polity 70, 76-82. 
9
 For more details on yellow card system see A Cygan, ‘Collective’ Subsidiarity Monitoring by National 
Parliaments after Lisbon – The Operation of the Early Warning Mechanism in Trybus and Rubini (eds) After 
Lisbon: the Future of European Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2012). 
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and daily political authority through direct democracy at both levels of EU democracy. The findings 
are that the ECI and EUA generally fit within the bounds of these two dichotomies, but the relatively 
minor challenges that they pose to the EU democratic framework are discussed in chapter four. 
The extent to which these distinctions between the legitimisation of the constitutional framework 
and the EU’s daily authority, and between Member State and EU level processes is able to be made 
is a significant characteristic of what sets the EU apart as a polity.10 The duality of EU 
democratisation should be recognised as its legitimacy develops both through using, at EU level, 
instruments previously tried at Member State level and also through the development of Member 
State level instruments that may impact EU democracy.11 The ECI and the EUA at first glance appear 
to be very different democratic instruments that operate in different political spheres. However, 
their assessment together allows the duality of EU democracy to be analysed and for the impact of 
direct democracy to be analysed at both levels of the EU polity. The iterative, interactive nature of 
the EU polity means that analysing both levels of the EU is beneficial in considering its overall 
democratic legitimacy. This thesis takes this approach and analyses EU democracy, not supranational 
or intergovernmental democratic legitimacy alone, using the case studies of direct democracy at 
both levels to inform conclusions about their likely impact together on the overall EU democratic 
paradigm and its democratic legitimacy. 
The premise in this thesis is that the individuality of the EU is largely defined by its lack of statehood, 
the dual routes of EU legitimacy, and the distinction between legitimisation of the constitutional 
framework and its daily political authority for policy making and legislating, and this underpins the 
analysis of EU democratic legitimacy that is made through the examination of the democratic 
potential of the ECI and EUA. These dichotomies support a more nuanced analysis of EU democratic 
legitimacy than would be possible if EU democracy were treated as a single democratic polity or just 
compared to Member State democratic legitimacy. The extent to which the ECI and the EUA have 
the potential to supplement the EU and Member State level democratic legitimisation of the EU 
treaties and law making authority, respectively, is assessed in chapters 3 and 4, and the extent to 
which they challenge the characterisation and legitimacy of EU democracy presented here is central 
to the discussion in the concluding chapter. Considering both sociological and political legitimacy 
from the two different perspectives of democratic legitimisation is important in indicating how the 
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 For an outline of the specific features that distinguish the EU from other polities see for example L Dobson 
and A Weale, ‘Governance and Legitimacy’ in E Bomberg and A Stubb (eds) The European Union: How Does it 
Work?, (OUP 2003) 160-166. 
11
 M Shu, ‘Referendums and Political Constitutionalisation of the EU’ [2008] ELJ 423. See also A Heritier, 
‘Elements of Democratic Legitimation in Europe: An alternative perspective’ [1999] Journal of European Public 
Policy 269. 
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dual legitimacy of the EU fits together and how it might be influenced or challenged by the 
introduction of direct democracy at Member State and EU level. This chapter provides the 
theoretical context to support this analysis; starting, in the next section, by defining sociological 
legitimacy. 
Sociological legitimacy  
Analysis of legitimacy deficits in the EU have been criticised for focussing on a particular aspect of 
the debate without clarifying the overall legitimacy framework within which conclusions fit and how 
the different legitimising factors interact.12 There has also been comment that, “much of [the 
literature on legitimacy deficit in the EU] also assumes that the only dimension of deficit that 
matters is the democratic one”.13 To provide a broad context to the specific democratic analysis in 
later chapters, the theoretical framework in this chapter will start with a broad foundational 
definition based largely on political science. This framework starts with a baseline definition of 
sociological legitimacy and then political legitimacy, before moving on to the normative criteria of 
political legitimacy of performance, identity and the more detailed analysis of democratic legitimacy 
in the second half of this chapter.  
The broad starting point for defining legitimacy should also reduce the potential for an overly 
legalistic analysis of democracy that suffers from a sense of isolation and disengagement from the 
realities of EU politics. Haltern, for example, argues that “legal studies [of European democracy] are 
in need of a new, and different, approach” from both a political and legal perspective because of the 
commonality between the two.14 It is hoped that this work is able to free itself of Haltern’s “legal 
isolationist ghetto” and make appropriate use of political science discourse fully integrating extra 
legal arguments into legal thinking. This thesis, which is an analysis of EU democratic instruments, 
must be able to do this to successfully provide a comprehensive and coherent contribution to legal 
debate. It therefore analyses the constitutional impact of the ECI and EUA on EU democracy from a 
legal perspective that recognises the links to political science doctrine, and with a clearly located 
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 For example, Beetham and Lord: “if there is a recurrent mistake ... it is the tendency to reduce the many 
dimensions of legitimacy to a single one: to legality or procedural regularity alone, to effective performance, or 
to consent, as the case may be” in D Beetham and C Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Longman 1998) 5. On this 
point and the plurality of visions of legitimacy in the EU see also C Lord and P Magnette, ‘E Pluribus Unum? 
Creative Disagreement about legitimacy in the EU’ [2004] JCMS 183, 199. 
13
 D Beetham and C Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Longman 1998) 23. See also Nikolaidis and Howse: "it 
seemed to us that debates on both sides [EU and US] have often been impeded by implicit and narrow 
assumptions about what constitutes the ultimate sources of legitimacy and sustainability in times of 
institutional change." in K Nicolaidis and R Howse (eds) The federal vision: legitimacy and levels of governance 
in the United States and the European Union (OUP 2001) 2 
14
 U Haltern, ‘A comment on Von Bogdandy’ in B Kohler-Koch and B Rittberger (eds) Debating the Democratic 
legitimacy of the EU, (Rowman & Littlefield 2007) 49. 
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position in the debate around democracy and legitimacy in the EU. The first step in this process is to 
define sociological legitimacy. 
Legitimacy has been described as ‘amorphous’15 and ‘elusive’,16 and there are many starting points 
containing differing aspects of legitimacy. Dobson and Weale state: “to say that a governing system 
is legitimate is to say that it has the right to rule and make decisions”17 and later quoting Lipset, 
“Legitimate means rightful. Political legitimacy ‘involves the capacity of the system to engender and 
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for 
society’”;18 or Nikolaidis and Hawse who described the concept of legitimacy as “the notion that it is 
fair or just in some way that a set of actors accept the influence or say of a particular collectivity 
exercising power”.19 These three quotes, from differing perspectives, set out the sense that the 
legitimacy of an organising polity relates to questions of fairness for individuals and acceptability of 
who exercises power over another and how. In other words, the people need to accept and consent 
to the authority that is exerted over them, and the wielding of that authority needs to be fair and 
effective. This is the basis of the distinction between sociological and political legitimacy. Acceptance 
and consent are aspects of an empirical, sociological legitimacy and the questions of fairness and 
effectiveness are normative aspects of political legitimacy, which are defined and discussed in the 
sections later on performance, identity and democracy. 
Max Weber described sociological legitimacy as a ‘belief in legitimacy’, defining it as support for the 
political regime, for the authority of the state.20 If those subjected to political authority recognised 
an authority as legitimate, it was legitimate; there are no predefined normative criteria that must be 
met before this measure of legitimacy can be met.21 The normative concepts of fairness and 
effectiveness may increase the likelihood of authority being accepted by citizens, but they are not 
essential for social legitimacy to exist. The legitimacy of a political authority could, for example, also 
be based on tradition, or on the charisma or other qualities of its leader, if sufficient to lead to the 
acceptance of their authority.22 Weber, though, believes that most commonly “legitimacy may be 
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 K Nicolaidis and R Howse (eds), The federal vision: legitimacy and levels of governance in the United States 
and the European Union (OUP 2001) 4 
16
 A Arnull and D Wincott (eds), Accountability and legitimacy in the European Union (OUP 2002) 3 
17
 L Dobson and A Weale, ‘Governance and Legitimacy’ in E Bomberg and A Stubb (eds), The European Union: 
How Does it Work?, (OUP 2003) 157. 
18
 Ibid 160. 
19
 K Nicolaidis and R Howse (eds) The federal vision: legitimacy and levels of governance in the United States 
and the European Union (OUP 2001) 4 
20
 M Weber, Economy and society: an outline of interpretative sociology (University of California Press 1978) 
213 
21
 M Weber, The theory of social and economic organization (Free Press New York 1964), translated [from the 
German] by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons. 
22
 Ibid. 
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ascribed to an order by those acting subject to it ... because it has been established in a manner 
which is recognised to be legal”.23 Legality of the EU, as expressed through the ratification of the 
treaties by Member States, is an important component of its sociological legitimacy, but some 
acceptance of the daily, supranational authority of the EU institutions is also a necessary component 
of EU legitimacy.24 There are strong criticisms of the EU in terms of its legitimacy, particularly in 
relation to its normative democratic basis, but it has persisted as a political entity that exerts some 
authority and, to a degree, remains accepted, consented to, and therefore maintains a degree of 
sociological legitimacy. As Warleigh stated, “It is also necessary to bear in mind that for most citizens 
a degree of acceptance of the Union’s existence appears to have persisted despite the perception of 
the democratic [legitimacy] deficit”.25  
One difficulty in relation to the EU is that the distinction between acceptance of an establishing 
authority and acceptance of a daily authority does not fit easily within Weber’s statist view of 
legitimacy, where the focus of legitimisation is ‘an order’; in other words, a single state entity that is 
the focus of both establishing and daily legitimisation and which brings clarity in terms of hierarchy 
and competence.26 The EU, however, is not ‘an order’ in the singular, in that sense, but a dual polity 
that combines supranational institutions and Member State institutions in the exercise of its 
authority, with differentiated routes of legitimisation for the constitutional framework and for the 
daily policy and legislative decision-making. The entity of the state as a continued focus for the 
discussion of sociological legitimisation and the EU’s lack of statehood therefore have an impact on 
the acceptance of EU authority and on strategies to resolve any EU legitimacy deficit.27 Without EU 
statehood any imposition from its institutions can appear as coming from ‘outside’, which usually 
means authority is less likely to be accepted than imposition from well established ‘internal’ 
authorities. As a result, there have been developments to resolve EU legitimacy deficits and to ‘bring 
EU citizens closer to the Union’ at EU level, with the ECI one of the latest examples. More recently 
there have been developments at Member State level, such as the increased use of state level 
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 Ibid 130. 
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 For discussion of the importance of legality in relation to the indirect, Member State based aspects of EU 
legitimacy see for example D Beetham and C Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Longman 1998) 11-16. 
25
 A Warleigh, Democracy and the European Union: theory, practice and reform (Sage 2003) 5. 
26
 M Weber, The theory of social and economic organization (Free Press New York 1964), translated [from the 
German] by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons 329-333. 
27
 J Weiler, ‘Does Europe need a constitution? Reflections on demos, telos and the German Maastricht 
decision’ [1995] ELJ 219. 
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referenda to legitimise EU treaty ratification, which recognise the need for EU legitimacy to be 
strengthened at Member State level as well.28 
If the ECI and the EUA are to increase the sociological legitimacy of the EU it will be through their 
potential to increase political legitimacy, particularly democratic legitimacy. The importance of 
democracy to the EU Member States means that the greater the democratic potential of these 
instruments, the more likely their implementation will increase sociological legitimacy. There is no 
guarantee, however, that this would be the case as other factors, such as the performance success 
of the EU or its lack of clear political identity, may offset any gains in democratic legitimacy; or 
indeed democracy may not be the major reason for EU legitimacy deficits. The theoretical 
framework provided here recognises the existence of the other criteria of political legitimacy, 
particularly to the degree they challenge EU democracy, but the link between the normative impact 
of the ECI and EUA and acceptance of EU authority is a complex question that will need to be the 
subject of research elsewhere. This thesis focuses on the prior question of the potential of the ECI 
and EUA to influence the EU’s democratic legitimacy and therefore political legitimacy; irrespective 
of whether this does actually lead to an increase in the empirical legitimacy of the EU. We turn next, 
therefore, to the definition of political, normative legitimacy. 
Political legitimacy 
Political legitimacy is distinct from sociological legitimacy in that it provides a standard that the 
legitimacy of the EU can be assessed against. G de Búrca, for example, succinctly summarises this 
distinction: “legitimacy has both a social aspect, in terms of being rooted in popular consent, and a 
normative aspect, in terms of the underlying values on which such consent is based”.29 Several forms 
of political legitimacy have been tried or proposed over the centuries, such as Monarchy, Marxism, 
Communism and Theocracy, but European Member States have broadly settled for what is 
commonly described as liberal democratic legitimacy as the normative basis for their societies.30 This 
is therefore the basis from which to develop an understanding of political legitimacy for the purpose 
of analysing the ECI and EUA potential to enhance EU democratic legitimacy.  
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 For a recent analysis of the increasing use of referenda in relation to the EU see F Mendez, M Mendez, V 
Triga, Referendums and the European Union: a comparative enquiry (CUP 2014). 
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 G de Búrca, ‘The Quest for Legitimacy in the EU’ [1996] MLR 59 349. For other approaches to the distinction 
between sociological and political legitimacy see Weiler’s use of formal and social which focuses on system 
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Press 1992) 11; and Arnull’s approach to this distinction in A Arnull and D Wincott (eds), Accountability and 
legitimacy in the EU (OUP 2002). 
30
 For discussion of legitimacy from the perspective of the liberal democratic tradition in European states see D 
Beetham and C Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Longman 1998).  
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Beetham and Lord provide a well recognised three part definition of political legitimacy that includes 
legality, which in the liberal democratic states of the EU is met through the constitutional rule of 
law; normative justifiability; and legitimation, which is met through electoral authorisation.31 Within 
this definition of political legitimacy, Beetham and Lord summarise the normative justifiability 
criteria that need to be met for liberal democratic legitimacy as performance, democracy and 
identity.32 The ECI and EUA are directly applicable to the criterion of democracy, but the three 
criteria interact and influence each other and it is important not to view democracy as the only 
legitimating factor for a polity. When analysing the democratic deficit debate, Joseph Weiler stated 
that “[There is] a loose usage of the notions of democracy and legitimacy. Very frequently in 
discourse about the Parliament and the Community the concepts of democracy and legitimacy have 
been presented interchangeably although in fact they do not necessarily coincide.”33 To avoid this 
loose interchange of concepts between political legitimacy and democracy, which is just one of its 
component parts, this chapter therefore includes some preliminary comments on the criteria of 
performance and identity before moving on to a more detailed consideration of democracy in the 
second half of this chapter. 
The “general or abstract framework” provided by Beetham and Lord for assessing the legitimacy of a 
political authority is intended as “a universal one; its specific form is variable according to the 
historical period, the society in question and the form of political system in question”.34 As the role 
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 D Beetham and C Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Longman 1998) 3-11; Warleigh also uses this “famous” 
definition of political legitimacy in A Warleigh, Democracy and the European Union: theory, practice and 
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of a political authority changes, therefore, its political legitimacy will also need to evolve within this 
definition of political legitimacy, if it is to avoid losing sociological legitimacy.35 The EU has evolved 
from a form of political legitimacy derived predominantly from the performance of the EU and the 
so called ‘permissive consensus’,36 to a duality that includes a stronger form of direct supranational 
legitimisation of EU policy and legislation to complement the legitimisation already derived via the 
Member States. This evolution, for example through the development of the role of the European 
Parliament, has not avoided persistent criticisms of its political legitimacy, which have focussed 
particularly, although not only, on the democratic deficit.37 The EU search for an institutional 
framework that addresses the political legitimacy dilemmas posed by the EU has been incremental 
and was described by Horath as “a ‘down to earth’ and pragmatic piecemeal approach in the 
tradition of Karl Popper”.38 He continues, “Reform policies should be formulated in small, clearly 
stated stages so that their premises can be scrutinised and their implications are transparent”.39 An 
incremental, evolutionary approach is perhaps the most appropriate for a novel constitutional 
environment, such as the EU, because there is no obvious blueprint that can be transposed to the 
European level.40  
The introduction of the ECI and the EUA are the latest small stages in EU development that are part 
of the evolving strategy to address problems with the normative justification of the EU, through 
influencing its democratic legitimacy. Having outlined a broad understanding of political legitimacy, 
the rest of the chapter addresses the three normative criteria for political legitimacy of identity, 
performance, and democracy. The next section will examine the criterion of identity primarily to 
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establish that the issues that have been raised in relation to the European demos and identity as an 
aspect of political legitimacy do not preclude democracy at the EU level. 
Identity based political legitimacy 
In many ways the identity criteria for political legitimacy is the most problematic for the EU and its 
clearest expression of difference from its Member States.41 Identity may be problematic in terms of 
EU legitimacy, but it is necessary for its political legitimacy.42 The issue for the purpose of this thesis 
is limited to whether the current issues with demos and identity in the EU preclude the possibility of 
EU level democratic legitimacy.43 I argue in this section that despite the weakness of the nascent 
identification of citizens with the EU polity, supranational democracy is still possible in the EU. This 
focussed comment is related to, but does not enter in to a wide ranging political science debate 
about the relative strength of an EU demos and citizen identification with it, and whether and how it 
might develop in the future.44 The broader questions about political identity are eschewed here in 
favour of comment focussed on identity legitimacy at the present time that specifically supports the 
later legal analysis of the ECI and EUA. 
Identification with some form of EU demos is needed because if citizens feel no common bond with 
other EU citizens at all then they are unlikely to participate in its legitimisation through methods 
such as voting in elections or supporting instruments such as the ECI. Beetham and Lord summarise 
why identity is important for political legitimacy as follows: “people might claim that governance is 
not rightful ... [if] decisions have been taken by a collectivity that has no right to expect their 
cooperation”.45 Having no European demos could lead the EU to be viewed as ‘other’ and to 
therefore have no right to expect cooperation from its citizens or be viewed as politically legitimate 
in liberal democratic terms. A sense of otherness could have many sources that lead to feeling no 
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identification with the EU and no engagement with its attempts to increase democratic legitimacy, 
such as a lack of an external ‘other’ for EU citizens to bond against, or because of the need to 
recognise a common bond with citizens that were previously ‘other’ in nation state terms. Some 
identification with the EU and a sense that it is not a fully external, imposed authority is therefore 
needed for it to meet the liberal democratic normative requirements of political legitimacy, and 
some form of EU demos needs to exist to support this identification.  
Instead of a common bond at EU level and some form of EU demos, intergovernmentalists might 
argue that there is sufficient identity legitimacy ‘borrowed’ from the Member States, which is a 
stronger source of this aspect of normative political legitimacy for citizens.46 It is likely that the dual 
EU polity does continue to benefit from the identification of citizens with the nation state for the 
implementation of EU laws at Member State level, but to accept the Member State level as the only 
source of identity based political legitimacy is to accept the EU as only an intergovernmental 
organisation. Instead, the EU is a dual polity that combines supranational and Member State 
institutions in the exercise of its political authority, with a degree of autonomy that requires political 
legitimisation at both supranational and Member State level.47 If this duality is accepted, then the 
political legitimacy of the current EU polity needs some degree of identity legitimacy at EU level to 
be normatively justified.48 
We next ask how such an identity can exist at an EU level that does not have a single, identifiable 
demos or the ‘volkish’ type national loyalties that might provide such an identity.49 No strong claim is 
made here for the existence of this type of identity legitimacy, rather it is claimed that the 
significance of its absence does not have a decisive impact on the overall political legitimacy of the 
EU. Such thick, ‘volkish’ forms of identity, which are now associated closely with the nation state and 
lead to criticism of EU legitimacy, did not exist to the same extent at the formation of the Member 
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States either.50 They are identities that developed over a long period of time; as Weiler put it, “these 
mutations are epochal not generational”.51 Although the EU clearly falls short of the standard of 
identity based political legitimacy that is apparent in the well established polities of the Member 
States, the more appropriate standard is to consider the EU in light of the identity legitimacy of 
Member States in the early years of their formation, rather than by today’s standards.52 
Moreover, the Member States are evidence that the lack of a ‘thick’ identity at the formation of a 
state does not preclude this ‘natural’ national or ethnic basis for identity from developing over time, 
if it turns out to be necessary for the EU. It may even be possible to construct identity over time 
through conscious decisions about issues such as language, political borders, currency and repeated 
political engagement by citizens as a single body; all issues that influence citizen identification with 
the EU today.53 As Weiler states, at certain critical transition points identity has a high “degree of 
artificiality, of social constructionism and even social engineering” and identity can be formed as “a 
conscious decision and not only be a reflection of an already pre-existing consciousness”.54 For these 
reasons the EU does not necessarily need to wait for the development of a ‘thick’, ‘volkish’ form of 
identity based legitimacy before attempting to develop the normative justification of its political 
legitimacy, such as through the introduction of new democratic instruments such as the ECI and EUA 
referenda. 
Citizens are not currently being asked to replace their Member State identity with an EU one, but to 
accept a new layer of identity, particularly in terms of their civic, political life, that complements the 
layer(s) of their Member State identity.55 In terms of identity, all the member states combine a 
national aspect and a political, state aspect for their citizens.56 A number of the EU member states, 
such as UK, Belgium and Spain, already contain multiple national identities, which inherently implies 
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a distinction between nation and state identity.57 This distinction though is not always strongly made 
and at the other extreme there are Member States, such as Germany, that have a very close 
alignment between nation and state identity.58 This does not stop German citizens, however, from 
being amongst the strongest supporters of the EU. As well as the multiple national identities in 
Member States, there are also multiple levels of political identity for citizens and multiple sources of 
political authority that they legitimise, with many living in federal states or regions with strong 
devolved powers, at the same time as local and national governmental powers. Hence, the 
experience of citizens at Member State level would seem to imply that the presence of an existing 
form of national or political identity does not necessarily preclude another form or level of identity 
at EU level. 
A ‘thinner’ form of identity has been offered as an alternative to the ‘thick’ ethno cultural identity 
that results from a community of citizens feeling that they are part of a single political community 
because it broadly reflects their values.59 One well known proposal for this alternative type of civic, 
values based identity to support democratic legitimisation is Habermas’ ‘constitutional patriotism’.60 
Constitutional patriotism is the attachment to and identification with a political or legal authority as 
a result of engagement with this polity, for example through democratic or civil society interaction, 
based on generalised acceptance of the relevant constitution.61 As long as citizens sign up to the 
democratic framework, feel linked to other citizens as part of the democratic process and press for 
control over government, and that this democratic citizenship is believed to deliver the essential 
framework and results citizens want for society, then constitutional patriotism means that support 
from a thicker form of identity is not necessarily required.62 There are aspects of this approach 
already existing in Member States where civic attachment to values of the state, such as tolerance, is 
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a strong part of the nation state identity. Habermas goes as far as to say that “all of us live in 
pluralist societies that are moving further and further away from the format of a nation state based 
on a culturally more or less homogeneous population. ... Except for policies of ethnic cleansing, 
there is no alternative to this route towards multicultural societies”.63 If this is correct, it means that 
statehood is already increasingly based on civic or political values rather than cultural ones, such as 
language. Citizenship and belonging to a political authority other than the one you are born in is 
therefore a well recognised concept, but the idea of EU level identity legitimacy only based on 
‘constitutional patriotism’ is still problematic for a number of reasons; some of which are briefly 
touched on in the following paragraphs. 
First, ‘constitutional patriotism’ does not seem to fit with the reality of the institutional structure of 
the EU, which is based on a combination of Member State and EU level control of political decision 
making. Constitutional patriotism is strongly linked to a federal concept of the EU, which is not the 
present political structure of the EU. As Warleigh said, “any European demos would require the 
continued existence of the more organic (if still at least partially invented) cultures of the Member 
States to give it the requisite resonance with citizens”.64 It is likely therefore that the political duality 
of the EU will remain for the foreseeable future and reduce the applicability of an approach to EU 
level identity that focuses predominantly on an idea of a federal EU. Secondly, this type of identity 
may be just as difficult to construct, or take just as long to develop, as a more cultural identity. The 
rejection of the European Constitution, which would have provided one of the hallmarks of a single 
constitutional identity, is perhaps one example of how difficult this type of constitutional identity is 
to form through deliberate action. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty did not stop democratic 
changes being made in the EU or opportunities being created for identity to form, but it has 
probably slowed progress towards a single EU identity formed around its values and laws, if this 
were ever to occur. Thirdly, it seems unlikely, or at least a remote possibility, that citizens in Europe 
will entirely abandon their existing sense of ethno cultural identity associated with the polities they 
legitimise for identification with a constitutional framework for democratic citizenship. Even at EU 
level the Eurobarometer surveys seem to indicate that a feeling of community with other citizens 
appears to be based on common culture and history more strongly than it is on values and laws.65  
These criticisms of constitutional patriotism, however, do not preclude the possibility of an EU level 
sense of identity that might have some civic, values based aspects within it. Instead the comments 
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are intended to reinforce the position in this thesis that the duality of EU legitimacy is likely to 
persist; one that contains citizen identification with the EU and also probably a stronger, more 
‘volkish’ identification with their Member State. Constitutional patriotism may be problematic, but 
developing some form of civic values based identity at EU level to complement that which is present 
at Member State level could still be important. Weiler indicates the potential benefits of this dual 
legitimisation route as follows: “Maybe the national in-reaching ethno-cultural demos and the out-
reaching supranational civic demos, by continuously keeping each other in check, offer a model of 
critical citizenship”.66 For the argument that is developed in this thesis, the most that needs to be 
claimed in terms of a thinner, civic, values-based EU identity is that it appears to be sufficient to 
allow the possibility of EU level, supranational democracy. 
The Eurobarometer surveys also provide some empirical support for the claim that a civic based 
identity is possible at EU level; at least to a degree sufficient for citizens to engage democratically at 
EU level and to complement their existing Member State identity. The acceptance of a European 
identity may be novel in that it is decoupled from the idea of a nation state, but there is evidence 
that, as of Spring 2014, over 50% of citizens already identified themselves as both a Member State 
national and a European.67 Further support for the claim that some form of EU level political identity 
exists came in 2014 from the fact that although EU citizens tend to see themselves as Member State 
citizens first, 65% of them also class themselves as European citizens, which reverses the decline of 
this measure since the financial crisis.68 Given that there is this level of identification with the EU 
based on both cultural and civic aspects of political identity at EU level, the conclusion here is that 
there is a degree of EU level identity that provides at least a sufficient level of normative justification 
for there to be EU level democracy in the dual EU polity. 
The novelty of the challenge for the EU is to establish sufficient identity-based, normative political 
legitimacy without itself being either a state or a nation. Formation of states, such as the UK, made 
possible what Habermas describes as “a new, more abstract form of social integration beyond the 
borders of ancestry and dialect”.69 The EU is now asking citizens to accept a further deliberate step 
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in this process to identify with the EU as a single political community that shares their values, despite 
its absence of state or nation hood, and to accept the democratic links with citizens of other 
Member States and to work together to control government. Habermas states: “Today we are faced 
with the task of carrying on this process with a further abstractive step ... of democratic will 
formation that can cross national borders”.70  If the EU is to be successful in this, it is not necessary 
to be able to claim a European demos in the thick identity sense or replace the Member State level 
identity, but the EU does need an acceptable level of identity on which to base its democratic 
legitimisation, perhaps through a combination of a civic, political identity at EU level and a more 
volkish, national identity at Member State level. This is not to claim a high level of normative identity 
legitimacy for the EU, there are clear weaknesses in this aspect of its political legitimacy, particularly 
when compared to the Member States, but it is claimed that the levels of EU identity are sufficient 
to not “preclude the Union from developing a sufficient, if novel, sense of demos”,71 or from striving 
for further normative justification of EU political legitimacy through democracy. It is possible that 
democratic instruments such as the ECI and EUA may help generate a sense of EU political 
community that contributes to a form of EU level identity for its citizens.  
The next section examines the second criteria of liberal democratic legitimacy, ‘performance’, 
arguing that it is no longer sufficient for EU legitimacy and that efforts need to be made to strive for 
strengthened supranational democratic legitimacy. 
Performance based political legitimacy 
Originally, the EU policy areas in which performance was expected to produce benefits were, 
broadly speaking, prosperity and peace.72 Normative justification was largely based on these 
performance criteria and on legality through ratification of the treaties. Democracy was limited to 
indirect legitimisation via Member State institutions. This situation was generally considered to be 
sufficient normative justification for EU political legitimacy: “As long as the Community succeeded in 
solving the limited problems in those few policy sectors which required European solutions, the 
integration process raised no legitimacy problems”.73 Supranational democracy was not yet believed 
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to be required and it was thought that EU political legitimacy would develop incrementally.74 This 
neofunctionalist integration approach, which relied on ‘spill over’ between policy areas to enhance 
EU legitimacy has its roots in the foundation of the Community itself and the technocratic vision of 
its early founders, such as Monnet, of a gradual elite-led development of the Community.75 The 
introduction in 1979 of the European Parliament, which has become a supranational institution of 
representative democracy, was a fundamental, if at the time largely symbolic, break from this 
approach to legitimising the EU, and recognised that meeting the performance criteria of political 
legitimacy and the neo-functionalist approach to EU development was no longer enough. This 
section comments on and criticises the arguments that have been made for a performance based, 
technocratic approach to governance at EU level, arguing that strengthened supranational 
democracy is also necessary. 
The leading advocate for a technocratic approach to EU governance during the 1990s and early 
2000s was Majone, who argued that the EU is a regulatory state that requires expertise and 
technical administrative cooperation to produce ‘pareto optimal’ outcomes for citizens.76 Majone 
argued that the focus should be on providing better performance inputs, and efficient and effective 
outcomes and that this is where the legitimacy deficit of the EU lies, not in a democracy deficit. 
According to his view, increasing supranational opportunity for democratic engagement will not help 
improve the outputs of the EU, or improve legitimacy as a result. The main legitimising focus should 
be on the supranational mechanisms that are designed to provide effective output. In fact, he 
argued, increasing democracy may actually lead to worse outcomes for European citizens as the 
impact on efficiency and reduction in expert control of policy decisions will lead to a reduced 
likelihood of ‘optimal’ decision making for European citizens. The outputs of liberal democratic 
legitimacy, however, do not seek to be ‘optimal’ in this sense, they seek to align outputs instead 
with the wishes of the electorate and as such rely on popular sovereignty. Majone though believed 
that, “the notions of popular sovereignty and popular representation, and hence the idea of direct 
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democratic legitimation, are highly problematic, ... the only concrete form of [democratic] legitimacy 
available to the European institutions today is indirect”.77 Majone was therefore proposing that the 
EU level political legitimacy should rely predominantly on the criterion of performance for its 
normative justification and have a technocratic form of governance. 
There may have been justification for emphasising supranational performance legitimacy in the early 
days of the EU when more limited policy goals were being achieved and political support rested on a 
‘permissive consensus’.78 Since then, however, each treaty has introduced significant policy changes 
that have broadened the areas of EU competence and increased the EU’s influence on the lives of its 
(Member State) citizens, in areas such as crime, foreign policy, and trade regulation.79 The EU may 
not be a fully fledged state, but it has taken on many of the traditional functions of the state. The 
more that the EU takes on the traditional functions of a liberal democratic state, the greater the 
need, broadly speaking, to meet the legitimacy criteria of the states these functions have moved 
from, which includes democracy.80 More recently, Majone, himself, has recognised that an 
increasing level of politicization of EU policymaking becomes unavoidable as more and more tasks 
involving the use of political discretion are shifted to the European level, and also that the EU is no 
longer just a regulatory state; describing, for example how the recent economic crisis of the EU has 
highlighted the democratic deficit and the need for democratic reform.81 
The further the EU goes beyond being a regulatory state, the greater the influence over the lives of 
citizens and the more traditional functions of a state that it takes on, the more likely it is for an EU 
polity based on performance to be normatively insufficient, in liberal democratic terms.82 Moreover, 
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the ongoing economic crisis since 2007 is testing the belief in the positivity of the EU’s outcomes,83 
and it is during these times of crisis that stronger normative justification for political legitimacy, 
beyond its performance, is likely to be required to sustain a political system and its decision making 
institutions.84 The ‘public regarding nature’ of EU policy and institutions cannot be guaranteed by a 
technocratic approach to EU governance that provides little opportunity for alignment of policies 
with citizen preferences, or for policies to be tested against public opinion. The EU institutions taking 
these policy and legislative decisions are permanent public bodies that act as a form of governing 
executive with influence over the lives of European citizens and as Armin Von Bogdandy succinctly 
stated in relation to the EU, “the exercise of any public authority begs the question of its democratic 
justification”.85 Democracy is therefore necessary at EU level as part of its political legitimacy, and 
just relying on performance is not sufficient. 
The argument for technocratic governance based on effective specialist performance as an 
alternative to democratic legitimacy is not a new one. As Dahl said, “The claim that government 
should be turned over to experts deeply committed to rule for the general good and superior to 
others in their knowledge of the means to achieve it – Guardians Plato called them – has always 
been the major rival to democratic ideas”.86 Although expertise is needed, it is not enough to govern 
a political system and expertise should not be viewed as a superior alternative to public opinion but 
as a complement. “An old adage has it, experts should be kept on tap, not on top ... it is one thing for 
government officials to seek the aid of experts; but it is quite another for a political elite to possess 
the power to decide on the laws and policies you will be compelled to obey”.87 In other words expert 
guidance should inform the decision-making not make the decision itself; democratic and 
performance legitimacy should complement each other not work in isolation. In considering 
technocracy from a wider legitimacy perspective Beetham and Lord put it even more strongly: “it 
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should be evident that technocracy [is not] an independent alternative to a democratic legitimacy, 
on which it remains parasitic ... Even as a temporary expedient technocratic forms of rule suffer 
from the characteristic delusion that the decision makers ‘know best’, that their decisions are merely 
technical or instrumental, and that they can be assumed to be benevolent agents of the public 
good”.88 Once it is accepted that political legitimisation of the EU through performance is not 
sufficient, and technocratic governance is inappropriate, the question becomes how to introduce 
and develop supranational democratic tools for the dual EU polity at both Member State and EU 
level.  
Performance criteria need to be met in all polities for their political legitimacy to be accepted, but 
democracy is the fundamental basis for political legitimacy in all Member States, and the experience 
of the last decades is that even with the success of its outcomes relatively high,89 the EU is failing to 
attract the support of the general public and a much stronger input of democratic legitimacy than in 
its formative decades is needed to complement any performance based, output legitimacy.90 ECIs 
and referenda are democratic supplements to the legitimisation process that influence the degree of 
popular sovereignty. As such they have little direct impact on either the performance input of 
expertise and efficient decision-making or on the outputs of decision optimisation and outcome 
targets. In many respects they are the other side of the balance, adding weight to participation 
rather than efficiency. The purpose of this section has been only to justify one of the assumptions 
this work rests on that excessive reliance on the performance criterion for political legitimacy in the 
EU is outmoded at best, and a form of technocratic governance is not appropriate for a decision 
making polity, such as the EU.91 The second half of this chapter turns to the third criterion of 
normative justifiability for liberal democratic political legitimacy, democracy, which is the core of the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. This section of the chapter provides a definition of democracy, 
a justification of why democracy is needed at EU level, a typology and concludes with a description 
of the democratic paradigm of the EU, which builds on the two dichotomies outlined at the start of 
this chapter. 
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European Union democratic legitimacy 
Democracy is the preeminent normative criteria for the political legitimacy of the liberal 
democracies of the EU Member States, to such an extent that it is almost synonymous with 
legitimacy. Its importance is reflected in the EU Treaties, where it is a founding value of the Union 
and also required of all states that want to be members of the Union.92 The growth of democracy 
across the world political landscape over the last 100 years has had a dramatic impact on political 
legitimacy. As Dahl said, “Today, the idea of democracy is universally popular. Most regimes stake 
out some sort of claim to the title of “democracy”...even dictators appear to believe that an 
indispensable ingredient for their legitimacy is a dash or two of the language of democracy”.93 The 
EU is no different in wanting to be considered as democratically legitimate and a highly significant 
part of the contestation about its political existence focuses on its democracy, or more commonly on 
the deficits of its democracy.94 The subsequent chapters enter this arena through a legal analysis of 
new democratic instruments in the EU polity. To prepare for the analysis of the ECI and EUA, this 
chapter examines the democratic criteria of political legitimacy in more detail than the previous 
criteria of identity and performance. 
An institutional rather than a behavioural approach to democracy is taken in this thesis.95 Broadly 
speaking the institutional approach to democracy will tend towards an analysis of the legal and 
constitutional rules that govern democracy, and the institutional framework that enables democracy 
to be the basis for the political system.96 Political scientists on the other hand will tend towards an 
analysis of democracy that considers more strongly the behavioural patterns that influence and are 
influenced by the institutional choices made within a constitution.97 The distinction between the two 
approaches is one of degree rather than polarisation and the subject area of this work is one that 
inevitably requires an awareness of both political science and legal studies. The focus, though, of the 
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discussion of democracy in this chapter and the analysis of the ECI and referenda of the EUA in 
subsequent chapters takes a predominantly institutional, legalistic approach. 
The first section of this chapter provides an outline of the definition of democracy and sets out the 
three democratic criteria that are used in this thesis to analyse the democratic potential of the ECI 
and EUA referenda.98 The second part of the chapter puts forward a positive case for striving for 
democratic legitimacy at the supranational, EU level to complement the argument in the previous 
section that performance is not sufficient on its own. The third part of the chapter then considers 
the interaction between the representative and direct institutional forms of democracy, and sets out 
a typology of the forms of government that combine them. The final section of the chapter describes 
the specific democratic provisions of the EU and provides a characterisation of the EU’s democratic 
paradigm that is used in the subsequent analysis of the ECI and EUA. 
Democratic criteria for ECI and EUA analysis 
The fundamental normative principles underpinning liberal democracy are popular sovereignty and 
political equality; in other words the belief that the only valid source of political authority is the 
people and each citizen should have an equal influence on this authority.99 David Beetham gives a 
typical basic starting point for describing democracy that includes these two principles: “Democracy 
can be most simply understood as a procedure for taking decisions in any group, association or 
society, whereby all members have an equal right to have a say and to make their opinions 
count”.100 Within this broad conception of democracy there is little consensus as to what the precise 
definition of democracy should be and wide recognition of the difficulties in trying to provide one; 
for example Amaryllis Verhoeven: “democracy is a highly elusive concept. Democracy means 
different things to different people”;101 or James Hyland who, having summarised various meanings 
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of democracy,102 concluded that “to identify a single precise and determinate meaning of 
‘democracy’ is fundamentally mistaken”.103 
Hyland goes on to argue that democracy should be approached as a term that indicates similarities 
in characteristics rather than a single precise meaning.104 This is the approach taken here for the 
purposes of analysing the ECI and EUA. Robert Dahl provides a classic list of such characteristics, 
which he selected, “from within the enormous and often impenetrable thicket of ideas about 
democracy”: effective participation, voting equality, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising 
final control over the agenda, and inclusion of adults.105 These characteristics are the democratic 
attributes that need to be in place for the members of a political system to be politically equal in 
determining the policies of the association.106 Generally these are discussed by Dahl within the 
context of a form of representative democracy, which he describes as polyarchy, but he leaves open 
the question of whether representative democracy is sufficient on its own and recognises its 
potential downside.107 Dahl’s criteria are modified here for the purposes of a legal assessment of the 
principal democratic attributes of the ECI and the EUA referenda of broadening citizen participation 
and increasing citizen influence over the decisions taken by political authorities, and which focus, 
therefore, on just two of Dahl’s criteria: ‘effective participation’ and ‘exercising final control over the 
agenda’.108 
The first modified criterion used in this thesis is an ‘effective participative opportunity’. This needs to 
be met for an instrument of direct democracy to be able to offer a useable alternative and 
supplement to other political processes. This criterion covers Dahl’s criteria of ‘effective 
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participation’, and to a limited degree includes aspects of two of Dahl’s other criteria, voting equality 
and adult inclusion; at least to the extent that inequality and exclusion might result from the specific 
provisions in the ECI and EUA legislation. This criterion of ‘effective participation’ would be fully met 
when citizens have an equal opportunity to engage with policy and when any practical barriers have 
been minimised, fairly applied, and do not preclude the possibility of the other democratic criteria 
from being met. The wider reasons that this criterion might not be met, such as an unequal 
availability of information, educational inequality, or lack of capacity,109 are more appropriate for a 
political science analysis and the legislative design of the ECI or the EUA referenda have little impact 
on them. As a result comment on effective participation is limited to specific issues that have 
occurred as a result of the legislation, such as the ECI identification requirements that exclude some 
EU citizens, technological requirements written in to the legislation that are prohibitively expensive 
or complex, or referenda topics that are unlikely to add to citizen participation because of their low 
public salience. 
The second of Dahl’s criterion that is modified for use in this thesis, ‘citizens exercising final control 
over the political agenda’, is defined by Dahl as follows: “The members must have the exclusive 
opportunity to decide how and, if they choose, what matters are to be placed on the agenda ... The 
policies of the association are always open to change by the members, if they so choose”.110 The first 
part of this definition of an exclusive opportunity for citizens to decide agenda items would only be 
possible in a polity based on just direct democracy. However, a radical position of completely 
replacing the indirect participation in the policy agenda through representative democracy with full 
direct democracy is little supported today, and direct democracy is generally viewed as a 
complementary rather than substitute mechanism for representative democracy.111 Even Marx’s 
political structure of the commune, which he intended as a replacement for ‘undemocratic’ 
representative institutions, could not completely avoid the use of representatives in some form.112 
As David Held put it, “Centralised state institutions ... must be viewed as necessary for enacting 
legislation, enforcing rights, promulgating new policies and containing inevitable conflicts between 
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particular interests. Representative electoral institutions, including parliament and the competitive 
party system are an inescapable element for authorising and co-ordinating these activities”.113 In a 
largely representational form of democracy supplemented to a limited degree by direct democracy, 
as we have in the EU, it is suggested therefore that it is more appropriate to talk of citizen influence 
over the political agenda rather than control.114  
Although, exclusive citizen control over the political agenda is impractical because of the need for 
representative democracy, the capacity for citizen influence over the issues that are deliberated as 
part of the political agenda remains a key indicator of democratic potential. The greater the degree, 
therefore, to which citizens influence what items go on the agenda the stronger the expression of 
popular sovereignty and the higher the democratic standard of the instrument that enables this; and 
conversely the more strongly mediated a democratic instrument is, and the greater the restrictions 
on the issues that citizens are able to place on the political agenda, the weaker the instrument’s 
democratic potential will be to enhance popular sovereignty. ‘Citizen agenda influence’ is therefore 
the second of the democratic criteria against which the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA are 
assessed.  
Influence over the agenda content is important because of the impact it has on the prioritisation of 
policy debate, but if there is no obligation subsequently imposed, legally or politically, on institutions 
that would increase the chance of an outcome that is guided by citizen preference, then the 
democratic potential of the instrument is heavily restricted, and the policies will not be open to 
change. At its extreme, citizen policy preferences that are expressed through direct democracy 
might be ignored or only ever have a tangible impact when the institutions involved in the process 
decide that they align with existing policy preferences. If this happens, then there has been almost 
no democratic impact from introducing a new instrument of direct democracy, aside perhaps from 
some deliberative democratic benefits from the public debate generated.115 The inverse is that the 
greater the likelihood and the frequency of outcomes as a result of citizen participation, the greater 
the democratic potential of the instrument of direct democracy.116 Dahl’s second criterion of 
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‘exercising final control’ is therefore expanded and split into two criteria for the purposes of this 
thesis: the second criterion of ‘citizen agenda influence’ already outlined above and the third 
criterion in this thesis of ‘citizen outcome influence’.  
‘Effective participation’ is critical for both the ECI and the EUA referenda because these democratic 
instruments are introduced to widen citizen participation. If there are inequalities or practical 
barriers built in to the legislative design of any democratic instrument, the possibility of increased 
participation will be reduced. This criterion is the gateway to the other criteria that directly influence 
the extent to which popular sovereignty has been enhanced. Of these two subsequent criteria the 
ECI will be expected to have most impact on ‘citizen agenda influence’ because a citizens initiative 
allows citizens to make policy proposals that institutions may or may not implement, and the EUA 
referenda will be expected to have most impact on ‘citizen outcome influence’ because referenda 
usually provide an opportunity of a vote that binds institutions on a topic selected by these 
institutions. The three criteria of ‘effective participative opportunity’, ‘citizen agenda influence’, and 
‘citizen outcome influence’, which are used in this thesis as the three organising criteria for the 
assessment of the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA referenda, focus on the purpose of direct 
democracy as a participative opportunity to increase the extent that citizen preferences are 
reflected in policy and legislative decision-making, possibly at odds with existing institutional 
preferences.  
One of the central themes in this thesis and a key factor that influences the potential of the ECI and 
EUA to meet the three democratic criteria outlined above is the extent of institutional mediation, 
which is reflected in the ability of citizens to challenge existing policy preferences. Institutions are 
able to control the extent that influence is passed to citizens over agenda content and its outcomes 
through their influence on the drafting of the legislation implementing an instrument of direct 
democracy and through their interpretation of this legislation once enacted. A democratic 
instrument that gives citizens a participative opportunity to engage with and influence the existing 
policy agenda is far weaker in democratic terms than an instrument that gives citizens an 
opportunity to challenge established policy preferences. Blaug describes this distinction between 
mere agenda confirmation and agenda change as ‘incumbent’ and ‘critical’ democracy, 
respectively.117 Incumbent democracy sees democratic instruments supporting the policy 
preferences of the existing political institutions, whereas critical democracy facilitates citizen led 
change. The extent of institutional mediation and challenge to established policy preferences are 
therefore an important part of the later analysis of the ECI and EUA. 
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A final point before presenting the argument in favour of EU supranational democracy is that it is not 
intended as a call for EU competences to be increased or for further political integration. 
Strengthening the direct democratic legitimacy of the EU provides political legitimacy for the 
authority that the Member States choose to allocate to the EU institutions; irrespective of the final 
outcome of EU integration. The claim that the EU needs to develop its democratic legitimacy is 
intended to be a politically neutral position, neither Europhile nor Eurosceptic, separated as far as 
possible from the question of whether the EU is on a path to more or less federalism or 
intergovernmentalism. This neutrality with regard to the ultimate political future of the EU, 
however, is tempered by the presumption that a form of political engagement between the 
European Member States is probably beneficial in today’s global political and economic 
environment,118 and that in the medium term the EU is likely to remain as a constitutional order of 
states containing aspects of both an intergovernmental and a federal polity.119 It is difficult to detach 
the political question of EU integration completely from the normative question of EU democratic 
legitimacy; for example because weak political legitimacy makes it easier to criticise the EU and 
therefore those who defend the development of EU level democracy might be viewed as defending 
its existence, or because introducing new democratic instruments may be used to serve political 
objectives related to EU development. However, this present work is not concerned with the 
political debate about whether the EU should exist or not. The EU does exist as a polity and therefore 
it should be democratically legitimate. Whatever the assumed finality of the integration process, EU 
democracy needs to continue to be developed at both EU and Member State level to support its 
current political role.120 It is a justification of this claim of the need for supranational democracy that 
is put forward next. 
Justification of supranational democracy 
The justification of democracy and comment on its benefits may seem almost superfluous given that 
all EU Member States are democracies, of varying type and age, and they have accepted democracy 
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as a founding principle of the EU. However, as Weale points out, if democracy is the best we have 
then a reminder of its value ensures some protection against changes in political fashion and public 
disappointment in the system.121 This is not to say that one should seek to stop the development of 
democracy, we are certainly not at the end of history,122 but that the values on which its 
development proceeds in light of changing political systems and approaches to its 
institutionalisation should be properly assessed. It is from this perspective that the analysis of the 
potential of the ECI and EUA to influence the democratic legitimacy of the EU is carried out. 
Why should democratic legitimacy be the focus of the efforts to legitimise the EU polity? After all, 
democracy has been shown to be far from a perfect form of government and support for democracy 
is often only based on the premise that it is merely a lesser evil than the alternatives, as famously 
expressed by Churchill: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other 
forms that have been tried from time to time".123 Dahl too recognises the shortcomings of 
democracy: “in practice democracy has fallen far short of its ideals. Like all previous attempts to 
achieve a more democratic government, modern democracies also suffer from many defects.”124 
However, Dahl goes on to state that, “In spite of its many flaws ... we must never lose sight of the 
benefits that make democracy more beneficial than any feasible alternative to it”.125 These benefits 
of democracy, such as peace, prosperity and the avoidance of tyranny, are wide ranging and 
fundamental and have been sufficient for it to persist as the preeminent normative criteria for 
political legitimacy, despite criticisms and difficulties.126  
Within these general benefits of democracy, there are a number of specific benefits that it is 
believed participatory democracy will achieve through increased democratic participation and self 
government of citizens, which can be grouped in to educative and popular control/decision making 
categories.127 The inherent benefits of participation, particularly its potential to increase political 
understanding and awareness of citizens, have long underpinned participatory democracy. Smith 
sums up the attitudes of participatory democrats in relation to this function: “Participation is a 
beneficial activity in its own right, increasing citizens’ political efficacy and understanding of their 
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own interests and political responsibilities”.128 Beetham gives a typical summary of the common 
educative benefits: better informed citizens, knowledge and capacities of citizens harnessed, more 
sophisticated public debate considering factors such as the wider public interest when reaching a 
decision, and a virtuous circle of increased involvement resulting from the positive experience of 
participation.129 These educative benefits are more likely to be the subject of political science and 
therefore it is the decision-making benefits, which are more strongly influenced by the legislative 
design of a political instrument and discussed as part of the analysis of the ECI and EUA referenda.  
Schiller and Setala summarise the decision-making benefits as being “to enhance democratic 
empowerment and self government”, and that these are the principal benefits of direct 
democracy.130 There are varying ways in which these benefits through participation are described, 
which should increase citizen influence over the decision-making by those in power and keep them 
more in touch with citizen preferences.131 Smith summarises the decision-making benefits in the 
following way: “participation as the most effective defence against arbitrary power; the individual as 
the best judge of their own interests; ... increased legitimacy and trustworthiness of political 
decisions”.132 In short, it is believed that further democratic participation is essential for popular 
sovereignty. In the next two chapters the legal analysis of the ECI and EUA considers the potential to 
achieve, broadly speaking, these decision-making benefits through an assessment of the legislative 
design of these instruments based on the three democratic criteria outlined earlier in the chapter. 
Although there is wide acceptance of the need for a form of EU democracy in academic writing,133 
and the discussion is usually focussed on how rather than whether democracy should be 
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developed,134 there has also been considerable debate about the EU democratic deficit and doubts 
raised about whether EU level democracy is possible or beneficial.135 Dahl, for example, was 
unequivocal in his assessment of the chances of democracy in the EU: “the European Union offers 
telling evidence. There, such nominally democratic structures as popular elections and a parliament 
are formally in place. Yet virtually all observers agree that a gigantic democratic deficit remains ... 
Bargaining, hierarchy and markets determine the outcomes. Except to ratify the results, democratic 
processes hardly play a role.”136 Despite this damning indictment of the democratic credentials of 
the EU, Dahl recognises that democracy is an evolving concept, that “democracy can be 
independently invented and reinvented whenever the appropriate conditions exist”.137 Since Dahl 
made these comments 15 years ago, EU democracy has evolved and continues to evolve significantly 
at both supranational and Member State level; the European Parliament is now co-legislator and 
able to hold the Commission to account,138 direct democracy has been introduced through the 
ECI,139 referenda are more widely used to legitimise treaties, and the national parliaments have a 
strengthened role at EU level.140 These changes and the democratic provisions introduced in to the 
Treaties by the Lisbon Treaty are part of the ongoing reinvention of EU democracy and the 
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legitimisation of the EU, and have led to Meny stating that there is “quasiunanimity that Europe 
should be democratic”.141  
In a recent analysis of the application of democracy at transnational level, de G de Búrca offers 3 
groupings for the range of responses to the legitimacy problems of transnational governance; “the 
denial approach: the claim that there is no “democracy problem” ... the wishful thinking approach: 
the assumption that transnational governance is either sufficiently democratic or that it can readily 
be democratized;”142 and “the compensatory approach [that] encompasses the view that democracy 
cannot be transposed directly to the transnational level, and instead that other more partial ways of 
strengthening the legitimacy of transnational governance must be found.”143 De Búrca rejects the 
wishful thinking approach for being insufficiently realistic about the challenges that are faced when 
implementing democracy beyond the state, particularly the possibility of recreating a political 
community to replace the state. The legal analysis of direct democracy instruments in this thesis 
does not fit within the wishful thinking approach because the EU is characterised as a dual 
democratisation process, not a transfer of democracy from one polity to another, and that there are 
significant challenges to overcome, even though further democratic legitimacy is possible.  
The compensatory and denial approaches, broadly speaking, are rejected by De Búrca for being too 
negative about the possibility or need for democracy at the transnational level.144 De Búrca states 
that, “Compensatory approaches generally take the view that a democratic system of transnational 
governance is not feasible because democracy ... cannot work properly beyond a certain scale and 
size”, and that a defined demos is required for democratic legitimacy.145 These writers therefore 
seek to compensate for the lack of democracy at EU level with limited, albeit related, alternatives 
such as transparency. The issues relating to identity and the size of the EU are problematic for 
democratic legitimisation but they do not preclude EU level democratic legitimisation. Supranational 
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democratic instruments, such as the European Parliament are already used at the supranational 
level and, as will be seen in later chapters, the direct democratic participation is possible despite the 
size of the EU. Two of leading writers to deny the need for EU level democracy were Majone and 
Moravscik.146 Majone’s claim for a regulatory state was argued against in the previous section. In the 
following paragraphs Moravscik’s intergovernmentalist approach to EU democracy is argued as 
being insufficient for a polity such as the EU. 
As with Majone’s argument for no democracy at the EU level, the strength and type of political role 
played by the EU institutions is central to the intergovernmentalist argument.147 Moravscik 
characterises EU law and policy-making as relatively limited because it is only a small percentage of 
Member State law making, substantively insignificant because the EU does not ‘tax, spend, 
implement or coerce’, and because the EU has almost no influence over a wide range of the most 
important issues, such as taxation, health, education etc.148 However, he does recognise some 
exceptions to this characterisation of the role of EU institutions, which, it could be argued, are 
already enough to warrant supranational democratic legitimisation: for example, the degree of 
autonomy reflected in Moravscik’s estimated 10-20% of EU based law-making; and the salience of 
the policy agenda that the EU institutions are able to influence, such as the economic difficulties of 
the Eurozone, agricultural policy, and the balance between free trade and social rights. The political 
salience of EU issues have continued to increase in recent years and the influence of the EU 
institutions has strengthened, which has even been recognised by Moravscik himself.149  
Moravscik highlights the limited strength of EU institutional control over its own constitutional 
framework: ‘In sum, the EU is not simply unwilling to act in new areas that require coercive, fiscal or 
human resources; it is constitutionally unable to do so, even as a result of unintended 
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consequences’.150 As indicated by the dichotomies at the start of the chapter, the EU constitutional 
framework is strongly controlled by the Member States and legitimised, almost exclusively, through 
Member State institutions and democratic processes.151 However, as Moravscik himself recognises, 
“it is important not to go to the opposite extreme and argue that we need not worry about 
European integration because the EU is so weak”.152 This characterisation of an EU polity that is in 
the political middle ground of not having the powers of a federal state, but also not so weak as to 
only be an intergovernmental organisation is the position taken in this thesis. It is agreed that the 
daily authority of the EU should not be exaggerated and that the Member States strongly control the 
constitutional change, but the not inconsiderable political role for the supranational EU institutions 
in guiding and implementing EU policy do in fact retain aspects of a federal type state, which means 
that supranational democratic legitimacy is appropriate and necessary for the legislative and policy 
making role of the EU institutions, and that indirect democratic legitimacy as seen in 
intergovernmental organisations is not sufficient. 
Part of the denial of the need for supranational level EU democracy for Moravscik, and also Majone, 
relates to the transfer of state level democratic processes to the supranational level and that it is a 
category mistake to discuss the EU in the same manner as the Member States.153 Moravscik asks: “Is 
EU governance as democratic as the (presumptively legitimate) domestic decision-making 
procedures of its Member States in dealing with similar issues”.154 His answer is that ‘the EU appears 
to act largely consistently with mobilised public opinion’,155 that there is transparency in EU decision-
making,156 that the issues that would be presented to citizens for engagement would often lack 
salience,157 and that therefore there is no need for supranational legitimisation. This may mean that 
some aspects of EU legitimacy compare more favourably with Member State democracies and the 
EU democratic deficit be less extreme than sometimes portrayed, but it downplays the growing 
salience of EU issues and the limitations of transparency in aligning the decision making powers of 
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the EU institutions with popular preferences. Even if you accept this favourable comparison with 
Member States, however, the EU still needs to strive to be more democratically legitimate than this 
minimum standard and at a supranational level.  
It is self evident that the EU and its Member States are not the same type of polity and that they 
should not be discussed in the same manner, and that using the normative language of democracy 
that has been developed in close connection with the nation state is problematic when developing 
democratic legitimacy at the supranational level. However, there is little alternative at the present 
time to trying to adapt the democratic experience of state level democracy to the supranational 
level because of the dominance of democracy as the normative approach to the political 
legitimisation of power, the lack of comparators to the EU and because of the close association 
between democracy and the state.158 The difficulties of democratic comparison and translation 
between Member States and the EU must be recognised, but they do not necessarily make the dual 
democratisation of the EU impossible or inappropriate. Furthermore, the approach taken in this 
thesis differs in that the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA are assessed in their own right, 
rather than in comparison with the use of citizens initiatives and referenda in a non-EU context. The 
analysis is intended to be of the democratic potential of two new strands of direct democracy at the 
Member State and EU level, together in EU democracy, rather than about the extent of the 
legitimacy of the EU’s current, largely representative democratic paradigm or how it compares to 
Member State democracy.159 
One of the organising assumptions in this thesis, therefore, is that the EU should continue to 
attempt to develop its democratic legitimacy whilst recognising its dual nature and that, despite the 
need and possibility of democracy at the supranational level, there are inherent difficulties in 
implementing democracy in a new political environment such as the EU. De Búrca has proposed a 
‘democratic striving approach’, which supports this presumption that the EU can and also should be 
democratically legitimised at the supranational level.160 She states that:  
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“Although the dominant model of democracy cannot simply be transposed from the national 
domain, we can and should try to translate the core values of democracy into a realizable 
institutional form when designing or reforming transnational governance practices. The democratic 
striving approach takes as its initial building block the principle of fullest possible participation by 
and representation of all those concerned with a commitment to ensuring the public regarding 
nature of the process”.161 
De Búrca is specifically assessing the appropriateness of this approach for transnational 
organisations such as the International Financial Institutions, but the argument is also applicable to a 
supranational body such as the EU, if not more so because of the greater powers allocated to the EU 
institutions, the greater degree of autonomous institutional influence over the policy and legislative 
agenda, and the democratic aspects of the EU that have already evolved, such as the European 
Parliament.  
In conclusion, the EU is independently involved in making policy decisions and drafting legislation 
that goes beyond the sort of technocratic regulation that Majone once proposed, and beyond the 
level of political influence of an intergovernmental organisation as claimed by Moravscik. Reliance 
on the indirect, intergovernmental democratic legitimisation of EU policy and institutions is also not 
sufficient, and there is a need to strive to improve the current status quo for EU democracy at 
supranational as well as at Member State level. If the benefits that democracy brings are to be 
enjoyed by citizens when they are affected by EU decision-making, and if the EU institutions are to 
enjoy a strengthened political legitimacy, EU governance needs to strive for democratic legitimacy as 
far as possible.162 Having looked at the meaning of democracy and argued for the need and 
possibility of democratic legitimacy at the EU supranational level, the next section moves on to look 
at the dominant institutional strands of democracy, direct and representative democracy, and to 
provide a typology of democracy in political systems before the chapter concludes with a 
characterisation of the EU democratic paradigm. 
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Institutional form of democracy  
Early institutional development of democracy was in the form of direct democracy in city states such 
as Athens and later in the use of forms of parliament called Tings by the Scandinavians.163 
Representative democracy, which is the most widely practiced form of democracy underpinning 
government today, came to the fore in the 17th century onwards as nation states were established 
across Europe, populations began to grow, and a new structure for managing political powers was 
sought. Today the democratic participation of citizens in constitutional, legislative and policy 
decision-making processes is largely provided through the election of representatives. In the 1970s 
new normative theories of participatory democracy began to emerge with the work of writers such 
as Pateman, often as an answer to criticisms of the prevailing liberal representative democracy, such 
as the over reliance on periodic elections to provide effective citizen participation.164 The 
strengthening of democratic participation is now an important part of democratic theory,165 and a 
number of theoretical approaches to participatory democracy have developed that prioritise 
different aspects of how the quantity and quality of citizen participation might be maximised.166 
There has been considerable analysis of the theories of democratic participation, but little attention 
has been given to the practical institutionalisation of the normative theories of participatory 
democracy to achieve these benefits.167 Direct democracy, which is assessed in this thesis, is one 
institutional means by which these broad conceptions of participation can be provided with a 
decision-making channel; a means by which citizens can directly influence the policy agenda or 
policy outcomes through a subject specific vote.168 
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Representative democracy and its reliance on the periodic vote has been criticised for being an 
infrequent participative opportunity that does not sufficiently provide for the effective and equal 
participation of all citizens in the political process.169 Rousseau famously said that the English are 
only free on the day of election.170 Direct democracy is one possibility to redress this over reliance on 
the election of individuals by providing citizens with the opportunity to select policy. This ability to 
vote on specific policies rather than for representatives to take policy decisions is the fundamental 
difference between the two forms of democracy. As Weale put it, ‘In a direct democracy the people 
choose the content of public policy. In an indirect democracy the people choose representatives 
who in turn determine the content of public policy’.171 Representative democratic institutions are 
still a central part of current European political systems, but they are increasingly being 
supplemented by direct democracy, such as the ECI and EUA, to meet the normative criteria for a 
democratically legitimate polity. For example, at EU level the claims of democratic deficit persist, 
despite the developed role of the European Parliament and the Member States Parliaments, and the 
indirect democratic legitimacy of the Council and European Council derived from each Member 
State’s democratic processes. There is also growing use of direct democracy at Member State level 
to supplement existing institutions of representative democracy, particularly in relation to the EU, 
which implies dissatisfaction with current democratic provisions.172  
The use of direct democracy may potentially be a means to ameliorate any deficiencies, or 
supplement the benefits, of representative democracy, but there are also significant issues facing 
the use of instruments such as the citizen initiative and referenda. Graeme Smith, for example, 
offers a standard range of five ‘challenges’ to increasing the use of direct democracy to institute the 
benefits of participatory democracy: 1 - ‘inclusiveness cannot be realised because of differential 
rates of participation across social groups’; 2 - ‘citizens tend to lack the skills and competence to 
make coherent political judgements’; 3 - the issues of scale, which has been commented on above; 4 
- ‘participation will have little or no effect on political decisions – citizens viewpoints will be ignored 
or the process and results of participation will be manipulated by political authorities to suit their 
own interests’; and 5 - ‘embedding citizen participation ... will place too many burdens on both 
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citizens and institutions ... [and] cannot be considered an efficient mode of governance’.173 All five of 
these criticisms are relevant to the assessment of the ECI and the EUA, but as they are mainly 
influenced by a wide range of social factors, such as education and wealth, rather than the legislative 
design of the democratic instrument, comment on them in the analysis in the subsequent chapters is 
reserved to the limited occasions when they are directly relevant to the legislative provisions. The 
exception to this approach is in relation to the fourth of Smith’s challenges: the extent that 
institutional mediation limits the democratic potential of direct democracy to increase citizen 
influence over agenda contents and legislative and policy outcomes.174 The impact of institutional 
mediation on the democratic potential of direct democracy is a key theme throughout the thesis and 
it is a ‘challenge’ to direct democracy that the legislative design of direct democracy instruments can 
have a strong influence over. The next section offers a typology of the political systems based on the 
combination of representative and direct institutional forms of democracy.   
Typology of democratic governance 
The broad typology of democratic forms of government offered next combines the use of direct and 
indirect (representative) forms of democracy in political systems today. For this I draw heavily on 
Albert Weale’s typology in his book ‘Democracy’.175 He takes an institutional approach to outlining 
the different forms of democracy, and a key distinguishing feature between the different versions of 
democracy in his typology is the extent that direct democracy is used to support and facilitate 
democratic participation provided through representative democracy. This makes the typology 
particularly suitable for the analysis of the ECI and the EUA referenda within an EU democratic 
paradigm based on representative democracy that direct democracy is being introduced to, and that 
is being strongly conditioned by the mediation of the existing representative institutions. The 
purpose of presenting this typology is to broadly locate the manner in which representative and 
direct democracy are combined in EU democracy.  
Weale sets out, in his words, ‘simplified descriptions of the distinctive characteristics’ of 5 versions 
of democracy: Unmediated popular government, party-mediated popular government, 
representational government, accountable government, and liberal constitutionalism.176 The first 
two versions of democracy are examples of direct democracy as the principal means of democratic 
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legitimisation, making use of instruments such as the citizens’ initiative and referendum, and the last 
three are forms of representational democracy. The first, unmediated popular government, is 
described by Weale as a Rousseauian form of direct democracy in which the connection between 
public opinion and the making of rules and laws is direct and constitutive, similar in many respects to 
Marx’s vision of direct democracy.177 Within this political organisation, effective participation and 
citizen control of the agenda and its outcomes, through direct engagement with policy making, is 
supposed to be achieved without any organising factionalism and therefore no political parties. This 
idealised form of direct democracy highlights possible features of a democratic system, emphasising 
the importance of consensus and the implementation of the general will through citizen 
participation. It is not, however, a description of any functioning democracy, which confirms that 
direct democracy is a complement to representative democracy and not a replacement.178  
The second type of government system, party mediated popular government, is a more realistic 
version of a system based primarily on direct democracy. It makes full use of instruments such as the 
citizens initiative and referendum to achieve the benefits of participatory democracy, but unlike 
unmediated popular government, it recognises the need for political organisation. Political parties 
would still exist and seek election to executive office and organise the political agenda, but 
legislative and policy decision making is carried out by citizens rather than elected representatives. 
Although more plausible, this version of democracy is also hard to find except at a local level.179 EU 
democracy is certainly far from being a system of party mediated popular government, and as will be 
seen by the later analysis, the ECI and the EUA have done little to move the EU towards such a 
system, particularly due to the continued exertion of institutional control over citizen participation. 
Weale’s next two versions of democracy, Representational and Accountable, are based on Powell’s 
classification of representative democracies and are commonly found in operation amongst EU 
Member States.180 Representational democracies, found for example in the smaller European states, 
have rules that encourage their representatives to more strongly reflect society in number and 
opinion, often through proportional electoral systems. They also tend to have a more consensual 
approach to policy making and a stronger emphasis on citizen participation, which facilitates the 
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inclusion of direct democracy as a complement to the existing representative democracy.181  The 
second group, which includes democracies such as the UK and France, have more executive 
dominated legislative processes and are more focussed on ensuring accountability of the elected 
government through elections, than they are on representativeness.182 Popular participation in both 
of these versions of democracy relies heavily on voting in periodic elections, but deliberation is 
actively encouraged and forms of direct democracy are not excluded, particularly in representational 
democracies, such as Switzerland where direct democracy is used extensively. It is notable that 
direct democracy is also increasingly being used in accountable democracies that have traditionally 
made little or no use of it, such as the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK, which held its first national 
referendum in 1975 and has now written referenda in to part of its legislative process using the EUA.  
The final form of government described by Weale, Liberal constitutionalism, is distinguished by its 
relative lack of concern for popular deliberation and popular direct engagement with political 
representatives and their policies.183 “The people do not rule, they merely choose who is to rule 
them”.184 This is the most passive form of democracy in terms of citizen participation, and direct 
democratic instruments are not appropriate for this form of government. It relies exclusively on 
periodic elections to maintain an appearance of democracy, and mechanisms such as separation of 
powers, judicial review and the ability to throw a government out at elections to avoid tyranny. This 
elitist version of democracy, closely associated with writers such as Schumpeter, only meets the 
criteria of democracy set out above to a minimal extent, relying as it does on the exercise of power 
by a political elite who are chosen to rule, and focussing on the avoidance of tyranny rather than on 
the implementation of popular sovereignty through effective citizen participation.185 The justification 
for liberal constitutionalism that the general will is unstable and incoherent and therefore requires 
elite control and expertise for policy making is similar to the justification for the type of approach to 
EU legitimacy proposed by Majone, and is not far removed from ‘guardianship’.186 
One limitation of this typology for the purposes of this thesis is the number of government types 
focussed on the use of direct democracy. Direct democracy is presented as a relatively extreme form 
of democracy with little representative institutions, just party political organisation, in ‘party 
mediated popular government’, and an even more extreme version in ‘unmediated popular 
government’ that is unlikely ever to exist. This ideal type approach to direct democracy does not 
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reflect the reality of its use in combination with both types of representative democracy. One 
possible addition might be an extra, more feasible version of democracy between the ‘party 
mediated popular government’ category and the representational government category, perhaps 
called ‘directly mediated representative government’. This category would still have some decision-
making by elected representatives, but would make more extensive use of direct democracy 
institutions within their democratic processes to enable citizens to directly mediate policy decisions 
and influence the political agenda.187 The ECI and the EUA referenda would need to strongly fulfil 
their potential to meet the democratic criteria of effective participation, agenda and outcome 
influence, and EU democracy would probably need to incorporate further instruments of direct 
democracy before it is likely to be suggested that citizens influence institutional decision-making 
strongly enough to be described as a ‘directly mediated representative government’, let alone as a 
‘party mediated popular government’. 
Whatever the exact typology used, different aspects from a range of the versions of democracy are 
recognisable in the governance system of the EU, which highlights its unusual, hybrid nature. For 
instance, there are elements of liberal constitutionalism, such as its strong separation of powers and 
the COREPER system of policy development; but there is also a consensual approach to legislating 
and emphasis on representativeness usually found in representational systems; and also, in recent 
years, efforts to increase transparency in decision making that is an important tenet of accountable 
systems of governance.188 More important for the analysis in later chapters is the indication in 
Weale’s typology of a direction of travel for democracies from liberal constitutionalism through the 
two versions of representative democracy towards a more strongly popular government system that 
makes greater use of direct democracy. The analysis of the ECI and EUA will indicate the strength of 
their potential to influence the balance of representative and direct democracy in EU democracy and 
towards increased direct citizen influence over the political agenda and decision-making. The next 
section moves from this general overview of political systems to look in more detail at how 
representative, participatory and direct democracy are reflected in the institutional framework of 
the EU democratic paradigm established by the EU treaties.  
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Democratic provisions in the Treaty on European Union 
Democratisation of the EU was not an early priority for the Union,189 and it was not until 1979 that 
the first form of democratic institution, the European Parliament, appeared at the EU level, and then 
1992 when the first limited reference to democratic principles were included in the Treaties.190 The 
political systems of the Member States continued to be the main source of the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy and the first express reference to democracy as the basis for the EU itself was included 
after the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997:  Article 6 (1), “The Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States.” A decade later a fuller description of the 
democratic basis for the EU was proposed during the drafting of the constitutional treaty and was 
then included in the Lisbon Treaty as Title II, “Provisions on Democratic Principles”, which contains 
specific reference to a range of democratic principles such as representation, participation, the need 
for transparency,191 equality,192 and accountability of Member State governments to their citizens.193 
Two important aspects of the representational form of democracy now exist to some degree at EU 
level: MEPs proportionally elected to a European Parliament that has a co-legislation role with the 
Council in most areas of EU law; and the ability to hold the Commission to account. However, a 
number of issues have limited the impact of the European Parliament, such as low voter turnout;194 
elections that have been called second order elections that reflect voter preferences in relation to 
incumbent national parliaments and governments rather than European institutions or policy;195 its 
difficulty in acting to the same degree as most national parliaments in shaping the formation of a 
government because it does not initiate legislation;196 and it is not the focus of debate and policy 
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challenge between political parties.197 Despite strengthening the role of the European Parliament in 
each of the treaties since its introduction in 1979, its existence has therefore never led the EU to a 
point of ‘sufficient’ democratic legitimacy that silenced criticism.198 
The Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe in 2001, which had a dozen general references in its 
short text on the need to strengthen democracy, such as: “The Union needs to become more 
democratic, more transparent and more efficient”, still focussed predominantly on legitimising 
through elections and national parliaments, and on institutional procedure, rather than on 
developing the democratic environment of the EU in a new direction.199 In the same year, though, 
participation was recognised as one of the general principles of good governance in the Commission 
White Paper on European Governance (2001).200 The White Paper proposed “opening up the policy 
making process to get more people and organisations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. It 
promote[d] greater openness, accountability and responsibility for all those involved”.201 This paved 
the way for an Article to be included in the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003) 
entitled ‘The Principle of Participatory Democracy’. This shift in attitude was important as it 
recognised the need for democratic legitimisation of EU legislation and policy-making beyond the 
traditional route of elections and parliamentary accountability.202 
The discourse on participation was a precursor to the introduction of the ECI as a complement to 
parliamentary, representative governance as the means of increasing popular sovereignty.203 The 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was rejected in referenda in France and the 
Netherlands and was subsequently not ratified, which put many of its reforms, such as the new 
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democratic provisions, including the ECI, in jeopardy. However, when the Lisbon Treaty entered in to 
force on Dec 1st 2009, the ‘Provisions on democratic principles’ and the ECI had survived. 
Art 10(1) TEU baldly reaffirms the representational basis of EU democracy: “The functioning of the 
Union shall be founded on representative democracy”. Art 10(2)TEU confirms the dual routes of 
democratic legitimacy for the EU. First, it states that “Citizens are directly represented in the 
European Parliament”, so the EU, despite being a non-federal polity of derived powers, enjoys direct 
democratic legitimacy from its citizens. Secondly Art 10(2) TEU confirms the indirect democratic 
legitimisation of EU institutions by stating that, “Member States are represented in the European 
Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their Governments, themselves 
democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens”. Art 10 TEU 
concludes by emphasising the importance of citizen participation and affirming the role of political 
parties at the supranational level.204  
Art 11 TEU supplements the representational form of EU democracy with participatory and direct 
democracy. The first three clauses of Art 11 TEU state the importance of citizen and civil society 
dialogue and consultation, and provide standards against which Union activity can now be held to 
account. Although participative in nature these provisions are more significant in terms of 
accountability and transparency, which reinforce representational governance principles, rather 
than in terms of popular governance, which wider forms of participation may ordinarily be expected 
to strengthen.205 Art 11(3) TEU, for example, states that broad consultations shall be carried out by 
the Commission, but the purpose is not to improve the alignment of policy preferences with citizen 
wishes, but ‘to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent’. Art 11(4) TEU is 
different in character from these first three clauses as it provides citizens, through the ECI, with a 
proactive democratic opportunity that they can initiate to try to influence the EU policy agenda.206 
Its introduction is an institutionalisation of principles of participatory democracy and has the 
potential to increase citizen influence over legislative and policy decision-making by EU institutions.  
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Art 12 TEU, the third article of the TEU’s democratic provisions, returns to representational 
democracy, this time at the Member State level.207 Art TEU 12 strengthens the indirect democratic 
legitimisation of the EU and the role of national parliaments in EU law and policy decision-making. 
For some years, at least since the Laeken declaration, national parliaments have been seen as a 
source for increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU.208 Article 12 explicitly, and in some detail, 
sets out the role of national parliaments with regard to the legitimisation of EU legislation and 
strengthens indirect parliamentary legitimacy of the EU through some innovative new mechanisms 
such as the yellow card process.209 This is a significant exception to the EU democratic paradigm 
because it introduces Member State level institutions in to an EU legislative process that is usually 
controlled by EU level institutions. For Member State citizens this is a new indirect means of 
democratic legitimisation of EU institutional activity. Art 10 and 12 TEU therefore confirm the 
strongly parliamentary basis of the representational EU democracy, despite the shift in emphasis 
towards participation in Art 11 TEU. 
The provisions on democratic principles are a significant development for EU democracy, but it is 
difficult to identify a clear, organising principle behind the structure of the Provisions on Democratic 
Principles.210 Article 10 relates to both direct and indirect democratic legitimacy, but Article 12 only 
relates to national parliaments, not to both European and national parliaments; there are references 
to general EU principles, such as taking decisions as closely as possible to the citizen, as well as 
specific mechanisms such as the yellow card system; and specifics relating to the implementation of 
direct democracy through the ECI are included with general principles of good governance, such as 
transparency. As well as this lack of clarity, which reflects the piecemeal and ongoing development 
of EU democracy, the dichotomies of the two organisational themes of this work between 
supranational and Member State level legitimisation, and between the legitimisation of the EU 
constitutional framework and its policy/legislative agenda are also not clearly identified in the 
democratic provisions of the EU. This is indicated more clearly in the next and final section of this 
chapter describing the current EU democratic paradigm. 
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EU democratic paradigm 
This section outlines the legislative and treaty amendment processes and how the EU democratic 
legitimisation set out in Title II TEU operates in practice, to provide a characterisation of the dual EU 
democratic paradigm that the ECI and EUA have been introduced in to and which, to some degree, 
they challenge.211 As we will see below, one of the characteristics of the EU is the distinction 
between the way in which EU level decision making operates and is legitimised and the way in which 
the EU constitutional framework in the treaties is formed and legitimised. First, there is an outline of 
the largely intergovernmental approach to treaty amendment and its legitimisation. 
The ordinary revision procedure to amend the treaties is set out in Art 48 TEU:  
1. The Government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Commission may submit 
to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties. These proposals may, inter alia, serve 
either to increase or to reduce the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. These 
proposals shall be submitted to the European Council by the Council and the national Parliaments 
shall be notified. 
2. If the European Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, adopts by 
a simple majority a decision in favour of examining the proposed amendments, the President of the 
European Council shall convene a Convention composed of representatives of the national 
Parliaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the European 
Parliament and of the Commission. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case of 
institutional changes in the monetary area. The Convention shall examine the proposals for 
amendments and shall adopt by consensus a recommendation to a conference of representatives of 
the governments of the Member States as provided for in paragraph  
3. The European Council may decide by a simple majority, after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, not to convene a Convention should this not be justified by the extent of the 
proposed amendments. In the latter case, the European Council shall define the terms of reference 
for a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States. 
4. A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened by 
the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to 
be made to the Treaties. The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
This treaty amendment process means that the more supranational of the EU institutions, the 
European Parliament and the Commission, have only limited involvement in the treaty amendment 
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process. Both can make proposals for the treaties to be amended but they have little influence, only 
being consulted, over whether proposals actually lead to the initiation of the revision procedure. The 
EU level institution that does influence the agenda and outcomes of the treaty amendment process 
is the European Council, which is made up of Member State heads of state or government. Other 
Member State representatives decide what amendments to the treaties will be made as a result of 
the recommendations from the Convention, and the final step is ratification at Member State level in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. In the UK, following the enactment of 
the EUA, the ratification requirements will usually be an Act of Parliament and, where the criteria 
are met, approval by referendum of the proposed changes. The treaty amendment processes are 
therefore legitimised via Member State level democratic activity. The role of the European Council 
and the other Member State representatives is legitimised through the election of heads of state 
and the government in each Member State. In accordance with Art 48(4), ratification then 
specifically involves Member State level legitimisation, usually through Acts of Parliament or 
referenda.212 
There are also two simplified revision procedures set out in Art 48(6) and Art 48(7) TEU.213 In terms 
of their intergovernmental character and the Member State control over the process there is little 
difference between the ordinary revision procedure and Art 48(6) TEU.214 The European Council 
must act by unanimity when adopting a decision under Art 48(6) TEU and it will only enter in to force 
once it is ratified in accordance with Member State constitutional requirements. Art 48(6) TEU 
though specifically applies to Part 3 of TFEU and it cannot be used to increase the competences of 
the EU. The provisions in s3 EUA would usually require a positive referendum result to approve a 
decision taken under Art 48(6) TEU. The European Council must also act by unanimity to adopt a 
decision under Art 48(7) TEU, but there is no provision for approval in line with Member State 
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constitutional requirements.215 National parliaments are able to oppose an Art 48(7) TEU decision 
and stop it being adopted. The decisions in Art 48(7) TEU relate to changes in voting procedures 
during the legislative procedures that apply to a wide range of policy areas. S6 EUA requires a 
referendum to approve decisions taken in relation to most of these policy areas.  
Since the Lisbon Treaty there have only been two legislative procedures, referred to in Art 289 TFEU 
as the Ordinary and special legislative procedure.216 The ordinary legislative procedure, which is set 
out in detail in Art 294 TFEU, is initiated by the Commission by submitting a proposal to the Council 
and the European Parliament, and these two institutions jointly exercise legislative and budgetary 
functions in the Union. Supplementary to this, the European Parliament also exercises political 
control and consultation,217 and the Council carries out policy making and coordinating functions.218 
The special legislative procedures, which are specified in the treaty articles relevant to the areas of 
law and policy where they are to be used, vary this process, usually according to the involvement of 
the EU institutions or the voting procedure to be followed.219 In general, a critical difference 
between the OLP and an SLP is that the SLP provides Member States a veto in the Council, whereas 
OLP decisions are passed using a form of QMV. 
A key difference between the treaty amendment process and the EU legislative process is that the 
latter is completed at EU level. Art 16(2) TEU states that “The Council shall consist of a 
representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the 
Member State in question and cast its vote”. There is also no provision for a second stage involving 
the respective constitutional provision of the Member State, except in a limited number of instances 
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as specified in the treaties.220 The other procedural exception is the oversight of the legislative 
process provided by the ‘yellow card’ system for national parliaments, which means that Member 
State level institutions can have some involvement in the otherwise EU level institutional legislative 
process.221 
EU legislative procedures and policy making are democratically legitimised through both 
supranational and Member State level means. The Members of the European Parliament are 
legitimised through direct European elections. The representatives in the Council and the European 
Council, which has a strong influence over the policy agenda of the EU institutions despite not having 
a direct role in the legislative process, are nominated by Member State Governments elected in 
Member State elections.222 From a citizen perspective this means that EU citizens have the right to 
vote in European Parliament elections to democratically legitimise the selection of representatives 
at EU level and the European Parliament’s role in EU level law making,223 and for UK citizens, as a 
Member State example, they have the right to vote in UK parliamentary elections, which provides 
some indirect democratic legitimacy for the UK’s EU policy and representatives in the European 
Council and the Council of ministers. 
The Commission, which has a virtual monopoly over legislative initiation, is something of an 
exception in legitimisation terms as its members are not elected and once nominated by a Member 
State they are expected to promote the ‘general interests of the Union’,224 which removes it from 
indirect legitimisation via Member State elections. The Commission though does derive some limited 
democratic legitimacy through its accountability to the European Parliament. Art 17(7) TEU 
establishes first that the list of members of the Commission adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Member State suggestions is subject to a vote of consent from the European Parliament; and 
secondly, the wording of Art 17(7) TEU was interpreted in 2014 as meaning that the Commission 
president candidate from the party grouping that gained the most seats at the European 
Parliamentary elections was expected to be proposed by the European Council, and then be selected 
as a Commission President subject to a vote of approval in the European Parliament. Supplementary 
to this legitimisation of its membership via a representative institution, the Commission is now 
potentially legitimised by the supranational, direct democratic instrument of the ECI. There is a 
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possibility that this may happen in the long run because the ECI gives citizens the chance to ask the 
Commission to propose a legal act of the Union selected by the ECI organisers. If the Commission 
responds to the indication of citizen preferences, it could lead to a closer alignment between citizen 
choices and EU policy, thus enhancing popular sovereignty and therefore EU democracy. As we will 
see in later chapters, however, the potential to legitimise Commission decision-making is not likely 
to be strongly realised. 
It is almost exclusively EU institutions that are involved in the political process of EU law and policy 
decision-making and these are legitimised through both supranational and Member State level 
democracy, whereas there are both Member State and EU institutions involved in the more 
intergovernmental political process of amending the treaties, but these are only legitimised through 
Member State democratic processes. To fit within the standard paradigm it would be expected that 
the ECI is used to legitimise EU level legislative and policy decision making, and the EUA is used to 
legitimise treaty amendment. They both do this to a large degree, but it will be seen in the 
subsequent chapters that they also pose some questions to the democratic paradigm in terms of EU 
citizens being able to influence treaty amendment through the ECI and the use of Member State 
level referenda triggered by the EUA to approve decisions taken in supranational institutions. 
Conclusion 
The EU is an emerging democracy beyond the state that has developed the unusual political 
framework described in this chapter as part of a piecemeal, dual democratisation process over a 
number of years.225 I argued in this chapter that further EU democratic legitimacy should be strived 
for and is needed at supranational as well as Member State level; the EU is not just a regulatory or 
intergovernmental organisation that can rely on indirect democratic legitimisation alone.226 
Democratic strengthening of the EU’s predominantly representational democratic framework 
remains an important part of the EU’s democratisation process,227 but on its own may no longer be 
sufficient.228 The ECI and EUA are recent direct democratic instruments that have institutionalised 
the turn towards more participatory forms of democracy, at EU and Member State level, and which 
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 In relation to striving for democratic legitimacy at EU level see G de Búrca ‘Developing Democracy Beyond 
the State’, [2008] Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 221. 
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 P Ehin, ‘Competing Models of EU Legitimacy: the Test of Popular Expectations’ [2008] JCMS 619, 624: 
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possibly move EU democracy towards a form of what I have called directly mediated representative 
government.229 The democratic potential of the ECI and EUA referenda to achieve such an outcome 
is assessed, in subsequent chapters, through analysing their legislative design and early 
implementation experience in light of the democratic criteria described in this chapter of ‘effective 
participation’, ‘citizen agenda influence’, and ‘citizen outcome influence’. Two important factors in 
addressing this issue of the ECI and EUA democratic potential are the degree of institutional 
mediation that is possible and exerted, and how strongly citizens are able to use these instruments 
to challenge established policy preferences. Next the legislative design of the ECI and EUA are 
examined in chapters two and three, respectively, and then the final chapter of the thesis examines 
their impact together on EU democracy and the challenges they present to the current democratic 
paradigm. 
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Chapter Two 
Democratic Potential of the European Citizens Initiative 
The ECI is a major democratic innovation that could set an example for all transnational 
organisations struggling with criticisms of their democratic legitimacy.1 The potential, theoretical 
significance of the European Citizens’ Initiative for the democratic legitimacy of the EU is widely 
recognised,2 and the Commission has stated that it will be ‘a significant step forward in the 
democratic life of the Union’ that adds a ‘whole new dimension of participatory democracy’.3 As well 
as being the first use of direct democracy at a supranational level, the ECI is also part of a step 
change towards a more participatory approach to democratic legitimacy in the EU that could bring 
the EU ‘closer to its citizens’ and significantly increase the level of democratic engagement with the 
EU.4 However, despite these high expectations, the legislative design of the ECI was strongly 
criticised early on for potential limits to its democratic impact, and the instrument itself could turn 
out to be little more than a democratic totem.5 This chapter analyses the treaty and Regulation 
provisions of the ECI and its early implementation to assess its potential to meet the democratic 
criteria outlined in the previous chapter, the extent that this potential is limited by the control of the 
European Commission, and the degree to which it is able to facilitate a citizen challenge to 
established policy preferences. The chapter starts with comment on the three criteria of ‘effective 
participative opportunity’, ‘citizen agenda influence’, and ‘citizen outcome influence’ as they 
specifically relate to the ECI.6  
Direct democratic instruments are the institutionalisation of participatory democracy and therefore, 
by definition, it is increased and more effective participation that is expected to strengthen the 
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 See G de Búrca ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’, [2008] Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 221 
for analysis of democratic legitimacy of transnational organisations. 
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 See, for example, A Warleigh, ‘On the Path to Legitimacy? The EU Citizens Initiative Right from a Critical 
Deliberativist Perspective’, in C. Ruzza and V. Della Sala (eds), Governance and civil society in the European 
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democratic legitimacy of a polity.7 If the legislative design of the ECI fails to provide a framework 
that enables effective participative opportunities for EU citizens then the influence of the ECI on the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU will be minimal; however well the regulation fulfils other democratic 
criteria. Effective participation for the ECI means first that the burden and barriers in terms of 
procedural complexity and resources that it imposes on citizens as both organisers and supporters, 
such as funding and time, numerical thresholds etc, are kept to a minimum and do not excessively 
impact on the ability to take up this democratic opportunity;8 and secondly that direct democratic 
instruments, although not introduced specifically to increase the equality and inclusiveness of 
democratic systems, must nevertheless be assessed against these democratic standards and, if 
found wanting, criticised. 
The second criterion is that citizens are able to influence what is put on the agenda, otherwise 
participative opportunities for citizens become token gestures controlled by those institutions that 
control the agenda. In the case of the ECI this agenda influence would be exerted through the 
Commission’s role of EU legislative initiative, over which it has a virtual monopoly.9 The legislative 
design of the ECI should provide the potential, therefore, for an increase in popular sovereignty and 
democratic legitimacy by providing EU citizens with the opportunity to influence the issues that are 
discussed in relation to proposing a legal act. The ECI can potentially facilitate this influence by 
providing citizens with a new formal means of raising the profile of issues with EU institutions and 
also, more indirectly, by generating public, cross border debate that can influence decision making in 
the longer term. 
The third criterion for a democratic instrument is that the legislative design enables citizens to have 
an influence over the policy and legislative outcomes. The ECI is not a ‘full scale initiative’ that 
obliges a further vote, usually in a referendum, but an ‘agenda initiative’ that is addressed to 
another political institution.10 The ECI does not guarantee the initiation of the legislative process, as 
some popular initiatives do; it only guarantees that the Commission will consider starting the 
process that will lead to a tangible outcome. Furthermore, the legislative process of the EU means 
that there is an extra step, when compared to an initiative at state level, in the move from citizen 
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proposal to legal or policy outcome because the Commission must decide to initiate the legislative 
process and then the European Parliament and Council will decide the form that any legal act 
ultimately takes. The potential strength and frequency of outcomes from the use of the ECI 
procedure is reduced as a result. It is likely therefore that the political pressure generated by public 
debate, and the deliberative opportunities of engagement with the EU institutions at the end of the 
process, are likely to be more important to its impact on citizen led outcomes than the relatively 
weak legal obligations in its design. 
The institutional mediation by the Commission, which is a key factor in how strongly the ECI process 
can facilitate genuine citizen-led participation and influence over the policy agenda, is built in to the 
legislative design of the ECI and also the Commission’s role in its implementation.11 This mediation is 
particularly evident through the Commission’s interpretation of the registration criteria for ECI 
proposals. The significance of this institutional control is reflected in the extent to which a 
democratic instrument facilitates citizen ability to challenge established policy preferences. The 
analysis in this chapter will show that the Commission’s control over the scope of the ECI and also 
any resulting legal outcomes has significantly limited citizen challenge to the Commission’s policy 
preferences. 
The assessment of the ECI’s democratic potential is carried out in two parts. First, there is an analysis 
of the legislative design of the ECI in Art 11(4) TEU and Reg. 211/2011, which is organised according 
to the key decisions taken in the legislation that impact on the ECI design: Support thresholds, legal 
obligation of the ECI, subject limitations, process complexity, and citizen eligibility. This analysis 
starts with some introductory comments on the provisions in Art 11(4) TEU, which established the 
ECI in the Treaties, and the regulation that implemented the ECI, Reg. 211/2011. Secondly, there is 
an outline of the mechanics of the ECI process and comment on areas of procedural complexity that 
impact on the ECI’s potential to increase effective democratic participation. Thirdly, there is 
comment on the legislative design of the ECI, which focuses on complexity, equality, support 
thresholds, legal obligation, and subject limitations. 
The second part of the chapter is a critical analysis of the Commission’s decision-making in relation 
to the registration of ECI proposals, particularly the requirement that no ECI proposal be manifestly 
outside the powers of the Commission and for the purpose of implementing the treaties, which 40% 
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of ECIs have failed.12 First, I categorise the initiatives that campaigners have asked the Commission 
to register. Secondly, there is a review of the Commission’s interpretation of the first part of the 
admissibility test that initiatives not be manifestly outside their powers, and thirdly, there is a review 
of the second part of the admissibility test that initiatives be for the purpose of implementing the 
treaties. The concluding remarks then return to the question of the democratic potential of the ECI 
and the impact institutional mediation has had. 
Analysis of the European Citizen Initiative’s legislative design 
Treaty provision for ECI – Art 11(4) TEU 
One of the striking innovations in the new Democratic Provisions in Title II TEU was Art 11(4) which 
introduces the ECI; the first supranational instrument of direct democracy and the latest EU level 
democratic instrument in the dual democratisation of the EU.13 Article 11(4) TEU is distinct from the 
other three clauses in Art 11 TEU, which are standards against which citizens can assess Union 
activity. Art 11(4) TEU has the citizen as its subject, rather than the institutions, and establishes the 
legal basis for a new democratic instrument that can be instigated by citizens themselves. In other 
words, the ECI provides a new, proactive opportunity for democratic engagement by EU citizens and 
the potential to influence EU policy, outside the usual control of the existing political institutions. 
Any shift towards popular government though should not be overstated, and Art 10(1) TEU reminds 
us that the EU remains founded on representative democracy.14 The ECI is only a supplement to the 
existing representational democratic processes, and one which the EU institutions, particularly the 
Commission, still retain a degree of legal and political control over.  
Art 11(4) TEU establishes the opportunity for citizens to invite the Commission to make a proposal 
for a legal act, once they have reached the requisite level of citizen support for their proposal in a 
significant number of Member States. Art 11(4) TEU states: 
Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework 
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 Art 4(2)(b) Reg 211/2011. 
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 The Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of other changes with democratic implications, such as the 
extension of the ordinary legislative process to make the European Parliament co legislator and the extension 
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of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a 
legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.15 
Art 11(4) TEU establishes the ECI within the broad category of direct democracy instruments usually 
referred to as a popular or citizen initiative.16 These instruments enable citizen influence over the 
political agenda through obliging a legal response once a pre-defined, representative, level of 
support for a legal or policy proposal has been collected.17 The phrases highlighted above in Art 
11(4) establish the treaty basis for the support thresholds, the strength of legal obligation imposed 
by the ECI, and the limits on the subject matter of the ECI.18 These provisions define the type of 
popular initiative that is introduced and the scope of the democratic instrument.19 
The legal obligation established in Art 11(4) is that citizens are given the opportunity of ‘inviting the 
European Commission’ to submit a legislative proposal. There is no obligation on the Commission to 
act, therefore, and this provision puts the ECI at the weaker end of the scale of legal obligations that 
are imposed by a popular initiatives.20 These initiatives are usually referred to as agenda initiatives 
because they places items on the agenda for debate, but outcomes are at the discretion of the 
political institutions. The ECI imposes little extra legal obligation than a petition; the main distinction 
between the two is that an ECI is presented in the form of a legal proposal and obliges a formal 
response from the institution that receives it, whereas a petition does not.21 
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Art 11(4) also sets two of the ECI’s threshold requirements: a proposal must be supported by “not 
less than one million citizens” and “a significant number of Member States”. Another defining 
characteristic of a popular initiative is setting a numerical target for support, which is included to 
provide a degree of representativeness. The participation of individual citizens, which for practical 
reasons is only ever a small percentage of total citizens, will only be able to become effective in 
influencing the legislative and policy agenda once a level of support is reached that is considered to 
be sufficiently representative. The setting of two thresholds in Art 11(4) TEU reflects the duality of 
citizenship in an EU polity that is legitimised via institutions that represent EU citizens as a whole and 
others that represent a subset of these citizens within the Member States.22 To be sufficiently 
representative in the EU, therefore, an ECI must be supported by both a representative number of 
EU citizens, and also by a representative number of Member States. 
The two phrases in Art 11(4) that have had a particularly strong impact on the scope of the subject 
matter of the ECI are “within the framework of [the Commission’s] powers” and “for the purpose of 
implementing the treaties”. The first phrase is a requirement that ECI proposals are limited to the 
competences allocated to the Commission by the treaties. . It is inevitable that the legal and political 
power of the institution receiving the proposal is a limiting factor for the scope of the outcomes 
from an instrument such as the ECI, but this restriction is particularly significant for the ECI because 
it is implemented at a supranational level that has limited competences derived from other polities, 
and has had an impact on both the level of public debate generated and the scope of legal and policy 
outcomes. As the findings later in the chapter indicate, the Commission’s interpretation of these two 
phrases, as they are implemented in Reg 211/2011, has led to a higher number of ECI proposals 
being refused registration than can be explained just by the need to fit within the EU’s competences. 
Furthermore, the second phrase highlighted in Art 11(4) TEU, above, has been interpreted as 
excluding any ECI proposal that requires or proposes treaty amendment. Both of these phrases are 
discussed in more detail in the later section of the chapter that contains the analysis of the 
implementation of the ECI legislation. Next we turn to ECI Regulation 211/2011 that implemented 
the provisions of Art 11(4) TEU.23 
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ECI Regulation No. 211/2011 
The drafting of the Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 that implements the ECI was started quickly after 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Following publication of a green paper and consultation from 
Nov 11 2009 to Jan 1st 2010, the Commission put forward its proposal for a regulation on March 31st 
2010.24 The European Parliament and Council made a number of suggestions for alterations, most of 
which were accepted, and Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 was adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council on 16th Feb 2011.25 In accordance with Art 24 TFEU the regulation established the 
‘procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initiative within the meaning of Article 11 of the 
Treaty on European Union’. In the initial proposal the Commission described the Citizens Initiative as 
“a significant step forward in the democratic life of the Union [that] provides a singular opportunity 
to bring the Union closer to the citizens and to foster greater cross-border debate about EU policy 
issues”.26 It is noteworthy that, despite the apparent support for the ECI, two of the key democratic 
criteria that citizen initiatives have the potential to impact, increased citizen participation and 
influence over the EU policy agenda, were not mentioned as objectives of the ECI’ introduction.27 
The Commission emphasised in the regulation proposal that its right of legislative initiative remains 
intact and that their obligation is only “to give serious consideration to the requests made by 
Citizens’ Initiatives”, there is no obligation on them to propose a legal act in response to a successful 
ECI.28  
The European Parliament sought to strengthen the Citizens Initiative’s potential during the drafting 
process by reducing practical rather than legal barriers to the participative opportunity it provides, 
and by introducing the idea of a ‘right to sign’.29 The guiding principles for the initial regulation 
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proposal indicated that the aim was to make the ECI easy to use, but it needed to represent a Union 
interest, prevent fraud or abuse and not impose unnecessary burden on the Member States.30 
Minimising practical complexity for organisers and increasing ease of accessibility for supporters is 
essential to open up the democratic potential of the ECI, but it will need to be more than just ‘easy 
to use’ to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
Analysis of the provisions of Art 11(4) TEU and Reg. 211/2011 in relation to the democratic criteria of 
citizen agenda influence and citizen outcome influence is presented in more detail later in the 
chapter. Before this we first look at the mechanics of the ECI as established by Reg. 211/2011, from 
the perspective of those wishing to organise an initiative and also of those wishing to support one. It 
was intended that the ECI regulation would minimise the practical difficulties of organising and 
supporting a Citizens Initiative.31 However, as will be seen below, there are some areas of the ECI 
procedure that contain a degree of complexity that may potentially limit democratic participation 
through the ECI. The following section contains a description of and comment on the practical 
aspects of each of the 5 phases that an ECI needs to complete.32 
ECI process step one - citizens committee 
The first task for ECI organisers is to set up a committee with 7 members, one of whom acts as the 
official representative for the campaign and lead contact with the EU institutions. The committee 
must be composed of seven EU citizens, who are resident in seven different Member States, but not 
necessarily of different nationalities, and who are of European Parliament voting age.33 The 
organisers are required to supply their full name, postal addresses, nationalities, dates of birth and 
email addresses to the Commission when seeking to register an ECI proposal.34 There is no 
requirement for an identification number. MEPs may not be counted as a member of an organising 
committee for a Citizens Initiative,35 and the organisers must be natural persons.36 The committee 
members are the data controllers of the information collected within the statements of support and 
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therefore legally responsible for the security of the data.37 Committee members are also responsible 
for the publication of information about any funding received. This is required to be publicised on 
the register and regularly updated as a means of ensuring transparency about the organisations 
supporting an initiative.38 Forming a Committee also indicates a degree of commitment from 
organisers that should mean there is less chance of Commission resources being spent on assessing 
or supporting initiatives that wither through lack of organisation. 
Not present in the Commission’s original proposal, the committee was introduced in to the 
regulation by the European Parliament to facilitate communication and to establish an 
organisational structure, to increase the European nature of an ECI proposal, and to reduce, through 
the natural persons requirement, the degree to which existing civil society organisations dominate 
the use of the ECI.39 In the words of the European Parliament the committee was introduced 
because “a minimum organised structure is needed in order to carry through a citizens initiative ... 
and to encourage the emergence of European-wide issues and to foster reflection on those issues.40 
Nominating a lead person from the committee to liaise with the EU institutions is “for the sake of 
transparency and smooth and efficient communication”.41 
This committee phase does not appear to have been an obstruction as 27 committees were formed 
to launch initiatives in the first year of the ECI alone. There are, however, two specific procedural 
issues in relation to the committee phase of the ECI that may limit participation: the committee’s 
legal responsibilities, and the resources required. The most significant legal responsibility for 
committee members is derived from their status as data controllers of the information collected as 
part of the statements of support.42 It is unclear though whether the committee is jointly responsible 
or just the committee’s lead representative for any legal infringements; whether the jurisdiction any 
infringement would fall under is based on the person’s residency or where the data is stored; and 
what the extent of the liability of the committee members is, which potentially could be very high. 
This level of uncertainty increases the legal risk for the organisers and may act as a barrier to citizens 
deciding to launch an initiative. The best funded initiative in the first six months after the ECI was 
launched, which was seeking an EU Directive on Dairy Cow Welfare, decided to withdraw their 
                                                          
37
 Art 12 Reg. 211/2011. 
38
 Art 4(1) Reg. 211/2011. 
39
 S Aloisio etc. ‘The European Citizens Initiative: Perspectives and Challenges’ ch 3 in R Matarazzo (ed.), 
Democracy in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty (Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2011). Available at 
<http://pubblicazioni.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/iairp_02.pdf 93> accessed 12 Apr 2015. See also amendments 8, 24 
and 26 of EP report. 
40
 Recital 8 Reg. 211/2011 and also in Amendment 23 justification European Parliament report. 
41
 Recital 8 Reg. 211/2011. 
42
 Art 12 Reg. 211/2011. 
73 
 
initiative two months after having it registered because of the uncertainty and potential extent of 
the legal liability for their committee members.43  
One means of mitigating the legal risk and reducing any reluctance to participate in a Citizens 
Initiative committee would have been to nominate a limited company as the committee ‘member’ 
on whom liability would fall in the event of any legal problems, thus allowing some form of 
insurance and limitation of liability that is not possible for an individual citizen. The natural person 
requirement, however, means that ordinary citizens are being asked to take legal responsibility in 
relation to their initiative.   
ECI process step 2 – initiative registration and admissibility check 
Within 2 months of receiving a request for registration the Commission will register an ECI that 
meets the conditions set out in Art 4(2) Reg. 211/2011 and publish its decision on the public ECI 
website. If the Commission refuses registration, it will communicate its reasons for doing so to the 
initiative organisers. This is a combined registration and legal admissibility check at the outset of an 
initiative that is intended to provide certainty to the organisers about the legality of their proposal at 
an early stage and, through the open publication of acceptance and refusal, to promote 
transparency. Once their initiative has been registered the organisers can begin the process of 
collecting statements of support. The means of redress open to organisers of an initiative refused 
registration are to bring proceedings before the General Court, in accordance with Art 263 TFEU, or 
to make a complaint of maladministration to the European Ombudsman, in accordance with Art 228 
TFEU. 
Art 4(2) of Reg. 211/2011 states the criteria that an initiative must meet to be registered: 
“the Commission shall register a proposed Citizens Initiative ...., provided that the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) The citizens committee has been formed and the contact person designated in accordance 
with Article 3(2); 
(b) The proposed Citizens Initiative does not fall manifestly outside the framework of the 
Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties; 
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(c) The proposed Citizens Initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious; and  
(d) The proposed Citizens Initiative is not manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set 
out in Article 2 TEU. 
Art 4(2)(a) is simply a procedural requirement that the first step in the ECI process has been 
completed.  
Art 4(2)(b) is included so that ECI proposals are not outside the legal powers of the Commission and 
therefore have the potential to lead to a legal act. This clause, which is not uncommon in the 
legislative design of direct democracy, should ensure that a proposal is addressed to the appropriate 
authority. The phrase for ‘the purpose of implementing the Treaties’ has been interpreted by the 
Commission as meaning that an ECI proposal that requests or requires treaty change will be refused 
registration.44 It will be shown later that the application of this clause by the Commission as a legal 
admissibility test of initiatives at registration has been particularly challenging for ECI organisers and 
significant in restricting the democratic potential of the ECI. 
Art 4(2)(c) allows the Commission to refuse registration of a Citizens Initiative that they perceive to 
be manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious. This is another common provision in the regulations for 
popular initiatives that allows authorities to block initiatives that are considered to be too far from 
mainstream democratic engagement, or are lacking a serious intention to engage with the policy 
making process. 
Art 4(2)(d), requires that an initiative is not manifestly outside the values of the Union. Again the 
Union is setting an outer boundary for ECI proposals. The content of the proposal is judged against 
the broad qualitative criteria of the principles in Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values 
of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.”  
In summary, these registration conditions mean that an ECI proposal must first pass the test of Art 
4(2)(c) by not being considered abusive, frivolous or vexatious; then it must be judged to not be 
against the founding principles of the Union as set out in Art 2 TEU and as interpreted by the 
Commission; and finally, to be registered, to just be given the go ahead to start testing the 
democratic credentials of the proposal, the Commission must believe that it is a proposal for a legal 
act that is not manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers. The limitation on the 
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democratic potential of the ECI as a result of these provisions is discussed in detail in the second part 
of this chapter through a critical review of the Commission’s decision-making. 
ECI process step three – signature collection and support thresholds  
Having a threshold for collection of support that triggers action is a defining characteristic of a citizen 
initiative. The ECI, though, is unusual in having three numerical thresholds as part of its process: 
i) The collection of 1 million absolute statements of support, which was established by Art 
11(4) TEU;45  
ii) That statements of support must come from a quarter of Member States, currently 
seven, according to Art 7(1) Reg. 211/2011, which defines the ‘significant number of 
Member States’ required by Art 11(4); 
iii) The number of statements of support from each of these seven Member States must be 
at least 750 times the number of MEPs for that Member State.46 
The EU institutions accepted the need for an initiative to be supported by citizens from several 
Member States, but they disagreed during drafting over what number of Member States was 
‘significant’ enough for a proposal to be considered European. The European Parliament wanted a 
lower number of Member States for practical reasons, “to allow for a simpler and less cumbersome 
procedure, it is appropriate to set a lower threshold”, whereas the Commission prioritised the 
strengthening of the cross border character of an initiative.47 The Commission proposed that support 
should come from one third of member states, the European Parliament recommended one fifth, 
but the Council’s proposal of one quarter, currently 7 states, was finally settled on as an appropriate 
compromise. The requirement of a minimum number of statements of support from a Member 
State for it to count towards the seven needed is degressively proportional and strengthens the 
degree of geographic representativeness. This reflects the importance of indirect legitimacy via its 
Member States, despite the ECI being a supranational democratic instrument that aims to engage 
citizens directly with the EU legislative and policy agenda. 
The European Parliament recognised the practical difficulties and potential costs of reaching the 
support thresholds for an ECI in a polity such as the EU and proposed a number of mitigating 
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measures.48 To this end they requested the provision by the Commission of an online system for the 
collection of signatures,49 a comprehensive user guide and a help desk for providing advice.50 These 
requirements were met in part: a set of guidelines and recommendations for the practical 
implementation of the ECI, intended for the use of competent national authorities and organisers 
was introduced in April 2013, and there is a partial online system and informal advice provided by 
the Commission.51 An EU data server has also been made available to organisers. More could be 
done at EU level, however, to support the organisers of an ECI during their campaign. One significant 
gap is the provision of legal advice to ECI organisers at the point of seeking the registration of an 
initiative. The formal provision of legal advice may have gone some way to reducing the number of 
ECIs that have not been registered because they failed the legal admissibility test. 
The ECI campaign organisers have 12 months to meet the collection thresholds for statements of 
support. It has proved possible to collect sufficient statements of support within 12 months and the 
Commission were flexible in applying the deadline when data storage and other technical issues 
stopped the first wave of initiatives from collecting support for some months. The Right to Water 
initiative was the first to begin collecting statements of support, on 4 Sept 2012. The Right to Water 
initiative was successful in finding a private host for their data partly because of funding of 100,000 
Euros from the European Federation of Public Service Unions. The Commission gave a 7 month 
extension to the time limit for collection of statements of support for the first nine ECIs. This type of 
exceptional measure, however, was not foreseen in the regulation and the Commission was not 
explicitly given the power to take such a step.52 
ECI process step four - verification of statements of support  
Once the organisers think the necessary number of signatures has been collected or at the point that 
the 12 months for collection is complete, the statements of support collected are submitted to the 
relevant authorities for approval in accordance with Art 8 Reg. 211/2011. No EU administrative body 
is used to verify statements of support so verification is a Member State based exercise. Each 
Member State is expected to “designate one competent authority responsible for coordinating the 
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process of verification of statements of support”.53 Initiative organisers are responsible for 
identifying which Member State statements of support have been allocated to and for submitting 
them to the relevant Member State authority. One reason for this process of allocating statements 
of support to a particular Member State is the need to show that the minimum threshold of support 
has been reached in sufficient numbers of Member States. The Member State authorities then have 
three months to verify the statements of support.54 
The Spanish presidency of the Council of ministers proposed that there be a common approach to 
verification of statements of support, and most respondents to the Green Paper on the ECI also 
wanted to see a common set of requirements across Europe to avoid having to comply with different 
rules in different countries.55 Agreement was reached that the authentication of signatures should 
not be required for ECIs,56 but there was disagreement between Member States about the 
appropriate method of verification of statements of support to ensure the fair operation of the ECI. 
The UK sat at one end of the spectrum with an approach that favoured accessibility over 
administrative certainty, wanting only sample based verification of residency information on 
statements of support.57 Austria sat at the other end of the spectrum favouring verification of 
signatures and identity on every statement of support.  
On the one hand, it could be argued that because the ECI is an electoral right that imposes weak 
legal obligations on existing institutions and any attempt to use it to subvert public policy is relatively 
easy to control, the risk of fraudulent use of the ECI is low and a light touch verification process is 
justified. On the other hand, it could equally be argued that all electoral rights are constitutionally 
important and should be strongly protected through a rigorous verification process. However, 
perhaps inevitably in a confederation of states, the decision taken was that ECI statements of 
support will be verified “on the basis of appropriate checks, in accordance with national law and 
practice, as appropriate”.58 The Commission stated that this decision was to limit the administrative 
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burden for Member States.59 This may have been achieved for some Member States, but the trade 
off is likely to be an increase in the administrative burden for initiative organisers needing to 
understand and communicate with a wide range of administrative regimes.60 Establishing an EU 
administrative body for the purpose of administering the ECI, thus providing a single point of 
communication and set of verification regulations, could have been one means of avoiding the 
complexity of the verification process for ECI organisers. 
ECI process step five – submission and examination of successful initiative 
The final phase for an ECI proposal is submission to the Commission for examination and for a 
decision on whether and which legal acts are to be proposed as a result. As part of this process the 
Commission will receive the initiative organisers to explain the issues raised by their proposal,61 and 
the organisers will also get the chance to present their proposal at a public hearing at the European 
Parliament in front of representatives of the EU institutions.62 The Commission will set out, within 3 
months, its legal and political conclusions and explain any actions it intends to take.63  
This phase was fundamentally rewritten by the European Parliament. The public hearing, the receipt 
of organisers by the Commission, the reduction to 3 months for a Commission response, and the 
requirement for both legal and political reasoning to be explained were all included in the final 
regulation as a result of European Parliament proposals.64 This is an indication of the European 
Parliament’s enthusiasm for the ECI to facilitate full and timely engagement and communications 
between the EU institutions and the supporters of an ECI proposal. The European Parliament said 
that the justification for action from the Commission should show that “the citizen’s voice is heard 
and the possible action to be taken is seriously and thoroughly thought out”.65 Although these 
changes did not go as far as to oblige a legal response from the Commission, they have potentially 
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increased the political pressure felt as a result of a successful initiative and therefore the chance that 
the Commission will choose to make a proposal for a legal act. 
Barriers for ECI campaign organisers 
The high level of resources needed for an ECI campaign in terms of time and money because of the 
size of the collection area, languages, the triple numerical threshold and other complexities in the 
ECI process means that it is likely there will be a correlation between those that have access to these 
resources and those that manage to gather one million statements of support. It comes as little 
surprise that the two ECIs that have presented over a million statements of support to the 
Commission were both backed by strong existing civil society organisations: the Right to Water 
initiative was backed by Trade Unions from across Europe, and the One of Us initiative was backed 
by the Roman Catholic church. The greater the level of resources needed for an ECI campaign, the 
greater the risk that the ECI will be captured by existing civil society organisations and turned in to a 
tool for lobbying groups and their specific agendas, rather than an opportunity for natural persons to 
directly participate in the democratic process in any area of popular interest.66  
Technology may prove to be crucial in reducing the impact of some of the complexities for ECI 
organisers and issues associated with campaigning across the EU, and be a catalyst for an increase in 
participation.67 For example, by enabling ECI campaigners to collect statements of support remotely 
and facilitating their ability to disseminate their proposal. The use of technology, however, brings its 
own particular issues in terms of resources and implementation. Data storage set back the start of 
the first ECI campaigns by 7 months, and there were a wide range of teething troubles in the first 
years of the ECI.68 The data storage issue has only been resolved with the Commission offering its 
own server centre in Luxembourg to host data for ECI organisers as an exceptional measure.69 Many 
                                                          
66
 On the potential for civil society capture of the ECI see M Dougan, ‘What are we to make of the Citizens' 
Initiative?’ [2011] CML Rev 1807, and J Greenwood, ‘The European Citizens Initiative and EU Civil society 
organisations’ [2012] Perspectives on European Politics and Society 325.  
67
 Smith discusses e-democracy as a category in G Smith, Democratic Innovations - Designing Institutions for 
Citizen Participation (CUP 2009); as does Schiller in T Schiller, ‘Direct Democracy and Theories of Participatory 
Democracy – Some Observations’ 52-63 in Palinger, Kaufmann, Marxer, Schiller (eds) Direct democracy in 
Europe (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2007). There appears to be a tendency in the literature to treat 
technology as a type of participation, rather than just a catalyst for participation to occur as a new 
communication tool. 
68
 For example, registration of support for a proposal was blocked by the software but without an explanation 
to the supporter, and the Right to Water initiative had thousands of registered statements of support not 
approved by the software. 
69
 “To help get the first European citizens' initiatives off the ground, the Commission has, as an exceptional 
measure, offered its own servers ... and is assisting in preparing for the certification of their online collection 
system”, <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/sefcovic/headlines/press-
releases/2012/07/2012_07_18_eci_en.htm> accessed 8 July 2015. This offer was extended at least until 2015. 
Minutes of meeting at which provision of data storage was agreed available at  
80 
 
technical issues remain for ECI campaigners, particularly with the Online Collection System, and 
there will continue to be resource implications for organisers unless there is improvement and 
increase in the services provided centrally.70 Technology could, therefore, both enhance the 
opportunity for direct democracy across large polities such as the EU by facilitating the collection of 
support, but also restrict the ability of ordinary citizens to initiate direct democratic instruments 
because of the cost and complexity of technological solutions. 
Procedural complexity for supporters of ECI proposals  
Next we look at the legislative design of the ECI as it applies to those citizens that wish to support an 
ECI proposal, in particular the eligibility rules and the identification requirements. The eligibility rules 
for supporting an ECI proposal are that ‘signatories shall be citizens of the Union and shall be of the 
age to be entitled to vote in elections to the European Parliament’.71 This citizenship requirement 
excludes TCNs and sets the age to support an initiative at 18 except in Austria, where the age for 
voting in European Parliament elections is 16. There was some support, mainly from sections of the 
European Parliament, for reducing the age at which you can support an ECI proposal to 16 and for 
allowing third country nationals resident in a Member State to support a Citizens Initiative.72 It was 
argued by the European Parliament that supporting an ECI was of a different order to voting for 
elected representatives and the opportunity should be taken to encourage participation at a 
younger age than usual.73 Allowing 16 year olds to support an ECI would have increased the scope to 
broaden European democratic participation and give the European public space a wider and new 
audience.74 This argument was rejected by the Council, which supported mirroring the age limit for 
voting in the European Parliament, which is decided by each Member State. Member State rules, 
therefore, set the conditions for supporting an ECI proposal and an EU citizens right to democratic 
participation through the ECI varies according to their nationality.  
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The other specific group of citizens excluded from the ECI are third country nationals (TCNs). Those 
supporting an Initiative must be EU citizens and therefore citizens of a Member State, which means 
that TCNs are not eligible to support ECI proposals. Residency in the EU is not sufficient to qualify. 
This means that TCNs resident in the EU will continue to have little avenue for democratic 
engagement at the EU level unless they have acquired citizenship of a Member State. The ECI 
therefore maintains the status quo and does not take the opportunity to extend the franchise within 
the EU. The prevailing approach to the democratic franchise in Member States is one based on 
nationality rather than residence, and it is perhaps unsurprising that the ECI took this approach.75 It 
must be remembered, of course, that if the ECI franchise was only based on residency then EU 
citizens living outside of the EU would be excluded from supporting an ECI proposal. The only way to 
include non resident EU citizens and also TCNs would be for eligibility to be based on both 
nationality and residency. 
For the purposes of counting the level of support from any given Member State “Signatories shall be 
considered as coming from the Member State which is responsible for the verification of their 
statement of support”, and Member States decide what citizens they are responsible for verifying.76 
As we will see in the following paragraphs, a variety of different approaches have been taken to 
establish the set of citizens a Member State is responsible for verifying. The franchise definition 
regarding EU citizens is based on whether someone is a citizen of the EU demos through holding 
nationality of a Member State. In contrast to this, residence is also used by some Member States to 
define the set of citizens that they are responsible for verifying as valid to support an ECI proposal; 
the UK for example will verify all EU citizens that are resident in the UK, but not UK citizens living 
abroad.77 The issue of allocation of statements of support is closely linked to the issue of citizen 
identification for the purposes of supporting an ECI proposal because the identity document in many 
cases ties that citizen to verification by the state that issues the document. This adds further to the 
complexity of this aspect of the ECI process. 
The subsequent paragraphs set out the rules relating to the allocation of citizens for the purposes of 
verification and the identification rules that apply to citizens wishing to support an initiative.78 
Member States can be categorised in to those that require an identification document number to 
support an initiative (category 1) and those Member States that only require residency information 
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(category 2). This second category can be further subdivided in to those Member States, the UK, 
Ireland and Netherland, that allow their citizens to allocate their statement of support to their home 
Member State, based on their nationality, only if permanently resident there, (category 2a) and 
those Member States, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Slovakia and Finland, that allow their 
citizens to allocate their statement of support to their home Member State when resident in another 
Member State, if the authorities have been notified (category 2b). If a citizen resides in their home 
Member State then their statement of support will be allocated to that Member State, as long as 
they have an appropriate identification document, where one is required, or the necessary residency 
information.  
It gets complicated if a citizen lives in another Member State as their options will vary according to 
the Member State citizenship they hold and also the Member State they are residing in. Citizens 
from a Member State that requires an identification document (category 1) and who live in another 
Member State that requires identification have the option of allocating their statement of support to 
either their home Member State or host Member State, assuming of course that they have 
identification documents for both. If they live in a Member State that bases allocation of support on 
residency, then they can allocate their support either to their home Member State, if they still have 
the necessary identification, or their host Member State if they are permanent residents. 
If you are a UK, Ireland or Netherlands national (category 2a) residing in another EU Member State 
that requires an identification document (category 1), then you must possess the relevant 
identification document of the host Member State to be able to sign up to a Citizens Initiative and 
your support will be allocated to the host Member State. If residing in another Member State that 
requires residency information (category 2) then their statement of support can be allocated to the 
host Member State through their residency there. A UK, Ireland or Netherlands national does not get 
the option of allocating their statement of support to their home Member State if living in another 
Member State.  
If you are a Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Slovakia or Finland national (category 2b) residing 
in another Member State that requires an identification document (category 1), then you have the 
option of using a host Member State identification document to allocate your statement of support 
to your host Member State. If residing in another Member State that requires residency information 
(category 2) then the statement of support can be allocated to the host Member State through their 
residency there. These nationals (category 2b) also have the option of allocating their statement of 
support, whichever host Member State they are residing in, to their home Member State if they 
have informed the authorities of their address abroad. 
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The complexity of these identification and allocation rules has a number of implications for both 
citizens wishing to support an initiative and also for ECI organisers. First, for organisers of an ECI, 
extra resources are likely to be needed to manage the collection process, particularly if they collect a 
million statements of support and need to submit to the relevant Member States for verification. 
This extra resource and complexity in managing the verification process is also likely to increase the 
chances of the ECI being a tool for well resourced existing civil society organisations.79 Secondly, 
organisers may need to collect in excess of the required support thresholds to be able to submit 
their proposal to the Commission because the greater the complexity of the identification, allocation 
and verification of statements of support, the greater the chance that errors will be made by citizens 
supporting or organising an initiative. For example, the more identification information that is asked 
of an initiative supporter, the more chance there is that they will make a simple inputting error. This 
issue is exacerbated by the reliance of the ECI on technology and the rigidity of information 
collection this implies, coupled with the inability of the ECI systems to gather email addresses that 
could be used to ask supporters to correct an error. Thirdly, ECI campaigners believe that the 
extensive identification requirements are making people reluctant to support initiatives.80 The issue 
of identification was one of the most discussed issues in the Council during the drafting of the ECI 
regulation, but no agreement could be reached and so, as we have seen, each Member State set its 
own rules. 81 Fourthly, the identification and verification rules have combined to exclude a number of 
citizens from being able to support an initiative. This question of equality is central to democratic 
legitimisation and is probably the most significant of the issues thrown up by the ECI rules in relation 
to identification and verification, and as a result this issue is discussed in more detail below. 
Substantive issues arising from ECI legislative design  
Equality 
Art 9 TEU states that, “the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall 
receive equal attention from its institutions” and Art 10(3) confirms that “Every citizen shall have the 
right to participate in the democratic life of the Union”. The ECI rules for identifying citizens and for 
allocating and verifying statements of support mean that some EU citizens are excluded from 
supporting an ECI proposal, either because of where they live or because of a lack of an appropriate 
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document, or a combination of both. For example, if an Irish, Dutch or UK national lives in one of the 
countries that require an identity document or number they do not or are not able to possess, then 
they will not be able to support an ECI proposal because they do not qualify on the grounds of 
residency or possess an identity number or document for the country where they are resident.82 
Although direct democratic instruments are not introduced specifically to increase the equality and 
inclusiveness of democratic systems, and the numbers disenfranchised by the ECI rules are likely to 
be relatively small as a percentage of the EU population, they are nevertheless democratic standards 
against which these instruments should be assessed and, if found wanting, criticised. 
The duality of Member State and EU citizenship and the differing electoral and administrative 
cultures in the Member States have led to the difficulties in the ECI regarding equality. Member 
States could have avoided the equality issues if they had reached agreement on standard rules for 
the identification of citizens and on the allocation of statements of support, which would probably 
have required agreement on whether to base the franchise for supporting an initiative on residence 
or nationality, or both. Given that the elections for the European Parliament are still not 
standardised across the EU,83 and that there is no common identification document for EU citizens, it 
was perhaps always going to be unlikely that the ECI would have standardised or centralised 
electoral rules or administration. That this is a policy area of which Member States are reluctant to 
relinquish control is reflected in the treaties, for example the legal basis in the treaties for amending 
the electoral basis of MEPs, Art 223(1) TFEU, is one of the organic laws, which means that approval 
of a decision under this legal base is strongly intergovernmental, similar to the process followed for 
treaty amendment.84  
The ECI voting and franchise rules and administration relate to EU citizenship and the opportunity to 
influence a supranational agenda that the Member States have already agreed to centralise, 
therefore it could be argued that these rules should not be based on Member State citizenship and 
decentralised administration. EU law, however, does not make it clear where the ECI stands in this 
respect. The opening paragraph of the regulation recital states that the Citizens Initiative ‘reinforces 
citizenship of the Union and enhances further the democratic functioning of the Union’, and Art 3(4) 
states that ‘signatories shall be citizens of the Union’, which could support a supranational reading of 
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the ECI and a call for centralised EU level franchise rules and administration. This seems to be 
contradicted, though, by Art 11(4) TEU which states that it is Member State nationals who are 
inviting the Commission to act, not EU citizens.85 Furthermore the ECI is not described as a facet of 
EU citizenship or included in the list of Union rights in Art 20(2) TFEU. It is perhaps surprising that the 
ECI is not included in this treaty article, which includes the right to petition the European Parliament 
and to apply to the Ombudsman.86 There is also some administrative justification for administering 
the ECI at Member State level because they already have systems in place to verify, identity and 
manage democratic processes, although in the long run it may prove a more effective use of 
resources to manage this centrally and not repeat tasks across the EU.  
There may be some arguments in favour of a more clearly supranational ECI, but it is perhaps 
inevitable in dual EU democracy that there are EU and Member State level influences on its franchise 
rules and administration, and therefore some inequality between EU citizens. The level of 
standardisation of rules and centralisation of administration should match the democratic purpose 
of the democratic instrument and its status should be reflected in the treaties, but Member States 
retain control over this policy area. There is already some Member State movement to reduce 
inequalities in the ECI, such as through Spain including the identity card for foreigners on its list of 
eligible identification means for verifying statements of support, but more would need to be done to 
remove the difficulties for the ECI in relation to democratic equality. It may be unrealistic, however, 
to expect centralised verification to be set up in a polity with such limited statehood to eliminate a 
few instances of inequality arising in a minor democratic instrument like the ECI. Increased 
standardisation of the franchise rules is possible and would eliminate the majority of the inequalities 
that exist in the legislative design of the ECI, but they are perhaps inevitable in a dual democracy 
such as the EU and any moves to increase standardisation rely on the willingness of Member States 
to compromise in this important policy area.  
Support thresholds in a dual EU democracy 
To ensure that an initiative is pan-European in nature, representative of the number of citizens and 
also of the number of Member States, the ECI has three numerical thresholds. The absolute 
requirement of one million was set by Art 11(4) TEU and adopted by Reg. 211/2011; the second 
threshold of one quarter of Member States, currently 7, was an interpretation of the phrase 
‘significant number of Member States’ in Art 11(4); and the third threshold, which is the minimum 
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number of statements of support required from each of the seven Member States, was an addition 
in Art 7(2) Reg. 211/2011. The support threshold for ECI organisers to be able to present their 
proposal needs to be high enough to indicate a sufficient degree of representativeness from the 
wider population that any subsequent legal act will apply to, but it also needs to be practically 
attainable.87 This is true of both the absolute level of citizens and the number of Member States. 
This need for the legislative design of an agenda initiative to try to avoid allowing an 
unrepresentative minority to excessively influence the policy or legislative agenda goes to the heart 
of the debate about whether democracy should always be a process that enables the popular 
sovereignty of the majority of citizens, or whether it is appropriate to facilitate the promotion of 
minority interests.88 
The total number of citizens required to support an ECI proposal is a relatively low percentage of EU 
citizens.89 This could raise questions about the representativeness of an ECI proposal that meets the 
support thresholds, but the wide geographic area of the EU means that, even at this low percentage 
level, the collection of such a high absolute figure of support may present practical difficulties due to 
the associated cost and organisational implications. The second and third requirements that the one 
million statements of support must be from ‘a significant number of member states’ with a sufficient 
level of support from each Member State also need to strike a similar balance between 
representativeness, in this case of Member State interests, and practical feasibility. This point was 
recognised by the Commission in its Green paper prior to drafting the regulation: “Whilst a high 
threshold would indeed ensure that the initiative is sufficiently representative [of Member States], it 
would nevertheless make the procedure more burdensome. On the other hand a low threshold 
would render the initiative more accessible, but less representative”.90 The indication so far is that 
well organised and well resourced ECI campaigns do have the ability to reach the support thresholds; 
the two ECIs that have reached a million statements of support so far have been backed by the 
Roman Catholic church and Trade Unions. However, a far higher number of ECIs, totalling 19, mainly 
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organised by groups of citizens, have failed to reach the level of support needed, with only two 
passing 100,000. 
The multiple ECI support thresholds are unusual for an agenda initiative, but not unheard of in 
federal states,91 and reflect the fact the EU is legitimised both by European citizens and more 
strongly via its Member State governments, and that in terms of both population and Member 
States the minority asking for action by the EU institutions needs to be sufficiently representative. As 
well as the equilibrium between representativeness and practicality, therefore, there is also a 
second equilibrium in the EU between EU citizen and Member State representativeness. This raises 
the hypothetical question of whether the Member States requirement is a legitimate protection 
against policy imposition by a minority of Member States or whether it is an unjustified barrier to 
effective participation by EU citizens. Would the impact of reducing the second and third thresholds 
make the ECI unrepresentative of the members of the Union or would it be a legitimate way to 
increase the supranational participative opportunities of EU citizens?  
Reducing the number of Member States needed would benefit those initiatives that have their 
support drawn disproportionately from a specific European area or Member State; in an extreme 
case an initiative that reaches one million statements of support from just one Member State. Direct 
democracy relies on the acceptance by the majority, or representatives of the majority, of the value 
of the opinion of a significant minority. An initiative that only has support from one Member State 
would be problematic in these terms due to the dual nature of EU legitimisation. The EU is not a 
unitary state where it may be acceptable for locally supported initiatives to have national impact 
because of the association with a single demos. Accepting an initiative that draws its support from 
just one Member States is unlikely, but it is possible to imagine scenarios where support may come 
from just two or three Member States that have a particular interest in a specific policy area, for 
example environmental issues that affect a specific geographic area or single market issues that 
affect industries based in a relatively small number of Member States, such as the fishing industry. 
There may be an argument, therefore, that the 7 Member State requirement blocks legitimate 
democratic participation, even in the EU polity that requires respresentativeness of its Member 
States and EU citizens. Furthermore, the Member State requirement for initiative organisers appears 
to be pushing up the number of statements of support that are going to be needed for an initiative 
to meet its thresholds. For example, the Right to Water initiative, as at 12 March 2013, had collected 
1.2 million statements of support but still needed two more quorate countries to make up the 7.  
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An alternative to having a fixed numerical requirement might be to leave the number of Member 
States required as ‘significant’. Leaving the number of Member States as a ‘significant number’ might 
increase the opportunity for democratic participation through the ECI, but it would also increase the 
level of discretion of the Commission and the control they have over the effectiveness of 
participation, and increase the uncertainty of success for organisers. There is no guarantee that the 
Commission would use its discretion to increase the number of ECIs that are able to propose a legal 
act of the Union; the opposite may occur and the use of the term ‘significant number’ may actually 
reduce citizen participation as a result. As we will see below, where the Commission has discretion 
over the application of the ECI registration criteria, it has used it to limit the scope of ECI proposals 
and reduced the ECI’s democratic potential. On the other hand, requiring a ‘significant number of 
Member States’ to support an ECI would allow greater flexibility and give citizens grounds for a legal 
challenge to a refusal by the Commission to propose a legal act. If there are acceptable reasons for 
the lower number of Member States and there are good reasons for the Union to act even if the 
issue is of relevance in a relatively localized area, then citizens have a basis to challenge any decision 
not to act. It is questionable though whether more legal challenges would be beneficial or whether 
courts should be defining an acceptable number of Member States for each policy area. A further 
speculative debate is whether the number of Member States and EU citizens needed in support of 
an ECI could be set according to subject matter, in line with the subsidiarity principle or competence 
arrangements. Initiatives related to exclusive competence, for example, could have a lower Member 
State requirement and initiatives that require treaty amendment, which is a more 
intergovernmental process, could require a higher number of Member States to be considered 
representative. 
The third threshold which indicates whether a Member State can be counted or not is logical, if the 
rationale for a minimum number of states is accepted. The criteria set by Reg. 211/2011 are 
degressively proportional in line with MEP allocation, to take in to account both Member State 
political significance and population significance. This reflects a third equilibrium that needs to be 
considered in the thresholds of the ECI, as a result of the specific nature of the EU, between the 
population of each Member State and their status as a single political entity amongst 27. This 
creates an issue of the equal effectiveness of Member State citizens when acting as EU citizens.92 
Citizens would be equal if treated as a single signature that counts towards an absolute total 
irrespective of their nationality, but the ECI requirements mean that in certain situations the vote, 
for example, of a Cyprus national will be more valuable than a German national because it is a higher 
percentage of the total needed for Cyprus to count as one of the seven Member States required. 
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Alternatively, the regulation could have been drafted with a nominal minimum of say 5,000 citizens 
before a Member State can count towards the seven needed, but this would mean that each 
Member State was equal in value irrespective of its population size. Unsurprisingly the regulation 
follows the example set for MEP allocation to strike a compromise between these two positions. On 
the one hand it might be argued that a supranational democratic instrument such as the ECI should 
focus more strongly on ensuring equality between EU citizens, but on the other hand it might 
equally be argued that Member State representativeness should be strengthened to limit the 
dominance of larger Member State populations in the support totals for ECI proposals. Whichever 
position you take, the duality of the EU is having an impact on the democratic potential of the ECI. 
The two numerical requirements of an absolute number of citizens and a number of Member States 
are inconsistently established in Art 11(4) TEU. A number is used for the total support needed, 
rather than a general phrase such as a “representative and accessible number of citizens”, which 
would leave the specific number to be determined in the regulation. On the other hand, the 
requirement for the number of Member States is that it be ‘significant’; no precise number is used. It 
is unclear why a specific number of citizens required to support an ECI proposal was included in the 
Treaties and the number of Member States was left to be decided during the drafting of the ECI 
Regulation. Given the potential for the EU to increase or decrease in size a definition on which to 
base a figure, rather than a number itself, would allow for flexibility in the ECI process and avoid the 
need to amend the treaties to maintain an appropriate level of representativeness. A definitional 
approach of this sort though would also leave most decision-making about this aspect of the ECI 
design to secondary legislation and the EU institutions, which raises the question of the extent that a 
democratic instrument of this type should be defined by Treaty or by secondary legislation; and 
therefore whether it should be defined by EU institutions or by Member States during a treaty 
convention involving other civil society actors. The greater the significance of a treaty Article the 
more certainty might be expected in the constitutional order of the EU rather than its legislative 
framework. A fixed figure included in the Treaties would provide certainty and secure the ECI more 
strongly within the EU, but reduce the ability of the legislation to be adapted to changes. Whatever 
the decision taken in relation to the level of detail included at Treaty level, it would seem 
appropriate for both the number of citizens and Member States to be either a specific number in the 
treaties or specified in the regulation based on a treaty definition. 
Much of the discussion during drafting about the collection conditions focused on the need to 
reduce the difficulty of collecting statements of support across a wide geographic area, but having 
three thresholds to meet will always make collection complex, more expensive and less able to 
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succeed. The three equilibriums that the thresholds try to take account of reflect the position of an 
EU that contains aspects of an intergovernmental organisation and a federal state and that needs to 
accommodate EU and Member State interests, which makes multiple thresholds and issues with 
democratic equality almost inevitable. 
Strength of legal obligation imposed by successful initiative 
Despite any political and democratic pressures it is possible for an ECI to reach its triple thresholds 
and have its proposal presented to the Commission, but lead to no legal impact. Art 2(1) Reg. 
211/2011 states that an ECI is only able to invite the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal 
for a legal act; there is no obligation imposed on the Commission other than to hold a hearing in the 
European Parliament, and set out within 3 months its conclusions and explain its reasons for the 
action, if any, that it intends to take.93 Not only is there no obligation on the Commission to propose 
a legal act, but when it does make a proposal there is no guarantee over the final outcome once the 
proposal has gone through the legislative process in the European Parliament and Council.  
The legal obligation imposed on decision makers is a distinguishing feature of citizens initiatives. At 
one extreme Poland provides detailed instructions for Parliament starting with a requirement that 
first reading of an initiative proposal needs to be within 3 months of its submission, making an 
initiative akin to the initiation of the legislative process; and at the other end of the spectrum in Italy 
there is no obligation on Parliament to even discuss an agenda initiative proposal, which makes it 
little more than a petition in the form of a legislative proposal.94 Austria sits somewhere in between 
these extremes with its requirements that a proposal be given formal consideration and 
representatives from the initiative being given the opportunity to speak in parliament and is similar 
to the type of political obligations imposed by the legislative design of the ECI.95 The ECI is a form of 
agenda initiative which provides citizens with the opportunity to influence the legislative agenda but 
not to demand action, such as the drafting of legislation or a referendum on the subject. The ECI is 
not an opportunity to directly make a legislative proposal to a Parliament that initiates the legislative 
process, as is the case for most agenda initiatives. It is just an opportunity to invite the Commission 
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to make a proposal for a legal act on behalf of the organisers, thus maintaining the Commission’s 
formal monopoly on initiating the legislative process, and which then needs to go through the EU 
legislative process. The discretionary role of the Commission in the ECI process is therefore an extra 
step when compared to the procedures of most other agenda initiatives and reduces the formal 
ability of an ECI proposal to influence the policy agenda and its outcomes as a result.96 
The evidence so far is that the Commission will be cautious in its response to successful ECI 
proposals and it will use its discretion to protect its established policy preferences. The response to 
both the successful initiatives, the One of Us and Right to Water initiatives, has been limited.97 The 
One of Us initiative led to no action by the Commission because the Commission decided that as ‘EU 
primary legislation explicitly enshrines human dignity, the right to life, and the right to the integrity 
of the person’, which sufficiently met the aims of the initiative. The One of Us campaign response 
strongly rejected the Commission’s reasoning and they have brought an action against the 
Commission in the CJEU claiming, inter alia, that the democratic process has been violated by the 
Commission’s reasoning and non conformity with Reg. 211/2011.98 The Right to Water initiative 
received a number of promises to support the aims of the initiative, but the only concrete action 
promised was a consultation on the Drinking Water Directive, there was no legal act proposed. The 
response of the Commission has been to state support for the aims of the initiatives presented to 
them, but to defend its current policy in both areas and not identify any legal acts that might be 
proposed in support of the initiatives’ aims. 
According to clause 1 of the regulation recital, the ECI should raise citizens to a level that is intended 
to be on a par with the rights of the European Parliament and Council in terms of proposing EU 
legislation.99 Michael Efler argues that if compared with the rights of the European Parliament and 
Council to request a legal act, as they were set out in ex-Article 192.2 TEC at the time of the drafting 
of Art 11(4) TEU, then the Commission is obliged to take some legislative action on the topic of the 
proposal once the criteria for submission are met.100 However, there is no specific mention of the 
comparison with the other institutions right to initiate legislation in Art 11(4) TEU or the Reg. 
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211/2011. Art 11(4) TEU has been drafted to closely follow the wording of Art 225 TFEU, which 
establishes the European Parliament right to request a legal act,101 but Art 11(4) establishes a lower 
legal obligation. An ECI proposal leads to an ‘invitation’ to the Commission ‘to propose a legal act’, 
whereas the European Parliament can ‘request’ the Commission to submit a proposal.102 
Furthermore, Art 225 TFEU goes on to stipulate that despite the stronger legal obligation on the 
Commission in relation to a request from the European Parliament, the Commission can still decide 
to take no action. Therefore, if the Commission can respond to the European Parliament by doing 
nothing, then it can presumably also do nothing in response to a Citizens’ proposal for a legal act, 
which is contrary to the argument put forward by Efler. One democratically interesting impact of 
obliging the Commission to propose a legal act following a successful ECI would have been to pass 
decision-making on the outcome of an ECI proposal more strongly to the democratically legitimised 
institutions of the European Parliament and the Council; and reduce the discretion of the non-
democratically legitimised Commission. 
Despite the weak legal obligation included in the ECI legislation it is still possible for a successful ECI 
to have an influence on the EU policy or legislation agenda and its outcomes,103 for example as a 
result of the procedural obligations at the end of the ECI process that allow organisers to promote 
their proposal to the Commission and the European Parliament and try to increase the political 
pressure for action. The number of legal outcomes from agenda initiatives used in Europe are not 
high, commonly 10-15% of proposals made, but this is not the only measure of the impact of direct 
democracy,104 and counter intuitively there is evidence that agenda initiatives with formally weak 
legal obligations lead to a comparably higher number of policy or legislative acts than agenda 
initiatives designed with greater legal obligations on institutions to act.105 These outcomes are the 
result of softer forms of power, of political pressure rather than the hard legal obligations included 
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in the legislative design of an instrument of direct democracy.106 Examples of this type of pressure 
are: the reluctance to frustrate a rare initiative that has managed to overcome the complexity of the 
process and gather the level of formal support needed, and the democratic value it represents; the 
political pressure that may be generated as a result of the public debate generated by the ECI 
campaign; the desire on the Commission’s part to be seen to be supporting democratic legitimacy; 
and the risk to the Commission’s reputation if a high number of Citizens Initiatives lead to nothing.  
The relative weakness of the legal obligations imposed on the EU institutions at the end of the ECI 
process could be turned in to a democratic benefit, if the removal of the perception of a threat to 
existing policy and existing representative means of democratic legitimisation, at both Member 
State and EU level, were recognised and it led to the Commission allowing a wider public debate and 
greater engagement with the EU policy agenda as a result. If this happened then the increase in the 
extent of effective participation and the participation of citizens in the policy agenda could 
compensate for the lack of hard legislative obligations that give direct citizen influence over agenda 
outcomes.107 Moreover, the weakness of the legal obligations removes one of the main risks of 
introducing direct democracy: that EU policy might veer unexpectedly and lead to the introduction 
of policies that are irrational or with long term negative effects. These type of outcomes are rare, 
but they have been seen with the use of the full-scale initiative in California, where an initiative can 
oblige the holding of a binding referendum whose result can only be overturned by another initiative 
and referendum.108 The ECI is far from having the type of legislative design with binding implications 
that direct democracy has in California. It is important therefore to recognise that the ECI is not a full 
scale initiative, as used in California, but an agenda initiative, when designing how extensive 
participation should be, and deciding how cautious institutions should be in protecting existing 
policy preferences, as Schiller and Setala put it: “Agenda initiatives do not seem to represent such a 
strong challenge for the legal or constitutional system since the legislature will, anyway, have the 
final decision on contents”.109 It will be interesting to see whether the Commission will continue to 
be cautious about proposing legal acts subsequent to successful initiatives or whether the ECI starts 
to lead to legal outcomes despite the weakness of the legal obligations its legislative design imposes. 
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The question of whether the legislative design of the ECI allows for wide and potentially critical 
democratic participation during the deliberative phase of the ECI process, prior to submission of 
successful ECIs, is considered next in the context of ECI registration. 
Scope of subject matter of ECI proposals 
One way of categorising agenda initiatives is between those that can make proposals that address 
constitutional matters,110 and those that are limited to ‘ordinary’ legislation.111 This distinction is 
significant because the inclusion of constitutional issues increases the range and salience of the 
influence that citizens can have on the policy agenda through an agenda initiative. For the ECI to be 
a constitutional initiative it would need to be able to make proposals that require or request changes 
to the treaties. The Commission has indicated that it will limit the ECI to legislative matters, making 
the ECI a legislative agenda initiative, such as in Poland where constitutional and budgetary issues 
are excluded.112 The other limitation on the scope of subject matter that the ECI can lead to public 
debate on is the result of the competences of the EU and the limitations to the powers of the 
Commission. The narrower the scope of the subject matter of an agenda initiative, the less influence 
that citizens will be able to exert over the policy agenda and the more limited the democratic 
potential of the instrument will be. The limitation on ECI subject matter is the result, in part, of its 
legislative design, but more significantly the result of the Commission interpretation of this 
legislation. The legislation is analysed in this section of the chapter. The application of these 
legislative provisions is discussed later in the chapter. 
 Art 11(4) TEU stated that citizens ‘may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, 
within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens 
consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. The 
provisions in Art 11(4) TEU could have been interpreted as allowing citizens to choose the subject 
matter of and seek popular support for proposals in relation to almost any issues that the citizens 
themselves, not the Commission, believe need some sort of legal action taken to implement the 
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treaty principles, with the legal test of the proposals only taking place once they were submitted to 
the Commission.113 However, Reg. 211/2011 adopted a more restrictive approach than this by 
establishing a legal admissibility test for the registration of initiatives, removing the reference to it 
being the citizen’s opinion that legal action is required for implementing the Treaties, and removing 
the reference to citizens being able to make ‘any appropriate proposal’.  
Reg. 211/21011 includes a four-part admissibility test that the Commission assesses each initiative 
against at registration. Arts 4(2)(b), (c) and (d) of Reg. 211/2011 are the three substantive parts to 
the admissibility test. Arts 4(2)(c) and (d) of Reg 211/2011 require, respectively, that the proposed 
initiative is not ‘manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious’ and ‘not manifestly contrary to the values 
of the Union as set out in Art 2 TEU’. The second part of Art 11(4) TEU became Art 4(2)(b) in Reg. 
211/2011 and requires that the proposed initiative does not ‘manifestly fall outside the framework 
of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties’.  
Art 4(2)(c) is a common provision in regulations for agenda initiatives that allows authorities to block 
initiatives that are considered to be irrelevant and/or malicious, too far from mainstream 
democratic engagement and without any serious intent to engage with EU policy; for example 
because the proposal relates to a personal issue or a private legal dispute, or is being used as a 
vehicle for expressing views widely considered to be offensive, bizarre or superficial. An agenda 
initiative derives democratic benefit from allowing as wide a range of proposals to be raised as 
possible and allowing citizens themselves to set the limit, but inclusion of this type of clause is 
justified in the interests of providing a legal means of ensuring the integrity of the ECI process, and is 
likely to have little democratic impact given how unlikely it is that this clause is not met by an 
initiative.114 Furthermore, the Commission would not want to be seen to be endorsing these types of 
proposals by registering them or want to allow them to use the (scarce) resources made available to 
ECIs.  
Art 4(2)(d) is a similarly broad provision that means an ECI proposal is assessed by the Commission 
against the qualitative criteria of the principles in Article 2 TEU. All the ECI proposals so far have met 
this condition and given the universality and broad nature of the principles in Art 2 it seems unlikely 
that this condition will not be met. However, if Citizens Initiatives are rejected on this basis, it will be 
interesting to see where the Commission draws the line as to what is manifestly against Union 
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values and to what extent it appears to be a political decision not to allow a challenge to the 
Commission’s own policy agenda. 
Neither of these two criteria for admissibility that test the ‘appropriateness’ of an initiative limit to 
any great extent the opportunity for citizens to exert influence over the EU legislative and policy 
agenda. The outer boundaries that these criteria establish are closely aligned and broadly defined, 
and provide plenty of scope to make proposals for legal acts that can develop or challenge EU 
policies. Clauses to set outer limits an initiative would only rarely exceed, based on generally agreed 
principles and standards of behaviour, are easily justifiable and appropriate for the Commission’s 
decision-making powers. The fact that no initiative has yet failed Art 4(2)(c) and (d) indicates that 
they are not stifling the democratic potential of the ECI.  
Art 4(2)(b) is different in nature to the other two registration criteria and has had the most 
significant impact on the democratic potential of the ECI. Both parts of the admissibility criteria of 
Art 4(2)(b) – ‘not manifestly outside the framework of the Commission‘s powers‘ and ‘for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties’ – allow for discretion in the Commission’s application of the 
legal admissibility test at registration. The requirement for an initiative proposal to not be manifestly 
outside the framework of the Commission’s powers could be interpreted as suggesting that it will 
only be refused registration if there is clearly no available legal act that can be taken that would 
contribute to the implementation of its objectives.115 This broad interpretation would mean that 
organisers of an initiative only need to propose objectives for registration purposes consonant with 
the broad system of competences set out in the Treaties. The Commission, as opposed to the 
initiative organisers, would then have to decide, once the support thresholds had been reached, 
precisely what sort of legal act to propose. A narrower interpretation of this first part of the 
admissibility criteria in Art 4(2)(b) would be to require organisers at the outset to clearly identify a 
legal base within the Treaties, for all aspects of their proposal, that would allow the Commission to 
propose a legal act of the Union at the end of the process. This interpretation would require a formal 
test of an initiative at registration as if it were initiating the legislative process, and would increase 
the burden on organisers to discharge the legal admissibility requirements.116 The Commission 
themselves have stated recently, in seeming contradiction of the ECI registration experience so far, 
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that in the case of doubt an initiative should be registered, and that an initiative can be registered 
without identifying a legal basis for their proposal.117  
For the second part of Art 4(2)(b), ‘for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’, a broad 
interpretation would mean that initiatives could be registered that had proposed legal acts for the 
purpose of implementing the principles of the Treaties, as set out in Arts 2 and 3 TEU, and which 
would not necessarily exclude treaty amendment. However, before the implementing regulation 
came in to force the Commission stated that treaty amendment would be outside the scope of the 
ECI and a narrower interpretation of this second part of the criteria in Art 4(2)(b) Reg. 211/2011 
would be applied.118 This was stated despite the fact that this is not explicitly required by Art 11(4) 
TEU,119 and there are treaty articles that could provide a legal base for the Commission to propose 
treaty amendment.120 
It is the interpretation and implementation by the Commission of the admissibility criteria in Art 
4(2)(b) Reg. 211/2011 that have led to all refusals  to register an initiative so far. The next section of 
the chapter analyses the registration decisions taken by the Commission focuses on the criteria in 
Art 4(2)(b) Reg. 211/2011. 
Review and critical analysis of Commission registration decisions for ECI proposals 
This second section of the chapter examines the extent to which the democratic potential of the ECI 
has been fulfilled in practice and whether this new facet of EU citizenship is a strong opportunity for 
citizen-led democratic participation in the EU or one that is throttled by institutional mediation. In 
the first 20 months after Reg. 211/2011 implementing the ECI came in to force on April 1st 2012, the 
Commission received requests to register 37 initiatives: 20 of these were registered,121 15 were 
refused registration by the Commission, and two were withdrawn and not resubmitted. By the time 
of the first deadline for collection on Nov 1st 2013 about five million statements of support had been 
collected by the registered proposals and three initiatives,122 which account for approximately four 
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million of these statements of support, had successfully reached the support thresholds needed to 
proceed to the final phases of the process. There is clearly interest in using this democratic 
instrument, but questions remain about how strongly this democratic engagement is being 
conditioned by institutional mediation. The potential democratic benefits of the ECI derive from 
increasing citizen influence over the policy agenda and over the outcomes from that agenda, an 
influence that should include the ability to challenge established policy preferences; and also, 
indirectly, through developing the political activity and debate of EU citizens. It will be argued, 
however, that the Commission has restrictively applied the rules relating to the admissibility of ECI 
proposals during the registration process and made a limited response to the two ECIs that have 
reached the thresholds of support. As a result the likelihood of the democratic benefits of the ECI 
being realised has been reduced. 
Categorisation of European Citizens’ Initiative proposals  
The proposed categorisation of ECI proposals to support the subsequent discussion of the 
Commission’s interpretation of the registration criteria relies on three factors: how specifically the 
subject matter is defined, the type of legal acts proposed, and the extent the proposal appears to 
challenge existing policy. 
The first grouping is of initiatives that submitted proposals with specific subject matter and with 
specific legal acts included in the objectives of the proposal. For example, one proposal cites a 
previously used legal base to request a further restriction on speed limits to 30km/h in urban 
areas;123 and another seeks to complete the move to ending mobile roaming fees, again citing a 
previously used legal base in relation to the proposed legal act;124 and there is a proposal asking for 
an extension of the use of the Erasmus programme.125 All the proposals in this group invite legal 
action from the Commission within an existing policy area and offer little challenge to the 
established policy preferences of the Commission. All the proposals in this group were registered. 
The second grouping is of initiatives whose subject matter is more widely construed and more 
challenging to existing policy than those in the first group. The majority of the proposals in this group 
are supported by civil society organisations and have broad mission statements or campaign 
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objectives associated with these organisations as their subject matter.126 Within their broad 
campaign objectives, however, these initiatives all invite the Commission to propose specific legal 
acts for which their legal team has found a specific legal base in the Treaties.127 For example, the 
High Quality Education for All initiative seeks to ‘establish a multi-stakeholder 
discussion/collaboration platform ... [to] debate and formulate a European policy for a quality, 
pluralistic and EU 2020-oriented educational model’.128 This is typical of the ‘softer’ legal acts 
proposed by initiatives in this group, which appear more likely to be registered than harder 
legislative proposals such as  those in the third group below.129 The Universal Basic Income initiative 
originally proposed legislation they called a ‘legal rights act’. This was refused registration and the 
reason given was that the suggested treaty article, Art 153(2) TFEU, did not provide a legal base for 
legislation to be proposed that might introduce an act of this sort. However, the initiative was 
resubmitted and registered with the same subject matter and long term goal after the legislative 
proposal was replaced by softer legal action, based on Art 156 TFEU, of an examination of the issue 
through pilot studies. The only other initiative in this category refused registration was the Friends of 
the Earth backed Anti Nuclear Power initiative.130 
The third and largest group of initiatives are those that contain the proposals that are more novel 
and most strongly seek a new direction in EU policy, although the extent to which this is true varies 
from proposal to proposal. The subject matter of these initiatives tends to be reasonably specific, 
but not just an extension of existing EU policy as is the case for those in the first group; and the 
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objectives tend to be more ambitious in the sense of being new or extensive legal acts, which 
distinguishes these proposals from those in group two. The subject matter in this group is wide-
ranging: to create a social, ecological and solidarity European bank,131 to sing a European anthem in 
Esperanto132, to end legalised prostitution,133 and to guarantee EU citizenship for citizens of newly 
independent regions, amongst others.134 The initiatives in this group have all been refused 
registration either because of a lack of a legal basis for action or because they propose treaty 
change, which relate to the two-part criteria in Art 4(2)(b) and are discussed in more detail next. 
First part of admissibility criteria: manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s 
powers  
Restrictive interpretation of treaty articles due to uncertain legal base for action 
The first part of the criteria in Art 4(2)(b) states that the legal acts proposed by initiatives must not 
be ‘manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers’. There is no requirement in Reg. 
211/2011 that uncertainty about the final legal outcome of a proposal should be reason alone for 
refusing registration. However, the Commission has strictly applied the requirement that a proposal 
must not be ‘manifestly outside’ the framework of their powers. The Cohesion Policy initiative, for 
example, invites the Commission to propose a legal act within an EU policy area of equality between 
regions and indicates specific legal bases to support the action proposed.135 Three specific actions 
were set out that the organisers of this initiative wished to have implemented; two of which are 
relatively soft legal acts that are not manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers: 
‘defining the concept of “national” regions’ and ‘identifying the “national” regions by name’.136 The 
basis of the registration refusal was that ‘promoting the conditions of national minorities cannot be 
understood as helping to reduce the ‘disparities as to the level of development between regions’ 
and underdevelopment of certain regions’. This aim of reducing disparities between regions is 
required by Art 174 TFEU to trigger Art 177 TFEU, which is the legal base that was suggested as 
relevant to the proposal. It is far from certain that the proposal in relation to national minorities 
                                                          
131
  For details of the initiative proposal and the letter informing organisers that registration has been refused 
go to <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/539> accessed 13 Apr 2015. 
132
  For details of the initiative proposal and the letter informing organisers that registration has been refused 
go to <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/449> accessed 13 Apr 2015. 
133
  For details of the initiative proposal and the letter informing organisers that registration has been refused 
go to <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/1486> accessed 13 Apr 2015. 
134
  For details of the initiative proposal and the letter informing organisers that registration has been refused 
go to <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/469> accessed 13 Apr 2015. 
135
 For details of the initiative go to <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-
registered/details/1488> accessed 13 Apr 2015. 
136
 The first objective of ‘ensuring that Member States entirely fulfil their international commitments regarding 
national minorities’ is manifestly outside the Commission’s powers. 
101 
 
meets the criteria of Art 174 TFEU, but it is at least arguable. For instance, in areas where there is a 
correlation between minority groups and poor economic performance actions that are taken to 
increase the understanding and definition of minority groups may well help to improve economic 
performance through enabling better targeting of funds and project development. Art 167(2) TFEU 
was also indicated as a possible legal base by the Cohesion Policy initiative: ‘Action shall be aimed at 
encouraging cooperation between member states and, if necessary, supporting their action in the 
following areas: improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the 
European peoples ...’. Although defining the concept of national minorities in an EU context and 
identifying them could be considered to meet this aim in relation to European peoples and be a basis 
for registering the proposal, Art 167 TFEU was simply dismissed as not providing a legal base for the 
objectives proposed by the initiative without further explanation.137 Despite the possibility of 
meeting the Art 174 TFEU criteria and Art 167 TFEU, and the relatively ‘soft’ nature of the legal 
outcome invited of a reprioritisation of funds, the Commission took the decision not to register the 
initiative. This strict interpretation of Art 4(2)(b) implies that rather than just needing to avoid being 
manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers, an initiative will only be registered if 
the legal acts proposed by the organisers meet the more stringent test of being clearly inside the 
framework of the Commission’s powers. 
Refusal when criteria for admissibility partially met 
The Commission has refused to register initiatives unless they meet the criteria for admissibility for 
all aspects of their proposal, despite there being no provision in the Regulation that states that an 
initiative cannot be registered in part or that resubmission without the offending part(s) cannot be 
suggested. This was clearest in the Minority SafePack initiative138 which proposed a range of 
measures to achieve progress towards its overall goal of improving the protection of persons 
belonging to national and linguistic minorities and strengthening cultural and linguistic diversity. The 
Commission response stated that although some measures were within their powers to submit a 
proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties the ‘Regulation on 
the citizens’ initiative does not provide for the registration of parts of a proposed initiative’. It 
appears problematic for the registration of an initiative if it invites the Commission to propose a 
number of legal acts, and when an initiative do so then all the actions need to have an applicable 
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legal base, which reduces the scope of proposals and limits public debate generated by an initiative 
in relation to its overall subject matter. 
Inconsistency in registration decisions 
The No Legalised Prostitution initiative139 sought to use Art 83 TFEU to invite the Commission to 
propose legal acts that would lead to the criminalisation of issues related to prostitution. Even 
though it was accepted that aspects of this proposal could be covered by EU level legislation, it was 
decided by the Commission that the initiative could not be registered as it was not specific enough 
about the types of prostitution related issues it was trying to address, and that it was not clear 
whether there was a legal base for the Commission to propose a legal act or not; even though Art 83 
TFEU specifically mentions sexual exploitation of women. Not only did the response to this initiative 
reiterate the Commission’s restrictive approach indicated in the previous paragraphs, it is also 
unclear from the explanation provided by the Commission why the No Legalised Prostitution 
initiative should have received a different registration decision from the Ecocide initiative, which 
supports its proposal to criminalise ecocide using the same treaty article, Art 83 TFEU, and which 
was accepted as a relevant legal base despite environmental crime not being specifically 
mentioned.140  One possible explanation is that the environment is an established EU policy area and 
there is case law that supports the possibility of the EU criminalising environmental damage.141 This 
would mean, though, that the No Legalised Prostitution initiative has failed the admissibility test not 
because criminalisation per se is not a competence of the EU, but because sexual exploitation is not 
a subject area that has already been dealt with by the EU, which is not a registration requirement. 
Another initiative related to environmental issues, the Anti-incinerator initiative, would also appear 
to have been dealt with more leniently than the No Legalised Prostitution initiative with respect to 
the need for a legal base to be clearly and specifically linked to all aspects of the proposal. The Anti-
incinerator initiative142 suggested ‘Maastrich (JO 29.07.1992) / Art 3 - alinéa k ‘ politique dans le 
domaine de l'environnement’ as their relevant treaty article, which does not provide a legal base for 
the proposed legal acts. This initiative stated seven wide-ranging framework principles as the legal 
action to be invited and the Commission considered there to be a sufficient legal base for the 
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proposal of a legal act and for the initiative to be registered even though a legal base is not clearly 
linked to each of the seven objectives. This seems to be a more lenient interpretation of the 
admissibility criteria than when applied to the Solidarity Bank initiative which also only indicated Art 
3 TEU as a supporting treaty article relevant to its proposal, but was refused registration.143 
The decision to reject the TTIP initiative in October 2014 is one of the highest profile registration 
refusals by the Commission.144 The unsatisfactory justification for this refusal and the attitude of the 
Commission it reflects has significant implications for the democratic potential of the ECI. The 
Commission refused to register the Stop TTIP initiative, in seeming contradiction of the previously 
registered Swissout initiative, for two reasons.145 The first is that the Commission considers that an 
ECI cannot be used to ask the Commission to make a proposal in relation to a ‘preparatory act’, such 
as a Council decision authorising negotiations. Although the decision taken by the Council to start 
negotiations is a legal act of the Union,146 the Commission believes that it is not an ‘appropriate 
proposal’ for an ECI because it does not directly modify EU law. The ECI Regulation, however, does 
not exclude proposals that only deploy legal effects between EU institutions and do not directly 
modify EU law. The regulatory requirement is just that the Commission be invited to make any 
appropriate proposal ‘on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required’; 
there is no specific requirement that it be to modify EU law. Furthermore, the Commission has 
registered ECI proposals previously that did not directly modify EU law; for example the High Quality 
Education for All initiative and the Universal Basic Income initiative; and the Commission have 
deemed policy consultation as an appropriate response to a successful ECI through their response to 
the Right to Water initiative. 
If this exclusion of preparatory acts from ECI proposals is maintained, it will mean that citizens are 
excluded from using the ECI process to try to influence the agenda of any external treaty, such as the 
TTIP, that is being negotiated by the EU. This excludes the ECI from one of the most important roles 
of the EU, one where it is acting almost as a form of federal state, and is a significant restriction on 
the scope and democratic potential of the ECI to try to influence the wider EU policy agenda. 
The second reason the Commission gives for refusing to register the Stop TTIP initiative is that a 
proposal that invites the Commission to not act or to stop something from occurring, in this case to 
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repeal the mandate for the TTIP negotiations and not to conclude CETA, is not admissible under the 
ECI Regulation. Again, there is no express exclusion of legal acts of this sort in the ECI Regulation. 
This exclusion is asserted in the registration refusal as a corollary of the positive requirement stated 
in the Regulation that an ECI ‘may only invite the Commission to submit an[y] appropriate proposal 
for a legal act considered necessary by the citizens’. However, for an initiative to be refused 
registration it should be on the basis that it fails to meet one of the four criteria in Art 4(2) of the ECI 
Regulation. The refusal to register the Stop TTIP initiative only refers to the criterion of Art 4(2)(b) 
Reg 211/2011 to support its decision.147 This states that for an ECI proposal to be refused 
registration it must ‘manifestly fall outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a 
proposal for a legal act of the Union’. Given that it is within the Commission’s powers to propose a 
termination of negotiations to the Council and it is a legal act of the Union, it is difficult to see how 
this criterion is met and the decision to refuse to register the Stop TTIP initiative justified. Not only 
does the refusal mean that ECI proposals must be clearly inside the framework of the Commission’s 
powers to be registered, instead of manifestly outside to not be registered, it also means that even 
when clearly inside the framework of the Commission’s powers there will be times when the 
Commission will decide not to register an ECI proposal. 
The decision to reject an ECI that invites the Commission to not propose a legal act or to not take a 
legal action also has significant democratic implications. It restricts citizen influence only to 
confirming support for an external treaty that the EU has negotiated and implies that in the future 
the Commission will refuse to register all ECI proposals that invite the Commission to recommend 
stopping or reversing any EU policy decision. This strongly conditions the ability of citizens to be able 
to use the ECI to challenge established policy preferences, and reduces its value in democratic 
terms.148 
The Commission has again decided to choose an interpretation of the legislation that restricts the 
ECI’s democratic potential by limiting the subject range of citizen participation. There is enough 
interpretative scope in the ECI legislation for the Commission to be able to register the Stop TTIP 
initiative, and it almost feels like the Commission first decided it did not want public debate 
unsettling the TTIP and CETA process, and then worked back from there to try to find a legal 
justification for this decision.149 It should also be remembered that registering an ECI is only to allow 
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public debate. It does not impose a legal obligation on the Commission to take any legal action 
proposed, and they have shown with the One Of Us initiative that they are prepared to take no 
action at all in response to ECI proposals, even when they are supported by a large number of EU 
citizens as is the case for the TTIP.150  
The ECI registration process places a burden of proof on the Commission to show that one of the 
criterion for non-registration is met; in this case it is that the ECI proposal is manifestly outside the 
framework of the Commission’s powers. It is not the ECI organisers that need to prove that an ECI 
should be registered, and if there is doubt as to whether an initiative should be registered then the 
wording of the Regulation implies that registration should be favoured. In the case of the Stop TTIP 
initiative the Commission has not discharged this burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and in 
the process has taken a stance that significantly limits democratic participation and is difficult to 
justify. 
Increased legal burden on European Citizens’ Initiative organisers 
Organisers are only required to provide limited information to register an initiative, such as the legal 
outcomes that are being sought and the relevant treaty articles.151 A draft legal act and further 
detailed information can also be provided but are not required. On the face of it therefore the 
registration of an initiative is not complex and should not impose a strong legal burden on 
organisers. The Commission decisions though have increased this burden by confirming that it is not 
enough to be within the general principles of the Union or an existing area of EU policy to be 
registered; and that an initiative will only be registered if a suitable legal base is identified for the 
specific legal act(s) the organisers are inviting the Commission to propose. Furthermore, the 
increased burden of meeting this higher threshold of legal admissibility has been reversed on to the 
organisers who must demonstrate that their initiative is clearly inside the framework of the 
Commission’s powers, rather than the Commission being required to establish that the initiative is 
manifestly outside the framework of its powers before refusing registration. 
The legal burden placed on the initiative organisers could have been mitigated if the Commission 
had taken a more facilitative approach to the registration process; an approach perhaps that 
checked the appropriateness of a proposal in an EU context and then assisted organisers to identify 
a legal base or to frame objectives that had a chance of achieving a legal outcome at the end of the 
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process. The Commission’s role at registration so far though has been a passive one limited to 
formally confirming whether or not the organisers have been successful in framing their proposal so 
as to meet the strict test of legal admissibility resulting from the Commission’s interpretation of Art 
4(2)(b). The letter informing organisers that their initiative has been refused registration usually 
provides limited information about the reasoning behind the decision taken, offers no further 
support to organisers, does not indicate resubmission as an option, and simply tells organisers that 
the General Court or the Ombudsman are the avenues for challenging a decision without inviting any 
further discussion with the Commission. 
Despite this formally unsupportive position, the Commission has actually provided further 
information and assistance for organisers to be able to resubmit an initiative when requested, 
which, if continued, could indicate a move towards being more supportive of registering 
initiatives.152 Furthermore, all the refusal letters include a statement that the Commission has 
carried out an ‘in depth examination ... of all other possible legal bases’,153 which is not required by 
the Regulation and would also appear to indicate some willingness on the part of the Commission to 
assist organisers in bringing their proposal within the framework of the Commission’s powers. 
However, no alternative legal bases have yet been suggested by the Commission that would allow a 
legal act of the Union to be proposed in relation to any of the objectives of any of the initiatives, 
which makes it seem rather more like a phrase by rote that discourages resubmission.154  
The burden on organisers is also increased by applying the admissibility test at the start of the ECI 
process. If it had been applied at the end of the process then this legal burden would have been 
more likely to fall to the Commission when exercising their responsibility to make the legal and 
political decisions about whether and how an initiative that has gathered the necessary support will 
be responded to.155 If the Commission were to initiate the legislative process in response to an 
initiative then it would fall to them to find a legal base to do so. Having the admissibility of the 
possible legal outcomes of a proposal tested at registration brings legal decisions, such as whether 
there is an applicable legal base, to the start of the process where the burden can more easily fall on 
the citizens proposing the initiative.  
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Front loading the admissibility test in the process also denies organisers the chance to put their case 
for action and to receive a comprehensive explanation of why their proposal does not fit in the 
Treaties, both of which are formally provided for at the end of the process.156 This significantly 
reduces input from organisers in to the decision-making about possible legal bases and outcomes 
and also allows for an increase in political factors influencing the registration of initiatives. There is 
some early indication that certain subject areas, such as the environment, may be more likely to be 
registered.157 If this were the case, and it is certainly not proven yet, then political decisions that 
should be part of the final phase of the European Citizens’ Initiative process, after the opportunity 
for democratic participation, are being taken in a closed manner without public deliberation.158 
Second part of admissibility test: for the purpose of implementing the treaties 
The second part of the legal admissibility criteria in Art 4(2)(b) Reg. 211/2011 is that the legal act the 
Commission is invited to propose must be ‘for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. Three 
initiatives - the Anti-Nuclear Power initiative,159 the Self-Determination Human Right initiative,160 and 
the Let Me Vote initiative161 - have required its interpretation and application by the Commission. 
The first two were refused registration, but the Let Me Vote initiative was registered despite the fact 
that it seeks an amendment to primary law: Art 20(2) TFEU. 
The Commission stated prior to the regulation coming in to force that the European Citizens’ 
Initiative cannot be used to propose treaty change.162 The Commission tried to confirm this principle 
when refusing the registration of the Anti-Nuclear Power initiative; notwithstanding the fact that the 
principle reason for refusal was that its subject was the Euratom Treaty.163 Nevertheless, and despite 
the fact that amendment to the Treaties was also not specifically invited by the initiative or intended 
by the organisers, the Commission took this early opportunity to assert, for the first time, that an 
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initiative cannot seek treaty change, and registration of this initiative would have been refused on 
this ground as well. The Commission stated in the registration refusal that ‘the legal bases of the TEU 
and TFEU cannot be interpreted as giving the Commission the possibility to propose a legal act that 
would have the effect of modifying or repealing provisions of primary law’.164 This assertive 
statement is not strictly correct as there are treaty articles that give the Commission the possibility 
to propose a legal act that could lead to the modification of provisions of primary law. Two such 
treaty articles, Art 48(2) TEU and Art 25 TFEU, have been cited as relevant treaty articles in the Self-
Determination Human Right initiative, and the Let Me Vote initiative respectively. The different 
registration decisions for these initiatives are discussed next. 
The refusal letter sent to the organisers of the Self-Determination Human Right initiative stated that, 
‘amending the Treaties, as implicitly suggested by your reference to Art 48(2) TEU, falls outside the 
scope of the ECI, as the latter may only be used to request the Commission to submit a proposal for 
the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. Despite this clear legal base for a Commission proposal 
of the sort envisaged by the Self-Determination Human Right initiative, it was decided that this type 
of proposal did not meet the requirement that an initiative must be for the purpose of implementing 
the Treaties. Art 48(2) TEU provides that the Commission may ‘submit to the Council proposals for 
the amendment of the Treaties. These proposals may, inter alia, serve either to increase or to reduce 
the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties’. As a result of the Commission’s rejection 
of the use of Art 48(2) TEU to support an ECI proposal, the EU is in a position where the Commission 
can propose changes to the Treaties using Art 48(2) TEU, but a body of EU citizens cannot use this 
treaty provision to ask the Commission to make such a proposal. As democratically unappealing as 
this position may appear, legally it is arguable that Art 48(2) TEU, as it provides a basis for 
amendment rather than implementation of the Treaties, should fall outside the scope of the ECI 
because Art 11(4) TEU and Art 4(2)(b) both refer specifically to implementation. However, this 
explanation of the Commission’s stance is challenged by the decision to register the Let Me Vote 
initiative discussed next. 
The Let Me Vote initiative invites the Commission to propose that EU citizens can vote in all elections 
in the Member State in which they are resident. Art 25 TFEU, which is a passerelle clause that 
provides for strengthening or adding to the rights listed in Art 20(2) TFEU, is submitted as the legal 
base for this proposal. This initiative was registered despite inviting a proposal from the Commission 
that would lead to a change in primary law. This means that in some circumstances Treaty 
amendment can fall within the scope of the ECI and meet the requirement that a proposal must be 
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‘for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’, and begs the question of what might exclude Art 
48(2) TEU from its scope but not Art 25 TFEU. 
One distinction between the two proposals that could explain the Commission’s approach, other 
than that the Let Me Vote proposal might be a more attractive proposition for the EU, is that the 
legal base for this initiative is a passerelle clause in the Treaties specifically related to the article in 
question, Art 20(2) TFEU. Whereas the Self-Determination Human Right initiative suggested a legal 
base that was not linked to a specific topic and would invite a proposal that would feed in to the 
ordinary revision procedure instead. Another distinction that might go some way to explaining the 
Commission’s approach is that the Let Me Vote initiative proposal, based on Art 25 TFEU, does not 
require a new competence to be introduced in to the Treaties for the legal act to be proposed by the 
Commission, whereas the Self-Determination Human Right initiative requires an amendment to the 
Treaties that introduces a new legal base before its objectives can be realised. It might be argued 
therefore that the structure of the legal basis for Union legislative action is not in itself being 
amended by an Art 25 TFEU action, but it would be if an Art 48(2) TEU proposal led to a legal act of 
the Union. 
However, neither of these distinctions avoid the fact that they are both treaty articles that provide 
for a legal proposal from the Commission that could lead to the amendment of the Treaties, albeit of 
differing character. The decision to register the Let Me Vote initiative means that amendment of the 
Treaties, broadly speaking, is possible through use of the ECI process. An amendment that creates a 
new legal base in the Treaties might be excluded, but left open are the questions of how the other 
passerelle clauses and the special revision procedure might be treated if they are indicated as 
relevant treaty articles in future initiatives and, more broadly, precisely when treaty amendment is 
acceptable as part of the ECI process and when it is not. 
This fine distinction between legal bases of the Treaties that are within the scope of the ECI does not 
feel like a very satisfactory basis on which to justify the variation in application of the admissibility 
criteria or particularly sustainable if one examines the relevant legal framework. Art 48(2) TEU is not 
clearly excluded by the wording of Art 11(4) TEU that the Commission can make ‘any appropriate 
proposal within its powers’ or by the requirement that it not be manifestly outside the powers of the 
Commission, and if treaty amendment is considered to fall within the Commission’s understanding 
of ‘for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’ in other situations then why not for Art 48(2) TEU 
as well? Without an explicit statement in either the primary or secondary law that treaty 
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amendment is excluded from the scope of the ECI it may leave any decision to reject the 
admissibility of an initiative on this basis open to legal challenge.165 
Allowing the ECI to be used to invite proposals for treaty change, whether using Art 48(2) as a legal 
base or using a differentiated process for ECI proposals of this nature, would provide a common 
institutional opportunity for all EU citizens to have some direct influence on the treaty change 
agenda, albeit with its impact formally weak and reliant on cooperation from the EU institutions. The 
Member States would still have the leading role in treaty change and control decision-making, and 
the mere agenda setting right of the ECI would not undermine the ability of the institutions to 
decide on the outcomes of any treaty change process. Potentially, though, it could enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the process through increased citizen participation and through enabling 
opinion formation for citizens thinking in a cross border mode that can feed in to the topics placed 
on the agenda. 
In summary, the review of the Commission’s application of the admissibility criteria in Art 4(2)(b) 
highlight a number of lessons for potential initiative organisers, but also a degree of uncertainty 
about their application. In practical terms an initiative’s chances of registration are increased if it 
invites specific proposals for legal action from the Commission and does not just promote a general 
policy objective. A legal base needs to be indicated that directly authorises the legal acts that the 
Commission is being invited to propose, although this requirement is not always stringently 
applied.166 An initiative will not be registered if the admissibility criteria are not met for all legal acts 
in the proposal. The legal actions invited can be wide-ranging, from proposing or abrogating 
legislation to writing a report, but the more strongly the initiative challenges established policy the 
‘softer’ the legal acts tend to be. Generally, if there is doubt about whether a legal base authorises 
the legal acts invited by the initiative, it is likely to be refused registration, but there does seem to be 
variation in how strongly an initiative must demonstrate it meets the criteria.167 The Commission 
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have imposed a number of specific restrictions on ECI proposals: a non-binding legal act, a delegated 
or implementing act, and an autonomous act cannot be part of a proposal; an ECI cannot ask for 
something not to be done; an ECI cannot request action that is not a legal act, such as a debate in 
Parliament; and most significantly a proposal for treaty amendment will not be registered by the 
Commission, although there has already been one exception to this general rule.168 Organisers can 
informally discuss changes for resubmission with the Commission if they request it, but this option is 
not formally promoted and no other support is offered when refusing the registration of an 
initiative. The burden of discharging the requirements imposed by the Commission’s interpretation 
and application of the legal admissibility criteria therefore fall almost entirely on the initiative 
organisers. The Commission plays almost no proactive role in assisting organisers in the sometimes 
complex task of putting together a proposal that satisfies the admissibility test. 
Concluding remarks - institutional mediation or direct democracy? 
So what, finally, does the analysis above tell us about the potential for enhancing the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy, through increasing citizen influence over the EU’s policy and legislative 
agenda and the ability to challenge established preferences? Early comment on the legal framework 
identified the potential for institutional mediation at the end of the ECI process due to the relatively 
weak legal obligation imposed on the Commission when responding to a successful initiative, their 
virtual monopoly over initiating legislation, and the legislative process involving other EU 
institutions.169 Less obvious was the extent to which Reg. 211/2011 provided for institutional 
mediation during the registration phase at the start of the process as a result of the Commission’s 
control over the legal admissibility test. The Commission’s narrow interpretation of the admissibility 
criteria in Art 4(2)(b), highlighted in the review above, has influenced, and possibly reduced,170 the 
number of initiatives refused registration, with the range, constitutional significance and critical 
capability of subject matter affected in a number of ways as a result. First, the need to specifically 
locate any proposal in the treaty framework and identify a particular legal base means that ECI 
proposals will tend to be in areas of competence already within the EU legislative agenda. Secondly, 
although there has been some scope for the proposals in the initiatives registered to have added 
new aspects to or invite redirection in existing policy areas, usually a proposal will only be suggesting 
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a modification of, not directly challenging, existing policy preferences. The One of Us initiative 
showed that even if a proposal that challenges current policy is registered and supported by EU 
citizens, the Commission is prepared to not propose a legal act. Thirdly, the exclusion of Art 48(2) 
TEU as a legal base that can be used to invite the Commission to pass on a proposal from citizens for 
Treaty amendment is significant. This exclusion limits the ability of citizens to critically influence not 
only current policy preferences, but also the framework of the EU itself, with fundamental issues, 
such as the increase or reduction of the competences of the EU, not able to be the subject of an 
initiative as a result. This all means that the likelihood of legal acts selected by citizens being enacted 
is reduced and the ability of citizens to influence the subject matter of the policy and legislative 
agenda is limited. 
The Commission’s legalistic approach to registration might also have increased the likelihood of 
judicial involvement in the ECI process.171 The Commission’s binary approach of refusing registration 
or not, and of indicating judicial review as the next step to challenge the decision without support 
offered to reformulate an initiative, gives those initiatives with borderline grounds for registration 
little option other than recourse to the courts. It is also possible that the converse is true: that the 
likelihood of recourse to the courts has influenced the legalistic nature of the Commission’s 
approach. The Commission may have decided that if the registration of an initiative could end in a 
legal situation, then a legalistic approach from the outset would be appropriate and more suited to 
defending their decision-making if required. Whatever the reason for the approach taken by the 
Commission, it appears to be at odds with the Commission’s willingness to enter in to informal 
discussions about registration refusals with those initiative organisers that insist on it. 
The other source of mediation for the ECI is through civil society organizations. Increasingly the ECI 
looks like an instrument for existing civil society organizations to use rather than individual citizens 
because of its cost and complexity.172 The only initiatives to reach, or even come close, to the 
support thresholds necessary for verification and then submission to the Commission are strongly 
linked to civil society organizations: the One of Us initiative is linked to the Roman Catholic Church, 
the Right to Water initiative to Trade Unions, and the Stop Vivisection initiative to animal rights 
groups.173 In placing such a heavy burden on the organisers of initiatives, the Commission’s 
interpretation and application of the admissibility test is likely to accentuate the degree of civil 
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society involvement because of the need for existing knowledge, research capability or resources to 
just get their proposal registered; let alone to embark on the resource hungry process of collecting 
statements of support.174 
The Commission has reinforced its existing control over the legislative output from the ECI by 
additionally making registration an ex ante limitation on the subject matter that can seek to reach 
the support thresholds. Although this means that little formal influence over the role of legislative 
initiative has been passed to citizens, this is not to say that there is no potential impact on the 
Commission’s role of initiating legislation in the Union. First, the principle of direct citizen 
participation in initiating EU legislation has been established, which in the long term may lead to 
further developments in direct democracy. Secondly, there is an increase in the avenues of 
accountability for the Commission’s legislative decision-making through obliging the Commission to 
account directly to citizens for the first time and making recourse available to the courts for the first 
time for decisions that relate to a legislative proposal. Thirdly, although the character of the ECI is of 
a legally reinforced petition because it only invites the initiation of the legislative process by other 
institutional actors, the collection of over a million statements of support from citizens is likely to 
have some indirect, political influence over the Commission’s legislative decision-making. Taken 
together this means that there is a possibility that the ECI, if widely used, comes to be viewed 
retrospectively as a significant step towards an EU agenda that more closely responds to citizen 
preferences.175 
The Commission’s approach to legal admissibility has also blocked the amount and variety of 
democratic deliberation that initiatives can generate, which some commentators place a great deal 
of emphasis on when discussing the democratic potential of direct democratic institutions.176 This is 
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despite the fact that the Commission themselves recognised public debate as a major objective.177 
Even when there is little chance that an initiative can lead to a legal outcome the deliberation 
generated can have a positive influence on the legitimacy of the policy agenda; for example through 
proposals for alternative policy preferences not receiving popular support, or policy being adapted in 
the long term following support for proposals that can only have limited or no legal impact in the 
short term. This type of citizen-led deliberation underpins the direct participation in the policy and 
legislative agenda resulting from instruments of direct democracy and would strengthen democratic 
legitimacy more broadly in the EU.178 The Commission’s approach to legal admissibility at registration 
means that the potential for democratic deliberation is strongly conditioned by institutional 
involvement, at the expense of control by citizens.  
In short, the institutional mediation by the Commission at the start of the ECI process, which limits 
the opportunity for citizens to test their proposals democratically and generate public debate, 
restricts the possibility of influencing the legislative and policy agenda, and has also almost entirely 
removed the ability of citizens to challenge established policy preferences. The Commission have 
expressed their enthusiasm for the ECI and their desire for it to succeed,179 but the formalistic, 
restrictive and sometimes selective approach taken, combined with the high number of proposals 
refused registration, leaves the Commission open to criticism in relation to their willingness to 
accept popular influence over the legislative agenda and a Union based on democracy.180 
A senior Commission official chairing a meeting about the ECI expressed regret that a high number 
of requests for registration had to be refused despite the Commission’s efforts to explain the 
rules.181 This exemplifies the Commission’s attitude of seeing initiative organisers as fully responsible 
for framing a proposal so that it can seek citizen support, and gives no acknowledgement of the 
Commission’s influential role in interpreting and applying the legal admissibility criteria, or of the 
impact this has on the registration of initiative proposals and their variety and critical capacity. 
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Commission mediation is directly limiting the capacity of citizens to use the ECI process to augment 
their influence over the legislative and policy agenda of the EU, and therefore reducing the potential 
impact on the EU’s democratic legitimacy of introducing direct democracy. It is early days though for 
this new democratic instrument. The Commission could still adapt its approach to legal admissibility 
at registration and facilitate greater scope for democratic participation and deliberation; and 
intervention by the Courts and the 2015 review of the ECI regulation182 may yet reduce the strength 
of institutional control provided by the legal admissibility test at registration, broaden the potential 
scope of initiatives, and increase its ability to challenge established policy preferences. For the 
present, however, the analysis of the first round of ECI registration decisions provides little cause to 
cheer the variety or critical debate of the proposals, or much expectation that in the short term it 
will lead to the strengthening of democracy’s central virtues of participation, citizenship and political 
activity for EU citizens.183 
Conclusion  
The ECI has been described as “unparalleled in the history of international organisations and thus of 
potentially enormous significance”.184 The ECI may be the first of its kind at supranational level,185 
and there is the potential that in the long term it may come to be viewed as a symbolic moment that 
led to EU democracy reducing its reliance on the representative democracy of the past. However, 
with minimal impact on EU policy and legislation, and dwindling numbers of proposals, the ECI does 
not currently feel like a ground-breaking democratic development. Kaufmann was probably closer to 
the truth when he stated that “In terms of its potential as a truly democratizing force, the new 
instrument needs to be seen as a very small, preliminary reform – simply as a transnational ‘baby-
step’.”186 The analysis of the ECI legislation and its implementation by the Commission has indicated 
the capacity for institutional mediation and the limitations this could bring to the ECI democratic 
potential as a result. Without reform of the legislative design of the ECI and a change in attitude 
from the existing institutions, the ECI may struggle to even be a ‘baby step’ towards further 
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  Art 22, regulation 211/2011 provides for a report to be presented to the European Parliament by April 1st 
2015. 
183
  For a summary of the importance of these democratic virtues see B Barber, Strong Democracy: 
Participatory Politics for a New Age (University of California Press 1984) 25. 
184
 A Warleigh, ‘On the Path to Legitimacy? The EU Citizens Initiative Right from a Critical Deliberativist 
Perspective’, in C. Ruzza and V. Della Sala (eds), Governance and civil society in the European Union, 
(Manchester University Press 2007) 64- 65. 
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 For comment on the extent to which direct democratic instruments of the citizens initiative type can be 
viewed as innovative see G Smith, Democratic Innovations - Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (CUP 
2009) 111-112, Democratic Innovations. 
186
 B Kaufmann, ‘Transnational ‘Babystep’: The European Citizens Initiative’ in M Setala and T Schiller (eds) 
Citizen's initiatives in Europe; procedures and consequences of agenda-setting by citizens, (Palgrave Macmillan 
2012) 229. 
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democratic legitimisation of the EU through direct democracy, and be consigned to history instead 
as an interesting, but insignificant democratic experiment. The next chapter on the European Union 
Act takes the analysis of direct democracy from the supranational level of EU democracy to the 
Member State level and an assessment of the democratic potential of referenda in the UK. 
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Chapter Three  
Democratic Potential of the European Union Act Referenda 
The thesis now turns to direct democracy at the Member State level of the EU polity, to the outcome 
influencing referenda of the EUA, and to an examination of their potential to influence EU 
democratic legitimacy. The introduction of referenda in to UK legislation is part of an upward trend 
in the use of the referendum for EU related democratic legitimisation in recent years, particularly for 
EU membership decisions and to approve treaty amendment at Member State level.1 The majority 
have been ad hoc referenda called by Member State governments because of the political salience 
of EU treaty amendments, but with the implementation of the European Union Act (EUA) the UK has 
joined the still relatively small group of Member States that have legislative or constitutional 
provisions obliging the holding of referenda to approve the ratification of an EU treaty.2 The UK has 
also gone a step further and provided in legislation for mandatory referenda to legitimise EU policy, 
rather than treaty, decisions, for the first time in the EU.3 The intended entrenchment of a new 
legislative process containing referenda is also notable in the UK constitution because of the 
importance of parliamentary sovereignty, whose traditional understanding the EUA referenda 
provisions have challenged.4 The EUA, therefore, has the potential to increase citizen influence over 
policy outcomes and to be a landmark alteration in the legitimisation of the EU in the UK. I argue, 
however, that the legislative design of the EUA does not prioritise democratic participation and 
maintains the opportunity for institutional control, and as a result limits the frequency and impact of 
direct citizen influence over the UK’s EU policy agenda.  
                                                          
1
 As of 2009 there had been 43 referenda in other European states on three types of EU related issues: 
membership, treaty ratification, and a small number of single policy issues. 21 of the referenda related to 
membership, 17 were to approve treaty ratification, and just 5 countries have held referenda about single 
policy issues: the adoption of the Euro in Sweden and Denmark; the Schengen agreement, free trade and 
bilateral agreements with EU in Switzerland; MEP mandate in Italy; and EC enlargement in France. For more 
details see S Hobolt, Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration (OUP 2009) 9, table 1.1. Or for 
a list of all EU related referenda see F Mendez, M Mendez, V Triga, Referendums and the European Union: a 
comparative enquiry (CUP 2014) 24-25. 
For comment on the wider increase in the use of referenda see for example L Morel, ‘The rise of Government 
initiated referendums in consolidated democracies’, in M Mendelsohn and A Parkin (eds) Referendum 
Democracy: Citizens, elites and deliberation in referendum campaigns (Macmillan 2001) 47-64. 
2
 For the mapping of when referenda are required in the different Member States of the EU see F Mendez, M 
Mendez, V Triga, Referendums and the European Union: a comparative enquiry (CUP 2014) 30-69. 
3
 Five countries have held referenda on EU policy issues, particularly the Euro, but none have been 
constitutionally mandatory. 
4
 For analysis of the impact of the EUA on parliamentary sovereignty see M Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty 
in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart 2015). 
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This chapter contains a legal analysis of the referenda provisions in the EUA to assess their potential 
impact on EU democracy. It does this in three stages. First, the rather complex mechanics of the EUA 
are described and the coherence of its legislative design is commented on.5 Secondly, the manner in 
which the EUA referenda provisions fit within existing EU and UK law is discussed. The third and final 
part of the chapter, which assesses the democratic potential of the EUA to indirectly legitimise the 
EU, is divided in to two sections. The first section assesses the motivation behind the 
implementation of referenda in the EUA, the criteria that trigger them, their likely subject matter, 
and what the implications are for democratic participation. The second section assesses the 
democratic potential of the EUA referenda against the two democratic criteria of citizen agenda 
influence and citizen outcome influence, using the classification of referenda based on their 
initiation and the binding nature of the result. The conclusion drawn is that the apparently strong 
democratic impact of introducing a citizen veto over EU policy in the UK is more significantly 
qualified than might be expected at first glance. 
The UK’s first national referendum was held in 1975 on the subject of the UK’s membership of the 
European Community.6 Since then UK membership of the EU, as it is now, has continued to be 
divisive for political parties and referenda have been promised a number of times to resolve 
uncertainty about public support for EU membership. In 2004, during the negotiations involving the 
Constitutional treaty, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, promised a UK public seemingly 
unsupportive of further integration a referendum to approve any UK government decision to sign 
such a treaty.7 However, following the Dutch and French referenda that voted ‘no’ to the 
constitutional treaty, the UK government stated in 2006 that a referendum was no longer 
appropriate because the treaty was as good as dead.8 Demands for a referendum remained during 
the Lisbon Treaty ratification process, but Gordon Brown decided that a referendum was not 
                                                          
5
 Dougan and Gordon describe the EUA as a piece of legislation that is “rather difficult to decipher and 
navigate around”, M Gordon and M Dougan, ‘The United Kingdom’s European Union Act 2011: “Who won the 
bloody war anyway?”’ [2012] EL Rev 3, 10. 
6
 Up to Jan 2015 there had been nine referenda called by the national government, a number of other local 
referenda on issues such as whether to have elected local mayors and transport policy, and referenda 
provided for in legislation such as planning laws. Five referenda have been held on the devolution of power in 
relation to Scotland and Wales, one on an elected mayor of London, and one on establishing an elected 
regional assembly in the North East of England. Of the other two referenda, one was to gain support for multi 
party talks in Northern Ireland and the other was the UK’s second nationwide referendum on a proposed 
change to the voting system for electing MPs. 
For comment on referenda in the UK see, for example, M Qvortrup, ‘Democracy by Delegation: The decision to 
hold referendums in the UK’ [2006] Representation 59. 
7
 Report in to these proposals available at <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03064/proposals-
for-a-referendum-on-the-new-european-constitution> accessed 8 July 2015. 
8
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6574411.stm> accessed 8 July 2015. 
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necessary because the Lisbon treaty was not a fundamental rewriting of the treaties.9 David 
Cameron promised a ‘cast iron guarantee’ of a referendum on the Lisbon treaty when in opposition, 
but at the end of 2009, prior to his election as Prime Minister, he announced that with ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty completed, his promise to hold a referendum could no longer be fulfilled.10  
In 2010, the Coalition Programme for Government promised a referendum lock for any proposed 
transfer in future parliaments and that there would be ‘no further transfer of sovereignty or powers 
over the course of the next Parliament’.11 The Government promised to provide certainty about 
holding a referendum in relation to the UK’s EU policy: ‘We will amend the 1972 European 
Communities Act so that any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or 
competences, would be subject to a referendum on that treaty – a ‘referendum lock’. We will amend 
the 1972 European Communities Act so that the use of any passerelle would require primary 
legislation.’12 The Programme for Government also promised to ‘examine the case for a United 
Kingdom Sovereignty Bill to make it clear that ultimate authority remains with Parliament’.13 These 
two promises led to the enactment of the EUA 2011, which sets out the situations where 
referendum approval is needed for policy decisions of the government in relation to the EU.14 
Despite the promise of the ‘referendum locks’ in the EUA, political pressure to hold a referendum 
has continued to come from the general public, conservative backbenchers and the eurosceptic UKIP 
party.15 As a result, the Conservative Party have gone further than the coalition government and 
promised to hold another ‘in-out’ referendum on the subject of EU membership in the next 
parliament, if they are re-elected to Government.16 
                                                          
9
 House of Commons debates 22 Oct 2007 : Column 19 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm071022/debtext/71022-
0003.htm#0710222000001> accessed 8 July 2015 
10
 <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/04/david-cameron-referendum-campaign-over> accessed 
8 July 2015. 
11
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_program
me_for_government.pdf> pg 19 accessed 8 July 2015. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 The EUA also provides for other approval mechanisms; for policy decisions that require an Act of Parliament 
before they can be approved and policy decisions that require something less than an Act of Parliament, such 
as parliamentary approval, before they can be implemented. This chapter only analyses the first category of 
decision making that requires a referendum and an Act of Parliament before the decision can be approved. 
15
 See pgs 9-10 for summary of opinion polls on whether a referendum should be held at 
<http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05071.pdf> accessed 8 July 2015. 
16
 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21148282> accessed 8 July 2015. 
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The use of referenda has also increased in a number of other Member States as a result of EU 
membership.17 States such as the Netherlands and Portugal, with no previous experience of national 
referenda, held or promised a referendum during the constitutional treaty and Lisbon treaty 
ratification process; and there have been 53 referenda related to the EU in total.18 At Member State 
level the referendum appears to now be an integral part of EU democratic legitimacy, and there 
have even been calls for the referendum to be used at EU level.19  The next part of this introductory 
section provides a classification of referenda to support the analysis of the democratic potential of 
the legislative design of referenda in the EUA. 
Referenda classification 
A referendum is a democratic instrument that gives citizens influence over a policy decision through 
voting to choose between two (occasionally more) policy options, with an expectation that the 
referendum result will be implemented. The opportunity for citizens to vote in relation to a specific 
policy issue, rather than the more customary vote to select representatives, is the distinguishing 
characteristic of a referendum. At its core it is a majoritarian instrument that has a relatively direct 
impact within the confines of the issue that is put to citizens.20 Even these narrowly construed core 
features, though, are able to be distorted, for example when referenda on a question of policy 
morph in to a vote on a political incumbent or institution,21 or when authoritarian regimes use a 
corrupt referenda process to provide a democratic façade to policy decisions that they have no 
intention of changing. Beyond these core features, referenda also vary greatly in the process 
followed and the type of issues they address, in the purpose for holding the referendum, and the 
potential impact on the policy agenda and legislation.22 
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 For a recent study of the use of referenda in relation to the EU see F Mendez, M Mendez, V Triga, 
Referendums and the European Union: a comparative enquiry (CUP 2014). For a summary of the range of 
political science and legal writing on referenda relating to European integration, and direct democracy more 
widely see this work pgs 7-19. 
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 For a list of all EU related referenda see F Mendez, M Mendez, V Triga, Referendums and the European 
Union: a comparative enquiry (CUP 2014) 24-25. 
19
 On the growing importance of referenda to the EU see S Hobolt, Europe in Question: Referendums on 
European Integration (OUP 2009). She also comments on the possibility of an EU wide referendum in the same 
volume pgs 242-248. On the possibility of EU related referenda see J Habermas, ‘A constitution for Europe?’, 
[2001] New Left Review 5. P Schmitter How to Democratise the EU – and why bother? (Rowman 2000). 
20
 G Smith, ‘ The Functional properties of the Referendum’ [1976] European Journal of Political Research 4 
21
 One referendum for reinforcing power of the incumbent president is that held by De Gaulle in 1962. For 
comment on the specifics of referenda in France see L Morel, The Rise of ‘Politically Obligatory Referendums’: 
The 2005 French Referendum in Comparative Context’ [2007] West European Politics 1041. 
22
 For a theoretical account of referenda see Maija Setälä, Referendums and Democratic Government. 
Normative Theory and the Analysis of Institutions (Macmillan 1999). 
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There is no accepted, standard means of classifying referenda and a number of approaches, usually 
descriptive or functional, are taken in the political science literature.23 The functional classification 
used in this chapter, which supports the analysis of the legislative design of referenda in the EUA, 
focuses on two of the democratic criteria outlined in chapter one for direct democratic instruments: 
increased citizen influence over the agenda content and increased citizen influence over the 
outcome of the agenda. The first vector for classifying referenda is the initiation process, which is 
critical for citizen influence over the agenda. This classifies referenda according to the degree of 
control that the three main political actors; government, parliament and the people exert over the 
initiation of referenda, particularly their subject matter and timing.24 The second vector for 
classifying referenda is based on the degree of legal and political control over the referendum 
outcome that these political actors exert, which is largely governed by the extent to which the result 
is binding on the legislature and executive of a state, and impacts on the degree of citizen influence 
over agenda outcomes.25 
The classification of referenda used here focuses on the formal rules established in the legislative 
design of the EUA referenda provisions, and on the democratic potential that these formal rules 
provide or inhibit, rather than the actual outcomes from the referenda.26 Whether or not the 
outcome from the referendum result is actually pro or anti-hegemonic can only be viewed 
retrospectively once the effects of a vote are seen. Therefore, although the extent to which the 
status quo is challenged is an important factor in determining the impact of a referendum, this 
functional approach is not a satisfactory basis for an a priori legal analysis of the democratic 
potential of the legislative design of referenda, which is the purpose of this chapter in relation to the 
EUA. For a referendum to be a strong instrument of direct democracy it needs to have the potential 
to be anti-hegemonic, but referendum that appear to offer the potential to provide strong citizen 
influence over the status quo may still have this democratic potential nullified by factors largely 
outside the scope of the legislative design and its formal rules; for example as a result of a corrupted 
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 For a summary of classification approaches see M Setala, ‘On the Problems of Responsibility and 
Accountability in Referenda.’ [2006] European Journal of Political Research, 699, 705-707 and in M Setala, 
Referendums and Democratic Government: Normative Theory and Analysis of institutions (Macmillan 1999). 
The classification used in this chapter is specific to the purpose here of a legal analysis of the EUA referendum 
provisions. 
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 ‘the precise effect of the use of referendums depends very much on who has the ability to determine when 
a vote will be held and on what issue’, in introduction in M Mendelsohn and A Parkin (eds) Referendum 
Democracy: Citizens, elites and deliberation in referendum campaigns (Macmillan 2001) 5. 
25
 For an example of a functional approach to referendum classification that uses similar categorisation see G 
Smith, ‘The Functional properties of the Referendum’ [1976] European Journal of Political Research 4. 
26
 G Smith, for example discusses the hegemonic effect of the actual outcome of a referendum as a second 
variant in his functional approach to categorising referenda, in G Smith, ‘The Functional properties of the 
Referendum’ [1976] European Journal of Political Research 4. 
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voting process or control over the supply of information. Rather than a descriptive approach based 
on the subject matter of the referendum, or a functional approach that focuses on the empirical 
outcomes of the referendum process, the analytical framework used here therefore contains a 
theoretical classification based on the process and criteria for the initiation of a referendum and on 
the legal obligation imposed by the referendum result.27 
The initiation of referenda, which is the first vector of classification for referenda, can be 
distinguished as either mandatory or non-mandatory.28 ‘Mandatory’ is used to describe referenda 
that are triggered by constitutional or legislative provisions.29 ‘Non-mandatory’ is used to refer to ad 
hoc or optional referenda that are called by political actors, but are not obliged by legislation. All 
national referenda to date in the UK have been optional, non-mandatory referenda initiated by the 
Government. However, the phraseology of mandatory/non mandatory is an overly stark means of 
describing the classification of referenda. On the one hand, holding legally mandatory referenda can 
be avoided through political strategy, legal interpretation of discretionary clauses, or ultimately 
through legislative change; and on the other hand the holding of ‘non-mandatory’ referenda can be 
forced by political pressures, as appears to be the case for the in/out EU referendum promised by 
the Conservative party. An alternative approach is to distinguish between those referenda that are 
provided for by legislation and those that are held as a result of a political decision, usually by the 
Government of the day, and that are not legally prescribed. Within the category of referenda 
provided for by legislation that the EUA fits in to there are a number of ways to distinguish further 
between different means of establishing a legal requirement to hold a referendum, such as those 
referenda obliged to be held once a citizens initiative reaches the necessary support thresholds or by 
provisions in a constitution.30 The approach taken by the EUA is to legally prescribe certain subject 
areas and also certain situational criteria that will trigger a referendum within ordinary legislation, 
which is a significant change in the UK from the ad hoc initiation of the past.31  
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 Setala uses a similar starting point for classifying referenda in ‘M Setala, ‘On the Problems of Responsibility 
and Accountability in Referenda.’ [2006] European Journal of Political Research 699, 705. Tierney takes a 
theoretical approach to referenda based on constitutional theory. His is a systematic analysis of referenda 
used to change and to form constitutions in S Tierney, Constitutional Referendums. The Theory and Practice of 
Republican Deliberation (OUP 2012). 
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 For discussion of the distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory referenda see M Setala, 
Referendums and Democratic Government (Macmillan 1999) 87-96. 
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 For comment on the relatively unusual mandatory referenda see T Schiller, ‘Conclusions’ in M Setala and T 
Schiller (eds) Referendums and Representative Democracy: Responsiveness, Accountability and Deliberation 
(Routledge 2009) 209-213. 
30
 Switzerland, for example, provides for referenda to be held when an initiative is sufficiently supported. 
Ireland is an example of a Member State that has to hold referenda due to provisions in its constitution. 
31
 The criteria for triggering referenda that are established in the EUA are described in the next section of this 
chapter. 
123 
 
The second vector of classification for referenda is the legal obligation imposed by the referendum 
result and who controls the subsequent legislative or policy outcome. Does the Government have 
discretion in how it responds to the result, have the people merely been consulted or have they cast 
a legally binding vote?32 The degree of legal obligation on the existing institutions that is imposed by 
the legislative design of referenda has a significant impact on their democratic potential.33 A binding 
referendum result provides a relatively direct link between public preferences and policy decisions. 
The stronger the obligation on existing institutions to implement the result of the referendum, the 
greater the potential for democratic impact on legislative and policy outcomes of citizen 
participation through voting in a referendum is likely to be. As with the use of the term ‘mandatory’, 
the description of a referendum as ‘binding’ is a stark one that does not reflect the political reality of 
using referenda, and that the degree of control over the outcome from a referendum result is not 
only dependent on the formal rules provided for in legislation, but also on the political environment 
in which the referendum is used. 
The legislative design of referenda provisions can therefore be classified according to the potential 
for institutions or citizens to influence the initiation of a referendum, and the degree of influence 
passed to citizens over policy and legal outcomes due to the referendum result. Finally, before 
examining the specifics of the EU referenda provisions there is comment on the two key factors for 
the democratic potential of the EUA: institutional mediation and the ability to challenge established 
policy preferences. 
Institutional mediation and challenging established policy preferences 
In terms of the criteria established in chapter one, the democratic potential of a referendum 
depends on the extent to which the referendum facilitates an opportunity for effective citizen 
participation that gives citizens influence over the content of the policy agenda, and over the 
legislative and policy outcomes of that agenda. The extent to which these criteria are met, and the 
democratic potential of referenda realised, depends to a large degree on the design of the 
referendum instrument and the degree of control that remains with existing institutions. Despite the 
seemingly direct impact on the policy of government that a referendum provides to citizens,34 
institutional mediation is possible through control over when and on what subject the referendum is 
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 For discussion of the differences between binding and advisory referenda See M Setala, ‘On the Problems of 
Responsibility and Accountability in Referenda.’ [2006] European Journal of Political Research, 699. 
33
 For a discussion of the different impact of advisory and binding referenda in a UK context see House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, 2009-10. Referendums in the United Kingdom para 190-197. Available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/99/99.pdf> accessed 8 July 2015. 
34
 See for example, G Smith, ‘The Functional properties of the Referendum’ [1976] European Journal of 
Political Research 4. 
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initiated, through administering the referendum process, and also to some degree through control 
over the implementation of the referendum result.35 Some degree of involvement of institutions in 
the referendum process is expected, however, because direct democracy is not replacing the 
existing legitimisation processes.36 The issue is therefore the extent of institutional control, rather 
than the fact that it exists. 
As with all democratic instruments there is the potential for corruption or such tight institutional 
control over referenda that they serve the ends of those with political power rather than the voting 
citizens. Referenda have been held by authoritarian leaders such as Hitler to give a democratic 
veneer to their position and policies,37 but they should not be rejected as a democratic instrument 
because of past abuses, anymore than representative elections should stop being held because of 
their ongoing abuse and corruption in some parts of the world.38 Although the political manipulation 
of referenda in western liberal democracies is not comparable to the plebiscitary uses of referenda 
by past authoritarian regimes, criticism remains that referenda are both ‘controlled’ by Government 
and ‘pro hegemonic’.39 Lipjhart states that referenda are controlled and pro hegemonic ‘weapons of 
government’, emphasizing governmental ability to control when referendum might be initiated, 
potentially only when their policy preference will be endorsed.40  
Matt Qvorturp, however, questions the extent to which referenda initiation is controlled and pro 
hegemonic.41 His empirical analysis of referenda results concludes that “the majority of referenda 
held have been uncontrolled referenda, and that most of them have gone against the wishes of 
government”.42 Of the referendum held that Qvortrup defines as ‘controlled’, the degree of control 
is argued based largely on political pressures and he acknowledges that the degree of control is a 
spectrum rather than two individual, opposing positions.43 For example the devolution referendum 
of 1979 is defined as uncontrolled because it was held following pressure from opposition parties 
and Labour (Government) backbenchers. There were similar pressures in the 1975 EC referendum 
but Qvortrup defines this referendum as ‘controlled’, presumably because the pressures were less 
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 The issue of institutional mediation is explored in detail by S Tierney, Constitutional Referendums. The 
Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (OUP 2012) 98-128 Ch. 4 Elite control. 
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 ‘Referendums and initiatives are inextricably entwined with the institutions of representative democracy’, 
stated in introduction in M Mendelsohn and A Parkin (eds) Referendum Democracy: Citizens, elites and 
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 M Setala, Referendums and Democratic Government: Normative Theory and Analysis of institutions 
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 G Smith, ‘ The Functional properties of the Referendum’ [1976] European Journal of Political Research 7. 
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marked and the Government was in a stronger position, despite the formal legal position being the 
same. The analysis in this chapter is of the legal framework of the EUA rather than the political 
pressures that might come to bear on the government. Anti-hegemonic voting is possible but 
institutional control of referenda initiation limits what topics are put to the people to be voted on, 
and therefore limits the policy areas in which citizens have the opportunity to challenge established 
preferences. The extent to which the EUA passes this legal, rather than political, control over 
whether a referendum is held to citizens from the existing institutions is an important part of the 
analysis of the EUA in this chapter. 
When the decision has been taken to hold a referendum, there is a further opportunity for 
institutional influence over the referendum outcome through the institutional administration of the 
referendum vote. Tierney breaks this phase of the referendum process in to ‘the agenda setting 
stage ... and the campaign process itself’, which take in issues such as defining the question and the 
provision of information, respectively.44 Ranney and Butler also highlight the significance of the 
procedural control governments have over the ability to frame citizen choices as an important 
limitation on the democratic potential to challenge established policy preferences.45 The greater the 
control governments have over the procedural aspects of referenda, the more likely it is that their 
policy preference will be supported in the referendum vote. The legislative design of referenda in 
the EUA does not specifically address these issues, other than to confirm that the Electoral 
Commission has an important role to play in decisions of this nature,46 and it is therefore a limited 
part of the discussion below. 
The implementation of the outcome of the referendum result is the third point at which there is the 
potential for institutional mediation. Graham Smith specifically refers to criticism of referenda for 
having little or no impact, and outcomes disconnected from the citizen participation that has taken 
place.47 For referenda the ability to increase citizen influence over agenda outcomes is one of the 
strongest legitimising aspects of their use as a democratic instrument. Notwithstanding the decision 
to make a referendum decision binding or not, a citizen can usually see a direct impact from that 
vote; at least when compared to a vote to select representatives, where there is an extra step 
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 S Tierney, Constitutional Referendums. The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (OUP 2012) ch 4. 
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 D Butler and A Ranney, Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Macmillan 
1994) 258-9 - cited in M Qvortrup, ‘Are referenda controlled and pro-hegmonic’ [2000] Political studies 281. 
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 G Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing institutions for citizen participation (CUP 2009) 17-18. 
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between the vote and the policy outcome.48 If a referendum does not clearly lead to the 
implementation of citizen preferences, as expressed in a policy vote, then its democratic potential 
will be significantly reduced, particularly given its weakness in allowing citizens to influence the 
content of the policy agenda. As with the control over the initiation and process for referenda, the 
control over the outcome from the referendum result is dependent on the legislative design of the 
referendum and its implementation, and the control of institutions at both these points. 
Whatever the empirical arguments about the degree of government political control over past 
referenda, Qvortrup, at the very least, makes the point that referenda can lead to a challenge to 
established policy preferences outside the full control of the existing institutions and that the claim 
by Lipjhart that all referenda are controlled and pro-hegmonic needs further investigation. This is 
confirmed by Tierney who stated that, ‘we need a much more nuanced account than the simple 
‘controlled and pro hegemonic’ claim, … taking account in full of the legal and political environment 
in which [the referendum] operates’.49 It is also necessary to look beyond the political rhetoric, 
which for the EUA, sits at the other end of the spectrum from Lipjhart and claims that holding a 
referendum passes control to citizens: William Hague, Foreign secretary, stated that the EUA “marks 
a fundamental shift in power from Ministers of the Crown to parliament and the voters themselves 
on the most important decisions of all: who gets to decide what”.50 The legal analysis of the EUA 
referenda provisions in this chapter, therefore, considers where the democratic potential of their 
legislative design is likely to sit between a fundamental shift in power towards citizens and 
institutions retaining hegemonic control over the initiation and outcomes of referenda, which would 
limit the possibility of a challenge to established policy preferences. The first stage in this analysis is 
to examine the mechanics of the EUA referenda provisions. 
Mechanics of the EUA referendum clauses 
The next section of this chapter describes the legislative design of the referenda for approval of EU 
treaty amendment and policy in the EUA.51 The four key sections of the legislation are sections 2, 3, 
4 and 6 EUA. Treaty amendment through the Ordinary revision procedure and Special Revision 
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procedure are dealt with in s2 and s3 EUA, respectively. s6 EUA in conjunction with Annex A then list 
miscellaneous other EU policy and procedure changes that are not captured by s2 and 3, such as the 
extension of EU foreign policy. For s2 and s3 situations to require approval by referendum one of the 
criteria in s4, such as an increase in the competences of the EU institutions, must also be met. 
Sections 2, 3 and 4 EUA need to be read together in relation to the legitimisation of EU policy to 
understand whether a referendum is required by the legislation. This section explains in detail the 
expected operation and interaction of these provisions of the EUA that establish when approval by 
referendum is triggered. 
s2 EUA – treaty Amendment - ordinary revision procedure 
The first type of political event that might require approval by referendum comes under the heading 
‘Treaties amending or replacing TEU or TFEU’. s2(1) EUA sets out the three requirements for a treaty 
of this nature to be ratified. First the details of a new EU treaty agreement must have been 
presented to parliament in accordance with s5 of the EUA, which states that the minister must 
present a proposed treaty amendment to parliament within 2 months of its agreement at the 
intergovernmental conference and state whether it falls under the criteria for triggering a 
referendum set out in s4 EUA.52 Secondly, the decision taken at the Council of Ministers must be 
approved by an Act of parliament.53 Thirdly, the treaty change cannot be ratified unless the 
‘referendum condition’ or the ‘exemption condition’ has been met.54 The referendum condition is 
met once the treaty amendment has been the subject of a referendum and the majority of those 
voting in that referendum have voted in favour of ratifying the treaty change.55 The exemption 
condition is met when “the Act providing for the approval of the treaty states that the treaty does 
not fall within section 4”.56 Ratification of treaty amendment via the ordinary revision procedure, 
therefore, does not always require a referendum to be held. A referendum is only required when 
one of the criteria in Section 4 are also met. 
s3 EUA – treaty amendment - simplified revision procedure 
s3 EUA provides for the second type of policy decisions by the UK government that might lead to a 
referendum. These come under the heading ‘Amendment of TFEU under simplified revision 
procedure’, and relate to decisions adopted by the European Council under Art 48(6) TEU. The 
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requirements for approving a UK government decision replicate those for ratifying treaty 
amendment that falls under s2 EUA, except for the inclusion of a significance condition.57 As for s2 
EUA, a statement must be put before Parliament by a government minister within two months of an 
Art 48(6) TEU decision being adopted by the European Council; secondly an Act of Parliament must 
approve this decision and thirdly the referendum, exemption or significance condition must be met. 
The referendum and exemption conditions are the same as for s2 EUA. The significance condition, 
which is only included in s3 EUA is defined as follows: 
a) the decision falls within section 4 only because of provision of the kind mentioned in subsection 
(1)(i) or (j) of that section, and  
(b) the effect of that provision in relation to the United Kingdom is not significant.  
The two relevant subsections of s4 EUA that are relevant to the significance condition are: 
s(4)(i) the conferring on an EU institution or body of power to impose a requirement or obligation on 
the United Kingdom, or the removal of any limitation on any such power of an EU institution or 
body;  
s(4)(j) the conferring on an EU institution or body of new or extended power to impose sanctions on 
the United Kingdom;  
If the Art 48(6) TEU decision applies only to these 2 sub sections of s4 and ‘the effect of the provision 
in relation to the UK is not significant’, then a referendum will not be required for the Government 
to approve the Art 48(6) TEU decision taken by the European Council. If the Art 48(6) TEU decision is 
deemed to be ‘significant’ then it must be approved by referendum before it can be approved by 
Government. If the decision is covered by any of the other criteria in s4 then it does not need ot be 
significant to trigger a referendum. There is no further guidance in EUA on the criteria that might 
define ‘significance’; this is left to the discretion of the relevant minister. 
Despite the similarities in the drafting of s2 and s3, s4 will apply quite differently to each of them 
because of the nature of Art 48(6) TEU. First, Art 48(6) TEU only relates to part three of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, which relates to the internal policies and action of the 
Union; it is a much narrower range of topics than those that would be covered by full treaty 
amendment. Secondly, Art 48(6) TEU decisions are not allowed to increase the competence of the 
EU and therefore it is unlikely that the 8 clauses relating to competence in s4 will ever apply to 
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them.58 If the UK prime minister believed there would be an increase in competence as a result of an 
Art 48(6) TEU decision then the illegality of this position could simply be pointed out and the 
decision stopped, without recourse to a UK referendum being required. Thirdly there is the 
significance condition that applies to two of the clauses in s4 and further limits s3. It is incongruous 
that the significance clause has been included at all given the limitation of discretion throughout the 
rest of the legislation and the political rhetoric of ‘referendum locks’.59 However, having decided to 
include significance for two clauses in s4 EUA it is surprising that the 3 other s4 articles, s4(1)(k), (l) 
and (m) that a 48(6) TEU decision might apply to do not also need to be ‘significant’; particularly 
given that these three subsections are process rather than subject based decisions and relatively 
technical in nature, which might not attract significant interest from the public.60 Presumably the 
Government believes that all voting change is significant enough to attract a significant turnout, 
whereas the changes in s4(i) and (j), such as increased powers to impose sanctions on the UK are 
not. 
In summary, s3 will only trigger a referendum if there is a ‘significant’ change in the ability to impose 
obligations or sanctions on the UK, or if there is a change in voting procedure, however significant 
the issue might be, whereas s2 treaty amendments will require a referendum for competence 
increase as well as changes in voting procedure, and future governments are not given discretion to 
decide that an issue that is part of the ordinary revision procedure is not significant enough for a 
referendum. 
s4 EUA - situations that attract a referendum 
s4 has been drafted to establish the specific situations that a treaty amendment event covered by s2 
or s3 EUA would need to involve for a referendum to be triggered, notwithstanding the significance 
condition just discussed. The explanatory notes described s4 as making ‘provision for the criteria 
against which a treaty seeking to amend or replace TEU or TFEU, or an Art 48(6) decision ... would be 
assessed in order to determine whether a referendum should be held’.61 Not all treaty amendment 
will therefore trigger the requirement to hold a referendum. The clauses in s4(1), which list the 
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situations when a referendum is needed to approve a Government decision, fall in to two categories: 
those that are subject focussed, which address change in the competences of the EU, and those that 
are process focussed, which address change in voting or legislative procedures in the EU. In s4(1)(a) 
to (h) the conferring of a new or extension of an existing competence for each of the three types of 
competence of the EU is stated as triggering a referendum. It is these clauses that in practice s3 will 
not apply to. The increased ability of an EU institution to impose a requirement, obligation or 
sanction is stated as a trigger for a referendum in s4(1)(i) and (j), which relate to the significance 
clause of s3 described above. The final three clauses of s4(1) relate to the ability to vote to block an 
EU legislative act in the Council: (k) and (l) refer to the use of QMV and (m) relates to the suspension 
of the OLP. s4(2) and s4(3) provide clarification about the application of s4(1). s4(2) states that any 
removal of a limitation on a competence is treated as if it were an extension of competence and 
therefore also triggers a referendum. s4(3) states the three policy areas to which s4(1)(m) applies.  
The final part of s4 then sets out three circumstances when a referendum would not be triggered by 
a treaty amendment, unless there is a possibility one of the other clauses in s4 may apply.62 The 
three situations that are exempt from the referendum condition are defined in the legislation as 
follows: 
“A treaty amendment or Art 48(6) decision does not fall within this section merely because it 
involves one or more of the following –  
(a) the codification of practice under TEU or TFEU in relation to the previous exercise of an 
existing competence; 
(b) the making of any provision that applies only to Member States other than the UK; 
(c) in the case of a treaty, the accession of a new member State.” 
The exemptions in s4(4)(b) and (c) raise some issues in relation to the general approach taken in s4 
to defining when a referendum must be held. First, the possibility for an increase in competence 
without a referendum is allowed for, even though this is covered in detail in the rest of s4 and its 
avoidance was one of the key aims of the legislation. It is understandable that changes that do not 
apply to the UK would not lead to a referendum, but it leaves open the related question of what 
happens if the UK joins an enhanced cooperation group that has already effected changes to EU 
voting procedures or competences for that group. As the changes did not apply to the UK when the 
Member States in the enhanced cooperation group made the changes there would have been no 
                                                          
62
 s4(4) EUA. 
131 
 
referendum.63 Then when the UK joins the enhanced cooperation there would be no requirement 
for a referendum either as the changes would have already taken place.64 This means that increased 
competences could apply to the UK and be approved by the UK government without a referendum. 
Given the approach of the EUA and its intention to cover all increases in competence it is surprising 
that this situation is allowed as an exception. Secondly, the accession of a new Member State will 
alter the voting arrangements of the EU, make decisions more difficult to block and have other 
significant impacts on the workings of the EU.65 The exclusion of accession treaties from the 
referendum condition means that a UK minister can still approve significant changes to EU processes 
without a referendum. William Hague stated that accession treaties were not included because they 
do not extend the powers or competences of the EU.66 Given that an extension of powers is possible, 
however, a more likely explanation for the exemption of accession treaties could be the political 
preference of successive UK governments, including the current coalition, for expanding the number 
of Member States in the EU, which the UK government did not want to give citizens the opportunity 
to veto.67 
The EUA could have been drafted without s4 so that all treaty amendments, including all those that 
increase EU competence, would have needed approval by referendum, especially given the wide 
range of situations that are captured by s4. However, the Government wished to restrict ministerial 
discretion over the holding of a referendum and was perhaps mindful of the repeated failures to 
hold referenda on treaty amendments in the past, such as Gordon Brown’s decision that the Lisbon 
Treaty was not ‘fundamental’ enough to require referendum approval.68 Another, albeit speculative, 
reason for the Conservative party wishing to specifically state that all competence increases require 
approval by referendum is that, rather than restricting ministerial discretion, they actually wished to 
allow discretion in relation to policy decisions that reduce EU competence, which otherwise would 
have also required a referendum if the EUA did not include the specific unidirectional criteria in s4. If 
this view were taken, s4 would be a limitation on the use of referenda, rather than a reinforcement 
of its use, as it ensures that referenda are only used to limit ministerial discretion over developments 
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of EU policy and actually allows freedom in relation to any, equally significant reduction in EU 
powers or competences. 
s6 EUA - other decisions requiring approval by referendum 
The final section of the EUA that deals with referenda, Section 6, groups together other decisions 
that now require approval by referendum in the UK, but which would not always be covered by the 
provisions in s2, s3 or s4 because they do not necessarily require treaty amendment. There are two 
categories of decisions: specific policy decisions and decisions that would change the voting process 
in relation to specified treaty articles and remove the UK’s veto in the Council in that policy area. 
The specific areas of policy considered to warrant an extended legitimisation process, including 
approval by referendum are a common EU defence,69 a European Public Prosecutors office,70 the 
Euro,71 and the Schengen Protocol.72 The explanatory notes state that these four subject based 
referendum triggers, which are of varying degrees of public salience, require legitimisation using a 
referendum because if implemented they would be “one-way, irreversible decisions which would 
transfer power or competence from the UK to the EU”.73 These are policy areas, though, for which 
supranational decision-making processes have already been established that are not dependent on 
legitimisation via member state institutions; unlike the treaty amendment decisions of s2 and s3 that 
must be confirmed in line with the constitutional arrangements of the Member States before they 
can be ratified.74 The exception to this in s6 is the adoption of a decision by the European Council 
under Art 42(2) TEU in relation to common EU defence, which has a two stage process that requires 
specific Member State approval ‘in line with their constitutional requirements’.75 This is one of the 
five ‘organic laws’ in the Treaties, which already require the type of two stage ratification process 
established in s6 EUA, and that are dealt with inconsistently by the EUA.76 Policy decisions can be 
adopted in the Council in relation to the other four ‘organic laws’ without prior approval in a 
referendum.77 Given that the ‘organic laws’ have already been elevated by Member States, including 
the UK, to a position of requiring an intergovernmental approval process akin to that followed for 
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amendment of fundamental EU law, which gives Member States some control over the approval of 
these laws, it is somewhat surprising in terms of consistency that the provisions of s6 EUA do not 
require referendum approval for the adoption of decisions in relation to all the ‘organic laws’. 
Perhaps the UK government simply decided that a common EU defence was more salient and more 
significant than the other organic laws.78 
The other parts of s6 EUA relate to various changes in the voting procedure in the Council; some of 
which are specified in s6 itself and a number of others listed in Schedule 1 of the act. Ministerial 
approval of these changes in voting procedure, which would remove the UK government veto in 
relation to a wide range of policy areas, such as EU finance, social policy and the environment, also 
now require approval in a referendum first. This removal of a veto would not necessarily mean that 
there would be a transfer of competence to the EU or any change to EU policy, but they would mean 
that there is an increased possibility that a legislative proposal may be passed at EU level that the UK 
government does not agree with, but will have to comply with. It would be possible to have a 
referendum on the voting procedure for EU level decisions in relation to one of the issues in s6 or 
Schedule 1 EUA and then at a later date another referendum could be required by s2 or s3 EUA for 
approval of treaty amendment covering the same subject area. The provisions in s6 EUA also leave 
the incongruous situation that a UK minister can only adopt a change in voting procedure after 
approval in a UK referendum, but the minister can adopt a decision in Council about the substance 
of that policy area without needing referendum approval. There are no exceptions in either category 
of decisions in s6, and there is no significance condition.  
Having described the mechanics of the EUA in terms of holding referenda, the rest of the chapter 
will proceed with an assessment of the democratic potential of the legislative design of referenda in 
the EUA. First, there is an assessment of the compatibility of the EUA provisions for referenda with 
EU law, and with UK law as far as it relates to the potential for indirect legitimisation of the EU. 
Secondly, there is comment on the political motivation behind the implementation of the EUA, how 
this is reflected in the criteria established and the potential referenda subject matter, and what this 
might mean in relation to its democratic potential. The chapter then concludes with specific 
comment on the potential influence of the EUA on EU democratic legitimacy.  
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Legal compatibility of EUA referenda provisions 
EU law compatibility 
The EUA referenda provisions relating to treaty amendment do not give rise to any issues with EU 
law compatibility. s2 and s3 EUA require approval of EU treaty amendment in a referendum in the 
UK, when one of the provisions in s4 EUA is met, before that treaty amendment can be ratified by 
the UK government. The legality of s2 and s3 is not brought in to question because the use of 
referendum is accommodated in EU law: the ordinary and special revision procedures, as set out in 
Art 48 TEU, require ratification and approval, respectively, “in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements.”79 The second stage of the ratification process in the ORP has included 
Member State level referenda in a number of countries, and there is no legal issue with adding the 
UK to those that require referendum approval prior to treaty ratification. This follows the standard 
EU democratic process of treaty legitimisation via Member State institutions.  
However, the provisions in s6 EUA for the use of referenda to approve EU decisions that would not 
normally be referred to the Member State level before ratification in the EU institutions do give rise 
to issues in relation to EU law. The legality of the provisions in s6 EUA can be questioned because EU 
policy and legislative decisions do not ordinarily provide for this type of two stage approval process. 
The focus for the discussion here is whether the provisions in s6 EUA are in accordance with EU law 
and of the practical implications for this decision to require Member State level referendum 
approval for EU level decision-making. The wider impact that this might have on the overall EU 
democratic paradigm is discussed in more detail, together with the ECI, in the next chapter. 
s6 EUA referenda are not triggered by treaty amendment. They are divided between those that are 
triggered by the policy area a decision is being taken in, such as to approve adopting the Euro,80 or 
signing up to the Schengen Agreement;81 and secondly those referenda that would be triggered if 
the UK government wanted to approve the adoption of QMV or the OLP instead of a special 
legislative procedure in relation to the wide range of treaty articles listed in s6 EUA and Schedule 1 
EUA. The EUA provisions require the UK minister representing the UK government in the Council of 
ministers to seek approval in a referendum in the UK before they can vote in favour of a decision 
covered by s6 EUA.82 The decision-making process in the EU Council of ministers must be followed by 
all Member States, but then, for the UK only, the draft decision must be approved by Act of 
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Parliament, and by the UK citizens through a referendum vote.83 This addition of direct Member 
State level institutional involvement in EU level decision-making is not accommodated by the 
treaties for any of the s6 decisions, except for a decision covered by s6(2) that relates to a Common 
EU defence and decision taken under Art 42(2) TEU. Craig put it this way: “There is a related 
objection to the section 6 strategy, which is that it makes the particular national parliament and the 
national electorate a formal part of the EU decision-making process where there is no warrant in the 
Treaty.”84 In other words, the insertion of UK referendum approval by s6 in to EU decision making is 
of questionable legality because it changes the institutional mechanism agreed in the treaties for 
making EU law. 
The s6 EUA provisions that introduce Member State level involvement in the legislative process are 
also of doubtful legality because they imply a unilateral, unapproved rewrite of the relevant treaty 
articles. The enactment of the EUA has, in effect, just for the UK, introduced a second Member State 
level stage to the decision-making process for the s6 decisions. In effect this has moved them in to 
the category of organic laws, which are an exception to standard EU legislative practice because they 
require that decisions are approved in accordance with the constitutional requirements of each 
Member State, as is the case for treaty ratification.85 Amendment to the EU treaties is confirmed 
after unanimous ratification or approval in all Member States, but this implied change to the treaties 
through the s6 EUA provisions only applies to the UK and has not been approved by other Member 
States, and hence raise questions of its legality.  
A further reason to question the legality of the provisions in s6 EUA is that UK ministers are no 
longer able to fulfil their obligation under Art 16(2) TEU.86 The Member States have agreed in the 
treaties that the Member State representatives in the Council, once negotiations have been 
concluded and a sufficient level of consensus reached, will be able to approve the relevant decision: 
‘The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may 
commit the Government of the Member State in question and cast its vote’.87 However, the 
provisions of s6 EUA mean that the UK minister is not lawfully able to cast a vote in the Council for 
the UK Government without first returning to the UK to seek approval for a draft decision from the 
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UK Parliament and from UK citizens in a referendum.88 This means that in meeting the legal 
requirements set out in s6 EUA the minister will be unable to discharge their obligation according to 
EU law as set out in Art 16(2) TEU. The final aspect of the treaties that it has been suggested s6 EUA 
may conflict with is the principle of sincere cooperation in Art 4(3) TEU.89 It is unclear though 
whether the provisions of the EUA requiring further approval in the UK of EU level decisions are so 
obstructive to the tasks and objectives of the EU as to fall foul of this principle. It is also less than 
certain that challenging the UK in the Court of Justice on this basis would be politically wise, given 
that the EUA provides for more EU democratic legitimisation.90  
Even if these questions of the legality of s6 EUA were able to be overcome, there are still a number 
of practical, political problems that could arise because of the introduction of the referenda 
provisions in s6 EUA.91 Negotiations in the Council may be complicated by the UK minister and other 
Member State representatives wishing to avoid triggering a referendum. Those involved in the 
negotiations will be aware of the issues that would trigger a referendum in the UK and this could be 
factored into the negotiations on any policy decisions in the Council and possibly cause delays or 
difficulties in reaching agreement. There is little clear evidence to date as to what impact the EUA 
provisions may have on EU level negotiations and decision-making either in terms of the UK’s EU 
policy or the positioning of other Member States or the final form of the decisions taken. The closest 
the EUA has come to influencing negotiations at the EU level is probably in relation to the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (Fiscal Compact) where Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
decided to exercise his veto. Although a referendum in the UK may not have been triggered by the 
Fiscal Compact, the complexity and uncertainty of whether the EUA provisions would have triggered 
a referendum, combined with the potential for significant political problems for the UK government, 
may have influenced the decisions taken by the UK and the final shape of the Treaty.92  
Previously, a UK minister went to the Council with a mandate, negotiating position and decision 
making power, legitimised at state level, prior to the supranational level engagement. The UK 
minister was given the authority to represent the Member State and to take decisions on behalf of 
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their government. Now, though, the minister will need to negotiate in the Council until there is 
enough clarity about whether the other Member States are going to approve a decision, then if he 
wants to support the decision that seems likely at the conclusion of the negotiations he will need to 
stop the EU legislative process and return to the UK to ask for the expected decision to be approved 
by parliament and referendum. The UK government would presumably try to hold the referendum 
at the end, or as close to the end as possible, of negotiations in the Council, but before the final 
decision is made. While referendum approval is being sought in the UK, the Council decision will be 
on hold and other Member States will likely be waiting for the UK referendum result before 
approving the decision. Implementing the decision at state level in other Member States would run 
the risk of having to repeal a recently enacted law in the event of a UK referendum rejection. During 
the delay in decision-making whilst the UK referendum is held, which may be anything upwards of 6 
months, the position of the other Member States in relation to the decision at issue may also 
change, for example because of a change in Government in the meantime, which means that money 
may be spent on a referendum in the UK about a decision that has already altered, may never 
happen, or which the UK government no longer wants to support anyway; which would all make the 
referendum approval meaningless.  
One possible outcome of rejecting the agreement that the UK government intends to approve is that 
a UK government representative will, if they wish to reach an agreement in this area, have to return 
to the Council to renegotiate with the other Member States. A referendum would then need to be 
held every time that it seemed that negotiations have reached a draft agreement that the UK 
government thinks the people will accept. These issues will make the Council decision-making 
process extremely unwieldy for the UK and the other Member States when the s6 EUA referenda 
provisions are triggered. If other Member States were to take the same position as the UK then all 
these issues would be exacerbated and undermine the purpose of membership of a supranational 
organisation with decision-making competence. Furthermore, implementing a functioning process 
consistent for all Member States for approving these decisions, which may include direct democracy 
at the Member State level, would require complex treaty change. Much of this comment is 
conjecture in lieu of any firm evidence of the impact of the EUA’s legal provisions, but it seems likely 
at this point that there will be some impact on the effectiveness of Council decision-making. 
There is also the potential for the EUA provisions to undermine the use of referendum in the UK. If, 
as was speculated in the previous paragraphs, there were to be referenda on decisions that change 
before they can be approved or multiple referenda on the same subject as part of the negotiations 
in Council, then there will be high levels of cost for the state to hold these referendums and for 
138 
 
people to engage with the issues and participate.93 Even more significant in democratic terms is that 
the democratic value of the opportunity for citizen participation through the introduction of 
referenda in UK legislation may be severely devalued as a result, and would do little to allay 
concerns about the competence or willingness of citizens to engage effectively. It is appropriate for 
the people to legitimise decisions, but it is up to the Government to negotiate. It is one thing for the 
UK constitution ‘to know something of the people’ as a result of referendum when approving state 
decisions,94 but quite another for the EU Council of ministers to know something of the UK people 
during the negotiations of what could be relatively minor EU level decisions, such as whether to 
change the voting in the Council in relation to energy measures that are primarily of a fiscal nature.95 
The s6 EUA provisions may be a challenge to EU law as it is currently established in the treaties, but 
it seems unlikely that an issue of significant substance will arise to lead to a legal challenge, or that 
there is likely to be much appetite for such a challenge. As Dougan and Gordon said a legal challenge 
based on UK law that provides for enhanced democratic provisions would seem “politically 
maladroit ... the perfect gift from naive Europhilia to cynical Euroscepticism”.96 It seems more likely 
that any legal issues will be left in abeyance until such time as treaty amendment is once more on 
the agenda, which does not currently seem imminent, particularly given the understandable 
preoccupation with the ongoing economic crisis. The implications of the challenge to the EU 
paradigm by the implementation of the EUA are discussed in detail in chapter four. The next section 
of this chapter moves the discussion away from the direct implications of the EUA on EU level 
democracy to its implications for Member State level democratic legitimisation of EU policy in the 
UK, and the indirect legitimisation this provides the EU. 
UK law compatibility 
This section assesses the potential for an instrument of direct democracy to have an impact on the 
democratic legitimacy of the UK’s EU policy decisions, and therefore indirectly on the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU. First there is comment on the theoretical possibility of any instruments of 
direct democracy reducing the control of existing institutions over the political agenda and its 
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outcomes because of the UK’s fundamental constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty, 
and then secondly there is comment on the potential of the specific legislative provisions in the EUA 
to have a democratic impact in the UK, and therefore indirectly in EU democracy. 
The EUA has established criteria for holding the first legally prescribed referenda in the UK. This is a 
potentially profound change from the previous position in the UK of referenda being initiated on an 
ad hoc basis, with the Government of the day having complete legal discretion over whether to hold 
a referendum. The legislative design of the EUA is expected to limit the legal discretion of future 
governments in relation to aspects of EU policy, and the holding of a referendum is now required at 
times as part of the legislative process in the UK. In theory, notwithstanding the political pressures 
that might be brought to bear to challenge them, any new Government could change the list of 
policy areas that require approval by referendum, or even repeal the EUA altogether. However, 
whilst the EUA is on the statute book there is a new process for passing legislation relating to the UK 
government’s EU policy decisions covered by the situations and criteria in the EUA, which affects a 
central tenet of the UK constitution: parliamentary sovereignty.97 Until recently, and according to 
the traditional approach to parliamentary sovereignty, it had been thought that legislation such as 
the EUA would not bind future parliaments as to the legislative process they had to follow.98 The 
future Parliament would be sovereign and able to pass legislation on the issue of its choice following 
the standard legislative procedure of a vote in the two houses of parliament and then the royal 
assent. If this traditional approach to parliamentary sovereignty still held today it would make the 
EUA virtually legally redundant, certainly in so far as it deals with a change in the legislative process, 
of which the referendum provisions are a central part. It would also mean that the democratic 
potential of the EUA provisions introducing direct democracy was severely limited as the existing 
institutions would maintain control over the initiation and outcomes of a referendum relating to EU 
policy. 
In recent years, though, the meaning of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK constitution has been 
reassessed as a result of legislation such as the European Communities Act 1975 and Human Rights 
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Act 1998, and cases such as Factortame99 and Jackson.100 Bogdanor stated in 2009 that the 
“traditional interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty, that Parliament cannot bind itself, is falling 
in to desuetude. But no new doctrine has yet replaced it.”101 Although not yet fully established there 
is significant support for a ‘manner and form’ approach to parliamentary sovereignty that is able to 
accommodate the numerous challenges to the traditional meaning of parliamentary sovereignty.102 
The ‘manner and form’ approach accepts that it is possible for Parliament to alter the process that 
legislation should follow before being enacted, and further that there is an expectation that future 
Parliaments will follow this new process until such time as new legislation is passed that amends this 
process again. This means that any new Parliament retains sovereignty over the content of 
legislation, the form that it takes, but that the process followed, the manner in which it enacts future 
legislation can be prescribed by previous Parliaments. Under this manner and form reading of 
parliamentary sovereignty future parliaments would be bound by the provisions of the EUA and 
need to meet the referendum condition to approve the prescribed decisions and treaty changes. 
Gordon argues that the EUA is in fact confirmation that the manner and form reading of 
parliamentary sovereignty is the most appropriate for the UK constitution.103 There has also been 
implicit judicial support for this position in the case of Wheeler v the office of the Prime Minister 
where the expectation was stated that Parliament is bound to follow the process set out in the EUA 
until it is repealed, although the case itself did not directly decide on whether the referendum 
provision had to be enforced.104 
This change in UK constitutional doctrine is particularly significant for direct democracy because it 
provides the doctrinal support for direct democratic instruments, such as the referendum or a 
citizens initiative, to have an impact on an ongoing basis. Without a shift towards a manner and form 
approach to parliamentary sovereignty direct democratic instruments provided for in legislation 
would have little or no legal force. Politically it may have been difficult to avoid a referendum in the 
past, but there was no legal impediment to the Government deciding not to hold a referendum. 
Now, assuming other legislation and cases confirm the expectation that a referendum will be held in 
the circumstances provided for in the EUA, the new legal requirement of the EUA to hold a 
referendum goes a long way to confirming the manner and form approach to parliamentary 
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sovereignty, which in turn reduces the executive control over the decision to hold a referendum 
pursuant to the EUA. 
The doctrinal questions relating to parliamentary sovereignty are dealt with comprehensively 
elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this thesis, whose focus is the democratic potential of the 
EUA for EU democratic legitimisation rather than its impact on UK constitutional theory. The central 
message from these brief paragraphs on this complex aspect of UK constitutional law is that the shift 
away from the traditional approach to parliamentary sovereignty means that the possibility of direct 
democracy to have democratic significance in the UK has been formally enhanced. Not only is one 
Parliament now able to bind a future Parliament as to the process for passing legislation, but the 
people are also now able to exert a veto over some legislation, which moves the UK in the direction 
of popular governance.105 In other words, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has adapted to 
allow for the concession of a shift in sovereignty to include citizens. This is essential for a mandatory 
citizen vote on policy matters to exist and for direct democracy to have a significant impact on 
democratic legitimacy. The legislative sovereignty of Parliament may have been shared to some 
extent with the people, such that a sense of popular sovereignty in the UK may be talked about 
between general elections, but the extent to which power, or sovereignty, has actually been 
distributed to the people away from the existing institutions is still strongly dependent on the 
manner in which these same institutions design and implement instruments of direct democracy. It 
is to the motivation behind the implementation and design of the EUA referenda provisions that we 
turn next. 
Prioritisation of citizen participation or party politics 
Political motivation for introducing EUA 
Gordon Smith, writing in 1976, described the pressures that led to the 1975 referendum on EC 
membership as follows: “On one level the pressure for the referendum resulted from a belief that 
the British people themselves should decide; on a second level the referendum represented the best 
available means of defeating the dominant inter-party coalition within parliament; on a third level, 
the referendum campaign was part of a wider strategy for the left wing of the [governing] Labour 
party to enforce its will on a reluctant leader and his close supporters”.106 There are striking 
similarities between this description of the pressures on the then Labour Government that led to a 
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referendum in 1975 and the political motivation for the Conservative led coalition Government to  
enact the EUA in 2011. 
The Government have stated clearly that they believe that it is democratically appropriate that 
citizens should have the final say on the development of EU policy. David Liddington, Minister for 
Europe stated: “I am immensely proud of what this historic law will do for our democracy. British 
voters have long felt disconnected from the EU and the decisions taken on the EU in their name, and 
this law is a vital step forward in this Government’s attempts to repair that disconnection”.107 The 
refusal of the previous Labour government to hold a referendum prior to the ratification of the 
Lisbon treaty has been pointed to as an example that ‘the important decisions about the EU have 
been taken without real consideration for the wishes of the people’.108 As well as this statement of 
the general importance of democratic participation and engagement with citizens, David Liddington 
has also emphasised the potential transfer of influence from political institutions to the people: he 
stated that the impact of the changes in the EUA will be “to disperse power more widely in Britain 
rather than hoarding authority within government”.109 The political rhetoric could indicate a genuine 
desire for stronger political legitimacy through democracy for EU policy at the UK and EU level. 
However, a more cynical interpretation of the political comments about the democratic importance 
might be that the government are trying to put a rather disingenuous democratic gloss on legislation 
that is being implemented to resolve their own political problems rather than any overwhelming 
desire to limit institutional discretion, or increase citizen control, in relation to EU matters.110  
As in the 1970s, there is a broad parliamentary consensus today on staying in the EU, with which 
eurosceptic opinion clashes; and the Government does not plan to leave the EU. The Programme for 
Government states that the Government intends, “to ensure that the British Government is a 
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positive participant in the European Union, playing a strong and positive role with our partners”.111 
This parliamentary consensus leaves citizens with little opportunity to challenge the membership of 
the EU through the ordinary electoral process. Democratic participation in the UK is largely reserved 
to voting for a constituency MP based on that policies they represent. If all the political parties 
support membership of the EU, a citizen is not able to indicate their preference to leave the EU 
through the vote they cast to choose an MP, which is a failing of representative democracy.112 
Supporters of holding a referendum have seen a direct vote on the specific policy issue of EU 
membership as a means of challenging the policy preferences of the main political parties. The turn 
towards citizens directly making the decisions about EU policy in the one-off referendum of 1975 
and the referenda provide for in the EUA 2011 perhaps indicates a lack of confidence in the ability of 
representational mechanisms to resolve these issues, and may even reflect a more general 
dissatisfaction with representative democracy.113 
The third level of political pressure suggested by Smith in the quote on page 141 above was the 
party political pressure within the governing party. As there was in the 1970s for the Labour party, 
there has been a concerted campaign in recent years by a small faction of the Conservative 
parliamentary party to leave the EU or repatriate powers back to the UK from the EU. In 1975, the 
‘committed anti-marketeers’ did not favour the usual democratic methods as control would remain 
in the hands of the Prime Minister, and the extreme wing of the leading political party campaigned 
then for renegotiation and referendum “as a strategy to tie the hands of a future Government”, and 
the same is true of the eurosceptic members of the Conservative party today.114 This clash between 
governmental and parliamentary policy preferences plays out badly in the public and a party divided 
on important issues usually lose votes as a result.115 The EUA was partly a Government attempt to 
tread the line between the competing positions within its party and to increase unity by sending “an 
important signal to the Europhobic wing of the Conservative party ... that its concerns would in the 
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future be taken seriously by the coalition government”.116 At the same time the EUA referenda were 
a means to avoid the need for an in/out referendum, which the Government was resisting and 
would have been worried about losing.117 With the EUA failing to quieten the anti-EU wing of the 
conservative party or stop the rise of UKIP, the Conservative party has promised EU renegotiation 
and a membership referendum in 2017, if re-elected.118 It would seem that the ‘division resolving’ 
intention of the EUA has failed and a further referendum has therefore been offered as a result of 
continued political pressures.119  Most of the referenda held in the UK have had a difficult political 
environment as part of their backdrop, for example the devolution referenda that tried to resolve 
regional tensions within the UK and the recent AV referendum that was held amid tensions in the 
coalition government. Bogdanor has gone as far as to conclude that in the UK the referendum has 
become an established part of the constitution because of “the vicissitudes of party politics”.120 The 
EUA is no different and the party politics associated with the EU have had an important effect on the 
introduction of the ‘referendum locks’. The greater the extent to which the motivations of wishing to 
resolve political party divisions and to impose or reinforce a policy position are actually the reason 
behind the enactment of the referenda provisions in the EUA, the less democratic participation is 
prioritised and the less democratic impact the referenda are likely to have.  
Despite the failure of the EUA to quell the Conservative party back bench rebellion on EU issues or to 
avoid the promise of a referendum on membership of the EU, a subject excluded from the EUA, 
eurosceptic political preferences, nevertheless, run strongly through the referenda provisions in the 
EUA. The Government selection of treaty amendment that increases EU competence, the four policy 
areas in S6 EUA, and the myriad changes in voting procedure included in S6 EUA and Schedule 1, 
means that there are a wide range of EU policy decisions or subject areas in the EUA that will trigger 
referenda. However, this seemingly broad spectrum is still only a limited part of EU policy and is a 
reflection of party political policy preference rather than criteria that prioritise the democratic 
participation of citizens. This subjective political preference is reflected by the fact that referenda 
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have only been introduced to approve developments in the EU, therefore providing a veto only over 
the extension of the EU, and not over Government policy that would reduce the competences of the 
EU. The topics that the EUA provisions leave out are also indicative of current governmental policy 
preferences: for example there is no referendum for accession of more Member States or for 
withdrawal from the EU.121 Legislation is naturally going to reflect a particular policy position. The 
government of the day will set the laws that reflect the political ideology of the governing political 
party. The EUA though is different to other legislation in that it does not only alter policy as reflected 
in the legislation, but also changes the democratic process that approves this legislation.  
It is worth emphasizing that issue is not being taken with the political policy of the present 
government, but of their decision to use legislation that purports to be for the purpose of a 
fundamental shift in power to citizens,122 to try in reality to entrench their own political 
preferences.123 Extreme instances where referenda have been used for political rather than 
democratic purposes have been witnessed repeatedly within authoritarian regimes over the years, 
and led to a perception that referenda suffer inherently from this problem.124 The EUA is clearly not 
in the same league as referenda held by dictators such as Pinochet or Hitler, but its political 
overtones point down the same road and the criteria for triggering democratic participation could 
have been more politically agnostic by triggering referenda for a policy area not a specific policy 
position, which in turn could have strengthened the democratic potential of the EUA.125 The 
unidirectional, politically motivated design of the EUA and the prioritisation of politics over citizen 
participation are reflected in the criteria that have been set for holding referenda and the potential 
subject matter of EUA referenda, which are discussed next. 
Criteria in the EUA that trigger referenda 
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There has been a break from the past in the EUA by attempting to define criteria in legislation that 
will trigger referenda rather than rely on an ad hoc Government decision responding to the political 
situation and Government priorities at that time. The ad hoc approach that relies on existing 
institutions deciding when a referendum should be held can be criticised for underestimating the 
value component of issues, for predetermining the issues that citizens will be interested in and 
capable of engaging with,126 and for being an elitist, limited approach to democracy reminiscent of 
Schumpeter.127 At the other end of the spectrum from this high level of institutional control of 
referenda is the option that is taken in states such as Switzerland and California of allowing citizens 
to choose the subject of a referendum through the use of a popular initiative.128 Citizens are able to 
propose a subject for a referendum vote and then, if the organisers reach the required support 
threshold, a referendum will be triggered. This avoids the problem of deciding which subjects are 
appropriate for a referendum in terms of constitutional significance or salience on an ad hoc basis, 
or of trying to set objective criteria to define in legislation when a referendum should be triggered, 
but could potentially lead to high levels of uncertainty for policy direction. The EUA takes a middle 
ground between these positions of institutional and citizen control and sets in legislation criteria 
that trigger a referendum. The criteria trigger referenda in three categories: treaty amendment, 
specific policy areas, and voting procedures. The position taken here is that the closer these criteria 
are to being an objectively set and unqualified, rather than a narrow subjective expression of party 
political preferences, the wider participation is likely to be and the stronger the democratic potential 
of the referenda. The criteria that trigger referenda are commented on next from this perspective.  
s2 and s3 EUA set out a type of political decision that should be approved by referendum, the 
ratification of treaty amendments, but then in s4 EUA it limits when referenda to approve treaty 
amendments need to be held by specifying circumstances that must also occur to trigger a 
referendum. Broadly speaking, it is only treaty amendment that transfers powers to the EU that 
citizens are intended to be given a veto over. This means that in s4 EUA there is a subjective 
categorisation of the subject matter that must be legitimised by referendum, which conditions the 
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objective criteria based on the type of legal act in s2 and s3 EUA. The seemingly broad, objective 
promise in s2 and s3 EUA of referenda on all treaty amendments is also restricted by the significance 
clause in s3(4) EUA. This subjective categorisation and requirement of significance introduce an 
element of discretion for the Government of the day, albeit a small one, in deciding whether a 
referendum has been triggered. It is likely to be difficult to avoid a referendum when powers are 
transferred as part of the ordinary revision procedure for treaty amendment because of the extent 
of the provisions in s4 EUA, but significance is a more malleable concept that is left undefined in the 
EUA. PM Gordon Brown avoided a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty because it was not ‘significant’, 
despite its close resemblance to the EU constitutional treaty, which the previous Prime Minister 
Tony Blair had decided was significant enough for a referendum.129 A referendum to approve treaty 
amendment will not always be triggered, therefore, and democratic participation is qualified as a 
result. 
Secondly, having used the objective criteria of the type of political act to define when referenda 
should be used to legitimise Government decision making and then qualified it, the legislation moves 
further from an objective approach to triggering referenda by including, in s6 EUA, a list of policy 
topics, rather than types of political act, that should be approved by referendum. The decision to 
include a list of subjects that trigger a referendum rather than using objective criteria is in itself 
reflective of the political subjectivity of the EUA. The explanation for including the list in s6 is that 
these are decisions that are “one-way, irreversible decisions which would transfer power or 
competence from the UK to the EU”.130 It is presumably on this basis that the EUA has established 
what subjects are appropriate for legitimisation via referendum and arguably provides some 
consistency to the types of issues that will be the subject of referendum votes.131 However, we will 
see in the next section that analysis of the subject matter of the referenda that are likely to be 
triggered only adds to the sense of prioritising political preferences and inconsistency, for example 
through excluding from s6 issues such as the increase in the number of Member States and EU 
withdrawal. There is a clear preference towards restricting EU development in the EUA, which is 
prioritised ahead of maximising democratic participation to address party political difficulties. This 
makes the ‘referendum locks’ appear more like an attempt to lock the political policies of the 
Conservative party in place rather than to lock in citizen choice over all EU treaty and policy 
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decisions. The next section looks at the implications of the decisions on the subject matter of the 
EUA on the democratic potential of implementing referenda. 
Potential subject matter of referenda triggered by the EUA 
Direct democracy has been summarised as ‘citizens voting on the most important issues’.132 Usually 
a referendum would be on a topic that has public salience or some fundamental significance so that 
citizens engage with the issues, and turnout is high enough to be representative. Descriptive 
classifications of the salient or significant issues of previous referenda vary, with categories such as 
constitutional, territorial or moral issues often used to identify past referenda subjects.133 This 
section considers whether classifications of past referenda might help indicate the appropriateness 
of the likely subject matter of the referenda triggered by the EUA. This is approached from the 
perspective of a predetermined definition of what is fundamental or constitutional, or from the 
perspective of reserving referenda for subjects of public salience. 
In terms of fundamental constitutional significance, the House of Lords Constitution Committee, 
despite believing that referenda are best reserved for such issues, stated ‘We do not believe that it is 
possible to provide a precise definition of what constitutes a "fundamental constitutional issue”.134 
Instead the committee offered a list of some of the current issues that they believe should be 
described as fundamental constitutional issues, such as abolishing the monarchy, changing the 
currency, and leaving the EU.135 In the UK there is also no written constitution that could be referred 
to for a list of constitutional issues and there will always be a grey area where it will be a matter of 
judgment whether issues are of a fundamental constitutional nature or not, which means that it can 
provide only a limited guide to subject matter for future referenda. As Bogdanor confirmed: ‘to 
enunciate those matters which are constitutional and therefore to be submitted to referendum 
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leads only to an impasse’.136 Public salience, which is an alternative approach to deciding what 
subjects are appropriate, is used here to refer to issues that people are interested in and care about 
and therefore have meaningful opinions on. This raises as many questions as trying to decide which 
issues are of ‘fundamental constitutional significance’ and is probably even less precise and more 
subjective than using constitutional significance to decide when a referendum should be held.137 
Having a list of subjects that trigger referenda, although not ‘constitutional’ issues in the UK, also 
suffers from the difficulty of needing to reach agreement on which criteria or subjects are 
fundamental enough to be included in such legislation.138 
The inconsistent experience of referenda subjects in the UK does not help resolve the difficulty of 
identifying the salient or constitutional issues that might be appropriate as referendum topics. Only 
a small number of such issues have been decided by referendum and there are a far larger number 
of policy decisions and legislative changes that are easily categorised as being fundamental 
constitutional issues or of high public salience that have not been considered to require approval by 
referendum: reform of the House of Lords, the Human Rights Act, and the ratification of a series of 
EU treaties, amongst many others. This inconsistency, the lack of a written constitution, the difficulty 
of defining a ‘fundamental constitutional issue’ or public salience, and the repeated ability to avoid a 
referendum on European membership in recent years means that the use of descriptive criteria 
based on past experience does not provide an effective method of identifying what subjects should 
trigger a referendum in the future, and be included in legislation such as the EUA.139  
Whilst defining a ‘fundamental constitutional issue’ or ‘public salience’ precisely remains 
problematic, they are still a reasonable scalar guide to whether the subject matter selected might be 
appropriate as the topic of a referendum. The easier it is for one of these terms to be applied, the 
more appropriate the subject matter is for a referendum. The House of Lords constitutional 
committee, having accepted that it is not possible to classify referendum on this basis, went on to 
state that they “acknowledge arguments that if referenda are to be used they are most 
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appropriately used in relation to fundamental constitutional issues”.140 Appropriateness of subject 
matter is important for the extent of the opportunity for democratic participation that the EUA 
referenda will provide. Constitutional significance and public salience are used therefore in the 
analysis of the EUA referenda triggers, to the extent that it can be presumed that the more an issue 
is constitutionally significant or salient, the more appropriate it is to hold a referendum, and that the 
less this is true the less appropriate it will be to hold a referendum and the less the referendum will 
be an effective participative opportunity for citizens.  
One democratic issue for referenda is that for them to be an effective means of participation the 
turnout needs to be sufficiently high for the result to be considered as representative of the wishes 
of citizens as a whole. It is difficult to say, though, at what point turnout is low, and this will vary 
from referendum to referendum.141 The conclusion from House of Lords Committee in 2009-10 was 
that “there should be a general presumption against the use of voter turnout thresholds and 
supermajorities. We recognise however that there may be exceptional circumstances in which they 
may be deemed appropriate”.142 The Scottish referendum on devolution in 1979 is one example of a 
referendum that fell short of its turnout threshold and therefore the majority vote in favour was not 
implemented. It seems reasonable that a decision on the subject of the referendum reverts back to 
Parliament, if there is not sufficient interest for citizens to turn out in high numbers and make the 
decisions themselves. The referendum result can still be considered in Parliamentary debate, which 
will presumably take in to consideration the choice of those that did vote and any indication of a 
strong minority preference, but it avoids the weak legitimacy issues of referenda with low levels of 
public interest being automatically implemented. What the turnout level should be and whether it 
should be a fixed figure or left to the discretion of Government to decide when a referendum result 
should revert back to parliamentary decision-making is a question for further debate. One of the 
issues discussed here in relation to the EUA is whether the subject matter chosen for referenda is 
likely to lead to a turnout that is sufficient for a presumption that the subject matter is appropriate. 
In Government speeches relating to the EUA the distinction between the constitutional significance 
of the overarching EU policy of the UK government and each of the specific situations that will lead 
to a referendum are often elided, with the importance of the EU to the UK constitution being used 
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to justify the whole range of situations that trigger referenda in the Act, whether or not the 
particular issue that would be the subject of the referendum is in itself significant.143 Ratification of 
an extensive treaty amendment or new treaty that might alter the EU competence framework or 
legislative process will have significant implications for the UK and are easy to categorise as 
constitutional. At the other extreme it is difficult to see how the change in Council voting process 
from unanimity to QMV with regard to changing the list of military products exempt from internal 
market provisions could be viewed as fundamental in UK constitutional terms.144 Between these 
extremes there are a wide range of issues that may or may not be classified as ‘constitutionally 
significant’ depending on the perspective of the person making the decision and the current legal 
and political situation, such as adoption of the Euro,145 environmental measures,146 police co-
operation,147 and the EU’s multi-annual financial framework.148 Even treaty amendments that 
transfer competence are likely to vary in their constitutional significance to the UK. To avoid 
discretion for future governments and to ensure the consistent application of referenda the EUA was 
drafted to cover all transfers of competence in a Treaty amendment, but the consequence of that 
decision is the lack of consistency in the constitutional significance of the issues that trigger 
referendum. This is less problematic if all referenda attract sufficient interest from the public for a 
high turnout, but it is more likely that there will be referenda required that do not attract high 
numbers of citizens to vote, meaning that the administrative cost is more likely to be viewed as 
unjustified and the effectiveness of the democratic participation through a referendum vote limited. 
The EUA criteria eschew the ‘fundamental constitutional issues’ approach to deciding when a 
referendum should be held. The EUA does, however, require referendum for some clearly 
fundamental constitutional issues, such as treaty amendment, which are likely to have a high 
turnout at a referendum. It is also possible that the Government have taken the view that all 
increases in the competences of the EU, and changes in voting procedures that affect national 
control of EU level policy, are fundamental constitutional issues because of their impact on 
sovereignty, and are therefore appropriate as subjects of a referendum. However, not only are there 
other clearly constitutionally significant issues, such as the accession of new Member States or a 
decision to leave the EU, that are not included, referenda may also be held to approve issues that 
are not only difficult to be viewed as constitutionally fundamental, but might even be described as 
                                                          
143
 See for example speech by William Hague HC Debate 7 Dec 2010 vol 520 col 191. 
144
M Gordon and M Dougan, ‘The United Kingdom’s European Union Act 2011: “Who won the bloody war 
anyway?”’ [2012] EL Rev 3, 19. 
145
 S6(5)(e) EUA. 
146
 Part 2, Schedule 1 EUA. 
147
 Ibid. 
148
 Ibid. 
152 
 
trivial.149 If the Government were to justify the use of referenda on the basis that any increase in 
competence is a fundamental constitutional issue, then it would beg the question as to why they do 
not also see reductions in competences as fundamental issues. It would have been more consistent 
to define the relationship with the EU as the fundamental issue that will require legitimisation by a 
direct citizen vote and require a referendum whenever this relationship changes, either to enhance 
or reduce the supranational powers of the EU. It is only certain aspects of the UK’s relationship with 
the EU that have been selected as appropriate for legitimisation via a referendum, not the UK’s 
relationship with the EU or the EU’s competences overall.  
The inclusion of the significance condition, despite the relatively small impact it is likely to have on 
the number of referenda held, is important because it would seem to acknowledge that it is not 
appropriate for referenda to be held on EU policy issues that have little impact on the UK. This 
condition confirms in the legislation that it is not sufficient to deem all referenda triggered by 
changes to the UK’s relationship with the EU, even if limited to increases in EU competences or 
powers, as significant enough to warrant a referendum vote. As the explanatory notes of the Act 
stated: ‘The inclusion of the significance condition minimises the risk that a referendum will be 
required in relation to the transfer of power considered to be insignificant’.150 It may be true that the 
significance condition reduces the risk, to some degree, of holding insignificant referenda that have 
low turnout, although it is not clear whether in constitutional or salience terms, but it only does so in 
relation to two clauses within the EUA (s4(1)(i) and (j)) and does not ‘minimise’ this risk in general 
when viewing the legislation as a whole. Moreover, its inclusion is in apparent contradiction of the 
blanket requirement in the EUA for all other competence increases and for almost all voting 
procedure changes to be approved by referendum as a result. 
As well as moving away from holding referenda just on issues of constitutional significance, the EUA 
has not tried to limit referenda to subjects that resonate strongly with the public, irrespective of 
their constitutional significance, and a number of referenda could be triggered that lead to low 
turnout as a result.151 There are issues of high public salience, such as the issue of joining the Euro,152 
included in the EUA, but there are other topics that are likely to attract a far lower voter turnout, 
such as the European public prosecutors office153 and the Schengen protocol.154 There are also highly 
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salient issues that have not been included in the EUA. One surprising omission from the list, for 
example, is withdrawal from the EU. The issue of salience also arises in relation to the technical 
nature of some EUA referendum triggers; for example people could be asked to vote on whether 
there should be a change from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure in 
the EU in relation to a specific treaty article without a significant policy hook. The relatively technical 
process based subjects in s6 and schedule 1 EUA are particularly problematic as they require a 
higher investment in time to understand and may be coupled with topics that do nothing to increase 
the salience of the issue; so that even if these voting processes have constitutional significance their 
lack of salience for the public may make them less appropriate as the subject of a referendum, lead 
to low turnout, and reduce the effectiveness of direct participation. UK experience of referendum 
indicates that technical procedural issues of this nature, even when they are of fundamental 
constitutional significance in the UK, do not resonate strongly with the public. The turnout for the AV 
referendum, despite its significance for UK politics, was only 42%, and this was boosted by being 
held on the same day as people were voting in other elections.155 It would be surprising if there was 
even this level of turnout for a referendum on the voting processes in the rather distant Council of 
Ministers. This may go some way to explaining why this sort of referendum requirement for 
technical changes to voting procedures or the legislative process is unprecedented in EU Member 
States, if not attached to highly politically salient or fundamental policy issues.156 
These issues related to the lack of constitutional significance or public salience could increase the 
risk of poorly informed voting occurring,157 reduce the willingness of citizens to engage with the 
referenda issues, increase the reliance on political cues, and increase the possibility of votes based 
on opinions on matters other than the specific ones in the question, such as the popularity of the 
incumbent government.158 All of this undermines the democratic value of using referenda and 
increases the possibility of manipulation of the referendum process by political elites.159 The 
distinction between expressing popular will as relates to the outcome of policy issues and more 
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technical political process issues might be one way to indicate where the people’s and their 
representatives’ roles might be distinguished in making choices using direct democracy. The more an 
issue requires specialist knowledge and time for an understanding that can lead to an informed 
decision the more likely it is that people would rely on their representatives for a decision. On the 
other hand, the more that a referendum issue is a subject or policy based one, or about policy 
outcomes of the legal process rather than the process itself, the more appropriate it is to make a 
decision using a referendum. The EUA criteria that trigger a referendum, though, do not follow such 
an approach, contain a number of inconsistencies and as a result may undermine the democratic 
value of using referenda in the UK. 
Of course, from a normative perspective, it might be argued that the people should be directly asked 
their opinion in a specific policy vote whenever possible to maximise the opportunity for democratic 
participation, irrespective of whether the issue is fundamental or not, or policy or process based, 
and that there will be a natural selection by citizens of the issues that they consider significant and 
worth voting on, and therefore appropriate as topics for a referendum. If this view were taken, then 
the EUA’s inconsistent selection of potential referendum topics is less problematic. However, a 
number of reasons have been indicated for taking a more cautious or limited approach to extending 
the use of referendum than that taken by the EUA.160 First it is impractical, even with today’s 
technology, to have referenda on even a small percentage of the policy issues that pass through 
Parliament without overloading people with the number of issues that they would need to 
understand and take the time to vote on. Secondly, direct democracy is a complement to 
representative democracy and political representatives elected will be expected to continue to carry 
out a decision-making role. In the usual course of events where an issue is of relatively minor 
constitutional impact or of minor interest to the public, it is likely that representatives will be 
expected to study the available options and then make a decision, rather than ask the people to 
understand and vote on them in a costly national referendum.161 The EUA confuses this position. 
Thirdly, the UK has only held a limited number of referenda so the culture of direct democracy is in 
an early evolutionary phase and voter engagement is not likely to be automatic. The reservation of 
referenda, as far as this is possible, for decisions on fundamental issues, before moving possibly to 
include the less significant issues of the type included in the EUA, would allow a gradual 
incorporation of direct democracy in to the existing representative framework, which would in turn 
allow the potential disadvantages and advantages of using referenda, such as the impact they might 
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have on Governmental ability to respond to political events and engage in EU policy making, to be 
assessed and the further roll out of referenda managed accordingly, if required.  
Behind the seemingly altruistic intentions of the UK Government increasing the democratic influence 
of UK citizens over EU policy decisions, and indirectly increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU, 
lie the policy preferences and self interest of party politics at Member State level. These political 
motivations for introducing direct democracy in to UK legislation are reflected in the strongly 
politically motivated criteria for the triggering of referenda, and the inconsistency in the significance 
of the issues that could be the subject of these referenda. Overall this gives a sense of a legislative 
framework that prioritises party political concerns over citizen participation, despite its introduction 
of a new democratic instrument in to UK legislation. The final section of this chapter assesses the 
overall impact of the legislative design of referenda in the EUA on the democratic potential of direct 
democracy. 
Democratic potential of the EUA - referendum initiation and binding results 
Finally, what does the analysis of the EUA legislative design tell us about the potential for enhancing 
the EU’s democratic legitimacy, through increasing citizen influence over the UK’s EU policy and 
legislative agenda and the ability to challenge established preferences? In addressing this question 
we return to the classification of referenda in the EUA according to their initiation and the extent to 
which the result is binding, and what this means for the democratic criteria of increased citizen 
influence over agenda content and over agenda outcomes. As with the ECI, the two key factors for 
how strongly these criteria are met are the institutional mediation of the EUA referenda and the 
extent to which they enable citizens to challenge established policy preferences.162 
In terms of increasing the influence of citizens over the content of the policy and legislative agenda, 
the referendum is inherently limited. In a referendum citizens are asked to approve or reject a 
government proposal or decision in a specific policy area, but usually this opportunity only arises 
when the Government decides to offer it to citizens or when legislation triggers a referendum. The 
ability of citizens to choose the subject matter and the timing of a referendum will only be enhanced 
if the referendum is combined with a democratic instrument such as the popular initiative, which 
allows them to propose laws. As Lipjhart says, “The voters’ influence is strengthened a great deal if 
they are allowed not only to vote on propositions originating in the legislature or the executive but 
also to propose laws … The referendum by itself entails a very modest step towards direct 
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democracy but, combined with the initiative, it becomes a giant step”.163 The EUA has not 
introduced anything akin to the initiative to allow citizens to propose the subject matter on which 
referenda should be held on an ongoing basis, it has only established in law a promise that citizens 
will be able to have a direct influence on certain specified policy matters when these are engaged 
with by future governments.   
As well as not providing citizens with an opportunity to choose when they want an issue to be the 
subject of a policy vote on an on-going basis, the Government also did not offer any means of direct 
participation for citizens to choose the subjects or criteria that have been included in the EUA as 
triggers for participation through referenda. The Government controlled and defined the decision as 
to when the EUA would provide citizens the opportunity to directly participate in EU policy. There is 
also no provision in the EUA for any direct involvement of citizens in the future redrafting of the 
EUA; for example, a requirement for referendum approval of changes to the legislation could have 
been included. As it stands, therefore, modification or repeal of the EUA need only follow the 
standard legislative procedures of the UK, and citizens will have no formal influence over the issues 
that may or may not be included as requiring referendum approval.164 If citizens have not been given 
control over the initiation of referenda and the policy issues they get the chance to vote on, the 
question becomes to what extent the legislative design of the EUA restricts government discretion 
over the initiation of referenda. 
The EUA has moved the UK from its previous constitutional position of referendum initiation being 
formally controlled by the incumbent government to a position where there is a legal obligation to 
hold a referendum if any of the criteria established in the EUA are met.165 Until such time as the 
legislation is amended future governments are expected to abide by the referendum condition when 
it is triggered.166 Despite the importance of this legal prescription, future governments will still retain 
some degree of control over the initiation of referenda as provided for in the EUA, which will limit 
the reduction in institutional control over the UK’s EU policy agenda. First, through negotiations in 
the EU, the UK Government could choose to use its influence to try to avoid the issues that would 
trigger a referendum in the UK or modify the approach in addressing them.167 Secondly, the 
Government still retains control over interpreting whether a referendum has been triggered. 
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Politicians have been adept at interpreting the political situation to avoid fulfilling political promises 
to hold a referendum in the past, for example during the Lisbon treaty ratification process as 
promises were made and then reasons found for not holding a referendum. It is possible that future 
Governments will be just as adept at interpreting the legal provisions of the EUA to avoid holding 
referenda, although the provisions in the EUA will make this more difficult.  
The EUA has been described as establishing a ‘referendum lock’ that guarantees a referendum will 
be held when there is any transfer of competence or power to the EU from the UK; but there are 
gaps in the provisions that could be exploited, such as the lack of a requirement for referendum 
approval for the UK to join an enhanced cooperation group even if this means new competences for 
the EU with regard to the UK, which would normally trigger a referendum; there may be some 
discretion for the Government when deciding whether competences have been increased; and the 
significance clause specifically provides for discretion in some limited areas.168 As a result, not only 
have citizens not been given increased influence over the policy agenda issues that a referendum 
might be held on, but the promise made to them in the EUA to hold referendum under certain 
conditions might also not be as locked in as it first appears.  
Furthermore, the complex and inconsistent framework for the referenda criteria that is the result, in 
part, of attempting to tightly restrict future government discretion could paradoxically have left the 
EUA more open to amendment and give future governments the opportunity to increase their 
discretion. This hypothetical situation might arise, for example, if costly and time consuming 
referenda start to be needed regularly on minor policy issues, or if the UK starts to be marginalized 
in the EU because of complications arising from the EUA provisions, or if the sheer number of 
referenda undermines their value in the eyes of the public. These issues could lead to a future 
government deciding that amendment of the EUA referenda provisions was necessary, which would 
afford them an opportunity to alter the political tone of the legislation or reduce the use of 
referenda that might not otherwise have arisen if the legislation had been drafted in a more 
straightforward manner. Despite the possibility of amendment of the EUA and Government 
discretion, the control of future governments over the initiation of referenda, in the policy areas 
covered by the EUA, has been limited to some degree, and there will be occasions when approval by 
referendum is legally required; particularly for the more significant EU related events, such as the 
ratification of treaties. More experience is needed, though, of how the legal provisions of the EUA 
are to be applied, and how future governments respond to the existence and content of the 
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legislative provisions for referenda, before a proper assessment can be made of the extent to which 
this potential for institutional control over the holding of a referendum is realised. 
Subsequent to confirmation that a referendum is to be held, there is the opportunity for the 
authorities to influence democratic participation by referendum through its administration. The 
Government has significant control of the process that is followed during a referendum because 
they set the question, the precise timing of the referendum, and frame the political agenda 
environment within which public debate occurs; all of which influences the voting decisions in the 
referendum itself and potentially allow the Government to increase the support for its preferred 
policy position.169 The EUA only addresses this issue directly by requiring a separate question on the 
ballot paper for each treaty or decision that the referendum is deciding upon,170 and by stating that 
the Electoral Commission is responsible for public awareness of the issues.171 The potential for 
institutional control as a result of electoral administration is moderated in the UK through the 
Political Party Elections and Referendums Act,172 which sets parameters for the funding of 
referendum campaigns, gives the Electoral Commission some influence, in an advisory capacity, over 
the question that is set in a referendum,173 and requires a separate act of parliament for the rules 
and processes of each referendum held, which further disperses control. Although the 
administrative control of the referendum process has an influence on a referendum result, the lack 
of specific provisions in the EUA relating to this issue mean that it is not discussed further here. 
The point at which the institutions have least control over a referendum is when citizens vote. 
Citizens are free when voting and when the ballot has been held in a fair manner there is the 
potential for a vote contrary to the institutional policy preference. Given the limited citizen control 
over the timing, procedure or subject matter of the referendum in the EUA, this relatively direct 
legal impact of a vote cast by citizens on a specific issue is the principal means by which the EUA will 
influence EU democratic legitimacy. It is clear from the drafting of the EUA that the Government 
should be bound by the referendum result when the result is negative: the referendum condition is 
only met if “the majority of those voting in the referendum are in favour ...” of the relevant treaty or 
decision.174 This is true to the extent that when a government policy in relation to the EU is rejected 
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in a referendum, the treaty cannot be ratified and Council decisions cannot be approved. However, 
it is not as clear whether the Government should be bound by a positive referendum result, or what 
the response of the government should be following a negative referendum result beyond the initial 
non-ratification of a treaty or non-approval of a s6 EUA decision.  
It would be surprising if a positive referendum result was not implemented by a government that 
has negotiated at EU level and reached a position where they wish to approve the decision or ratify 
the treaty. However, on rare occasions a Government may not want to implement a positive 
referendum vote. For instance, economic or political circumstances in the UK may change suddenly 
between the holding of the referendum and completing the ratification of the treaty, so that the 
Government no longer believes it is tenable or desirable to ratify a treaty, despite the referendum 
result. It is also possible that there is a change in Government in the time between holding the 
referendum and finalising the ratification of a treaty or approving a Council decision, and that the 
new Government does not agree that the referendum approval should be implemented. The EUA 
does not address this eventuality. The legislation clearly states that a treaty cannot be approved 
without a positive referendum result, but conversely it lacks specific legal provisions stating that 
referendum approval must be applied. The significance of this for the analysis of the EUA is that it is 
another example of the unidirectional nature of EUA provisions and reflects the appearance of a 
political rather than democratic motivation behind introducing the EUA referenda. This scenario also 
raises interesting constitutional questions, which are outside the scope of this thesis, about whether 
direct or representative democracy would take precedence when they would lead to different 
decisions, and whether there is the need to specify in legislation that a referendum result must be 
implemented. 
The Government also retains control over action taken following a rejection for a policy position 
from citizens in a referendum, which could influence the eventual policy outcome of the vote by 
citizens. There are options open to a Government that is determined to get approval for the decision 
or treaty that has been rejected in a referendum vote. One option is to repeat the referendum and 
rerun the campaign in an attempt to have a different result second time around. This approach has 
been taken twice in Ireland when an EU treaty has been rejected by referendum and on both 
occasions the second referendum result approved the ratification of the treaty.175 This raised a 
number of questions about the enforcement of referendum results and the appropriateness of 
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holding a referendum again on the same subject, or how long it is appropriate to wait before a 
referendum can be validly rerun. The legislative design of referenda in the EUA does not address 
these essentially political decisions relating to the negotiation about a decision or treaty that has 
been rejected in a referendum vote in the UK. The key issue for this chapter is the potential 
institutional mediation that this lack of legal provision leaves in relation to a referendum vote. The 
Government will decide whether to renegotiate the decision or treaty, what the key issues are, and 
when a suitable point has been reached to present the decision to its citizens for a vote again. The 
voice of UK citizens has been injected in to the approval process but the existing institutions handle 
the echoes of that voice. 
The legal provisions in the EUA may leave options open to the UK government in their response to a 
referendum result, but there is likely to be political pressure on implementing the result. Even for 
non-binding referenda that lack any legal obligation on a government to implement the wishes of 
citizens expressed in a referendum result there are likely to be political pressures on a government 
to ensure the implementation of the result. As Setala put it, “in established democracies it seems to 
be very difficult for parliamentarians to vote against the result of an advisory referendum”.176 The 
greater the level of support for an issue and the greater the level of turnout at the referendum the 
more difficult and less likely it will be that the government would ignore the result. Mendez, Mendez 
and Triga described the divide between legally binding and non-binding referenda as “being 
somewhat artificial” and cited Finland’s EU membership referendum as an example of an advisory 
referendum whose result it would be “unimaginable” not to be implemented.177 Similarly, none of 
the referenda that the UK national government has held before have been formally binding, but the 
results have always been implemented. On this reading, therefore, the EUA referenda results are 
likely to be implemented by the Government, even if the provisions in the legislation might legally 
allow an element of discretion at times. It is also possible, however, that the Irish example is 
indicative of the influence of EU membership on the political response to Member State referenda 
on important EU issues, which brings in to conflict the expressed wishes of a specific Member State 
and the political preferences of the other Member States.  Similar pressure to find a ‘solution’ may 
be brought to bear on the UK government following a no vote in a referendum, which could also 
influence their political response to the referendum vote.  
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 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 2009-10. Referendums in the United Kingdom para 
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 Finland is one example of a state with non-binding referenda – F Mendez, M Mendez, V Triga, Referendums 
and the European Union: a comparative enquiry (CUP 2014) 37. 
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The final point about outcomes is whether, irrespective of the political pressures, the referendum 
result can be legally binding on any Government in the UK system, as a result of the provisions in the 
EUA, because of parliamentary sovereignty. The EUA not only imposes an obligation on future 
institutions to hold a referendum, when the criteria in the EUA are met, but it also imposes an 
obligation to abide by a result that vetoes a treaty or decision. As discussed above, the manner and 
form approach to parliamentary sovereignty is that future parliaments can be bound as to how 
legislation should be passed, in this case through the addition of the referendum condition.178 The 
new legislative process established for the issues covered by the EUA means that if there is a 
disagreement between a Parliament that wishes to approve a decision taken by the UK Government 
and citizens who have indicated through a referendum that they do not, then it is more likely now 
that the view of the people will prevail and the decision will not be approved. The referendum 
condition of the EUA introduces popular sovereignty in to the UK’s parliamentary system to some 
degree and, once you have accepted that this is possible, an extension of the same argument means 
that it is likely the referendum result will become binding in law as a result of the EUA provisions and 
also through political pressure.179  
Conclusion  
The analysis of the ECI in the previous chapter showed evidence of institutional mediation by a 
bureaucratic institution through the manner in which they implemented the legislative provisions 
and as a result of the ECI’s legislative design. That there will be institutional control over the 
referenda of the EUA is less apparent than for the ECI because of the strength of the legal obligation 
imposed by a referendum result, but the analysis in this chapter shows that there is still a strong 
degree of institutional control written in to the legislative design of referenda in the EUA. When a 
referendum is triggered, the impact of the vote will be the point at which institutional mediation is 
weakest. Prime facie, the EUA has established referendum ‘locks’ that promise mandatory recourse 
to popular vote and implementation of the referendum result, and the limitation of future 
governmental discretion in relation to EU policy. However, as we have seen from the analysis of the 
EUA provisions, once this promise and the extent of Governmental discretion is examined in more 
detail, it becomes apparent that future governments will still have a degree of control over the 
promise that has been made and the policy impact the EUA might have. Without experience, 
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though, of how Governments respond to situations where a referendum may be required, and how 
they administer and respond to a referendum vote, the extent that the democratic potential of the 
EUA referenda are limited by institutional mediation remains unclear. It will be interesting to see 
how the UK government responds to referendum results, legally and politically, when citizens are 
eventually given an opportunity to directly participate in EU policy decisions through the referenda 
provisions in the EUA, and the extent to which they restrict the quantity and quality of the 
opportunities for democratic participation. 
The governmental control over the policy agenda has led to the EUA containing partisan policy 
preferences which reflect a form of ‘party political’ institutional mediation. The government has 
used its institutional position to protect a policy position against future challenges by other political 
parties that may be in Government. This policy preference that the Government has reinforced is a 
strengthening of the inter-governmental nature of the EU even if it leads to insignificant referenda 
topics that could undermine attitudes towards using direct democracy. Increasing democratic 
participation therefore appears as a tool for these political purposes, rather than the central 
objective of the legislation itself.  
The continued control of the representative institutions over the opportunity, agenda and even, to 
some degree, the legal impact of the EUA referenda means that the democratic impact of writing 
referenda in to UK legislation is likely to be limited. As with the ECI, the striking introduction of direct 
democracy, through the EUA, in to an otherwise representative democratic system is better 
described as a ‘baby step’ than a leap forward in democracy. That said, introducing referenda in to 
UK legislation remains a change of some importance, not least for UK constitutional doctrine, 
because citizens are now empowered, if they wish, to reject the established policy preferences of 
the standing government, and almost any future EU treaty amendment is dependent on citizen 
approval. Having analysed the ECI and the EUA separately, the final chapter brings together the 
findings in the two previous chapters to consider what they mean overall for the EU’s dual 
democratic paradigm and its democratic legitimacy. 
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Chapter Four  
Direct Democracy In and Between the EU and the UK 
The ECI and EUA are an important part of the recent developments in the ongoing process of dual 
democratisation that is taking place in and between the EU and its Member States. The rise of direct 
democracy in the EU has the potential to be a substantial stride towards increased citizen 
participation and popular influence over the EU constitutional framework and the legislative 
authority of EU institutions. This final chapter brings together the research findings from the 
separate legal analysis of the ECI and EUA and their democratic potential, in the two previous 
chapters, to consider what the joint impact from the contemporaneous implementation of these 
two new instruments of direct democracy could be for the institutional framework of EU democracy 
and its legitimacy. This is done by examining two questions.  
The first question is, ‘What are the implications of the ECI and EUA for the existing EU democratic 
paradigm?’ There are some tensions between the ECI and the EUA, and the EU’s dual democratic 
paradigm where these new instruments challenge the existing legitimisation boundaries in the EU. 
The analysis of the previous chapters indicates that for the ECI this challenge comes particularly 
when it raises questions of whether EU citizens should be able to propose treaty amendments, and 
for the EUA from the provision in the legislation for Member State level referenda on matters of EU 
level law and policy making. However, the findings discussed in this final chapter indicate that in 
general the ECI and EUA fit within the existing democratic paradigm to the extent that they 
legitimise EU law and policy making, and EU treaty amendment, respectively. The first section of this 
chapter, therefore, includes first a reminder of the characterisation of the EU democratic paradigm 
used in this thesis and secondly comments on the implications for the democratic institutional 
framework from the implementation of direct democracy at Member State and EU level. 
The second question examined in this chapter is, ‘What is the potential influence of the ECI and EUA 
on the democratic legitimacy of the EU?’ The findings from chapters two and three, in relation to this 
question, show that institutional mediation limits the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA to 
increase citizen influence over the policy agenda and its outcomes. This similarity in experience is 
reflected in a restricted ability to challenge established policy preferences, which is a key indicator of 
the democratic strength of any democratic instrument. This restriction occurs despite the ECI and 
EUA operating at different levels in the EU and influencing different aspects of EU democratic 
legitimacy. The ECI and EUA both provide an extra opportunity for citizen participation to 
democratically legitimise the EU, but in practice there are limits on their democratic potential to 
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facilitate an increase in citizen influence over the EU law and policy agenda, or its outcomes. The 
second section of this chapter, therefore, comments on the institutional mediation of direct 
democracy from an EU perspective, the extent to which policy preferences were restricted as a 
result, and what the implications might be for the use of direct democracy in the EU.  
The overall conclusions that are drawn in relation to these two questions are that the introduction of 
the ECI and the EUA could, in principle, bring significant changes to both the democratic paradigm 
and democratic legitimacy of the EU. However, in practice, the challenges of the ECI and EUA to the 
current dichotomies within the dual framework of EU democracy are limited in number and unlikely 
to lead to any telling alteration to the status quo in the short term. Similarly, the ECI and EUA have 
the potential to increase EU democratic legitimacy through greater citizen participation and 
influence over the EU political agenda and its outcomes, but the structure of the EU polity and the 
institutional mediation of these democratic instruments, which has prioritised politics over 
participation, have limited the ability of citizens to challenge the established policy preferences.  
Democratic paradigm of the EU 
The institutional form of democracy in the EU polity is based largely on representative democracy, 
but is supplemented now by the referenda of the EUA since 2011 for UK citizens, and by the ECI 
since 2012 for EU citizens.1 Two of the key characteristics of EU democracy are its combination of 
supranational and Member State democratic processes and legitimisation, and the differentiation 
between the legitimisation of the constitutional framework of the EU, and its daily policy and 
legislative decision-making.2 In the following section there is a reminder of the manner in which 
these two dichotomies interact and the institutional paradigm they underpin, which is followed by 
discussion of the impact that the new challenges of the ECI and EUA might pose. 
There are three types of institution in the EU: the supranational institutions directly legitimised by 
EU citizens, the intergovernmental institutions that are indirectly legitimised via Member State level 
democratic processes, and there are the Member State institutions that make EU related policy 
decisions and ratify treaties that are directly legitimised by Member State citizens. The treaties, the 
constitutional framework of the EU, are predominantly legitimised using member state level 
democratic processes, such as the general election of political representatives and, for a limited 
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previously held a referendum on EU membership in 1975. 
2
 These dichotomies were described in detail on pgs 10-13. 
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number of states, approval by Member State citizens through a referendum.3 There is some 
relatively minor involvement of the supranational EU institutions, for example through participation 
during the early stages of the treaty convention process, in establishing the constitutional order of 
the EU, but the agenda is set through Member State representatives in the European Council and 
the final treaty text must be ratified in accordance with Member State processes.4 
The daily policy and legislative decision-making of the EU, on the other hand, is largely controlled by 
supranational institutions.5 The co-legislating bodies, the European Parliament and the Council of 
ministers, are legitimised through EU level and indirect Member State level democratic processes, 
respectively. UK citizens, prior to the introduction of the ECI and EUA, could vote in European 
Parliament elections as part of democratically legitimising EU law and policy making, and they could 
vote in Westminster elections, which indirectly legitimise the role of Government ministers in the 
Council, the role of the Prime Minister in the European Council, and the role of the Government in 
negotiating and ratifying treaty change. 
Although there is Member State level legitimisation of both the constitutional order and the daily 
political authority of the EU, there is an important distinction between the two that is written in to 
EU law. Art 48(2) TEU states that ratification of a new treaty or treaty amendment must be carried 
out in line with Member State law and processes, which means that agreement at supranational 
level is followed by approval at Member State level.6 For EU legislation, however, it is expected that 
in the normal course of events the minister will be there acting as representative of their Member 
State government and able to approve decisions without recourse to further Member State level 
approval processes, once agreement has been reached in the Council.7 This means that although 
there is indirect Member State level legitimisation of the policy making and legislative procedures of 
the EU, there is little direct involvement of Member State level institutions or democratic processes, 
which has implications for the use of direct democracy at Member State level as part of the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy.8 
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 See F Mendez, M Mendez, V Triga, Referendums and the European Union: a comparative enquiry (CUP 2014) 
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procedure to protect the principle of subsidiarity. For more details on yellow card system see A Cygan, 
‘Collective’ Subsidiarity Monitoring by National Parliaments after Lisbon – The Operation of the Early Warning 
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One noteworthy gap in the EU democratic paradigm is that the Commission is not an institution 
democratically legitimised by its citizens. The Commission derives some democratic legitimisation as 
a result of its accountability to the directly elected European Parliament for its membership and 
performance.9 However, there has been no specific mechanism for citizens themselves to elect 
members of the Commission or, prior to the ECI, to influence their policy decisions. This is of 
particular relevance to the discussion of the ECI because of the Commission’s control over the ECI 
process and its role of legislative initiative. The institutional position of the Commission, including its 
virtual monopoly over legislative initiation that provides influence over the EU policy agenda, has 
traditionally relied on the rule of law and technocratic, performance legitimacy for its 
legitimisation.10 The ECI might, in the long term, come to be viewed as part of the legitimisation of 
the Commission’s role of legislative initiative,11 but as things stand the extent to which the ECI might 
move the Commission along a path towards being viewed as less technocratic and a more 
democratically legitimate institution is very limited.   
This sketch of the EU democratic paradigm is structured around the institutional balance of the EU 
and the manner in which Member State and EU institutions combine to legitimise the EU. However, 
it should be emphasised that the political rights to participate in parliamentary elections at 
supranational and Member State level, and now through direct democracy instruments for UK 
citizens at both levels, rely on dual Member State/EU citizenship. Central to the discussion of the 
impact of the ECI and EUA is the change in the role that citizens might play in influencing the EU 
constitutional framework and daily political decision-making through the contemporaneous 
introduction of the ECI and EUA, and the extent that it remains controlled by the existing 
institutions. This inevitably has links to the subject of citizenship, but the analysis in this chapter is of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Mechanism in Trybus and Rubini (eds) After Lisbon: the Future of European Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 
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the impact on EU democracy and citizen participation rather than an analysis of citizenship per se.12 
The focus, therefore, is on the extent to which citizens are able to influence the policy agenda and its 
outcomes as a result of the ECI and EUA, and the impact this has on EU democratic legitimacy rather 
than the meaning of citizenship.  
The characterisation of the EU democratic paradigm that is presented here is not always clearly 
reflected in EU law and is already challenged by a number of processes other than the ECI and EUA, 
for example, the supranational institutional right to propose treaty change, and the EU organic laws, 
which are commented on below.13 Another challenge is provided by the so called yellow card 
process, which was introduced following the Lisbon Treaty and provides a stronger role for national 
parliaments in relation to monitoring the application of the principle of subsidiarity in EU law.14 
Notwithstanding its limited use and impact so far,15 the significance of the ‘yellow card system’ to 
the discussion here is the example it provides of Member State level institutions having an 
opportunity to participate directly in the daily political authority of the EU, rather than in the 
Member State ratification of treaties.16 This does not fit easily within an EU democratic paradigm 
where EU level institutions usually carry out policy making and where Member State involvement in 
the EU legislative process is indirect through the Council and European Council, and which reserves 
EU legislative initiative almost exclusively to the supranational Commission. The Art 48(2) TEU right 
of supranational institutions is discussed below in relation to the ECI, and the EU organic laws are 
discussed in relation to the referenda provisions in the EUA. These are just three examples of 
challenges to the general position that there is Member State legitimisation of the EU constitutional 
order, and predominantly supranational legitimisation of EU policy and law making. This complexity 
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in the EU democratic paradigm reflects the piecemeal, dual democratisation of the EU. Next is 
considered the extent of the challenges posed by the ECI and the EUA to the already partially blurred 
institutional and democratic framework of an EU polity that rests on supranational and 
intergovernmental democratic legitimacy. 
The ECI, EUA and their combined implications for the current EU democratic paradigm 
The ECI and the EUA might question whether the current democratic paradigm is to be sustained, 
but it seems unlikely that they will have a major impact. Despite the challenges commented on in 
subsequent pages, the current paradigm substantially accommodates these instruments of direct 
democracy. The ECI is a supranational instrument that is able to be used by citizens to propose legal 
acts within the framework of the Commission’s powers. EU citizens are able to propose EU law and 
policy and the Commission, in line with its current role, decides whether to initiate a legal act or not. 
There may be scope to interpret Art 11(4) TEU and Reg 211/2011 as allowing the inclusion of treaty 
amendment in the ECI, but there has been little indication from the Commission that they intend to 
follow this path. The Commission stated prior to enacting the ECI regulation that citizens could not 
use the ECI process to ask the Commission to propose treaty amendment, and this was confirmed 
when they rejected the Anti Nuclear Energy initiative.17 Supranational political rights will, on this 
reading of the ECI, therefore be reserved for the legitimisation of the daily political authority of EU 
institutions and not challenge the democratic paradigm. Moreover, the Commission approach to ECI 
registration and subsequent legal outcomes has meant that a challenge to the existing EU policy 
agenda is unlikely; let alone a challenge to the institutional balance of the EU through the ECI.18 
The s2 and s3 provisions of the EUA, which require referendum approval in the UK before the 
Government can ratify a new EU treaty or treaty amendment, fit within the EU democratic paradigm 
of Member State legitimisation of the EU’s constitutional order.19 This strengthens the already 
intergovernmental nature of the treaty process for UK citizens by providing for an extra domestic 
step in the ratification process,20 but EU law specifically provides for this two step process and it is in 
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line with developments in several other Member States.21 The constitutional treaty, in particular, 
saw a rise in the use, or at least promise of, Member State ratification referenda: France, 
Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg held a referendum, and Portugal and the UK promised one.22 In 
an EU context in relation to its provisions on treaty amendment, therefore, the EUA is not 
particularly remarkable and fits within the approach of using direct democracy for treaty ratification 
that appears to have been developing across EU Member States in recent decades.23 
In general the ECI and EUA have fitted within the EU democratic paradigm and their impact on the 
overall structure of the EU is likely to be limited, but they have raised some questions about EU 
legitimisation of the EU’s constitutional order and the daily law and policy making authority of the 
EU, respectively. The first question addressed in this section is whether it is appropriate for EU 
citizens to be able to use the ECI to influence the treaty change agenda, given the supranational 
character of this voting right and the institution that the proposals are presented to,24 or whether 
responsibility for legitimising the EU treaties is best left with Member States and the participation of 
their citizens through national instruments, such as the referenda of the EUA. This question is 
addressed through considering the arguments for the inclusion of treaty amendment in the ECI 
process and then the arguments against. The question of Member State level legitimisation of EU 
law and policy making is discussed later in this section in relation to the referenda provision in s6 
EUA. 
Supranational legitimisation of EU treaty amendment 
So far the Commission’s stated policy has been to refuse to register initiatives that propose or 
require treaty amendment.25 If this were to continue it would mean that the largely 
intergovernmental process for legitimisation of the EU’s constitutional framework would remain 
unaffected by introducing the ECI. However, the Commission has already diverted from this policy 
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170 
 
when registering the ‘Let me  vote’ initiative,26 which proposed a change to Art 20(2) TEU; accepting 
in the process that treaty amendment can, in their view and in certain circumstances, be a part of 
the ECI.27 The Commission’s position is that treaty amendment that is triggered by a special revision 
procedure, such as the passerelle clause of Art 25 TFEU, can be the subject of an ECI proposal, even 
though an ECI proposal that would require the initiation of the ordinary revision procedure cannot. 
The Commission argues that there is a different legal character between the two treaty revision 
procedures and that the ECI proposal to extend voting rights for EU citizens can be registered 
because, although it does ask for a change in the TEU, it does not require a new power to be granted 
in the Treaties for the proposal to be acted upon. Whether this argument is sustainable or not, it 
does raise the question of using a supranational democratic instrument to initiate treaty 
amendment, which challenges the current democratic paradigm. 
The arguments about whether it is lawful to request or require treaty amendment as part of an ECI 
proposal were analysed in chapter two.28 The conclusion was that it could be lawful for ECI proposals 
to include treaty amendment, particularly as a result of Art 48(2) TEU, which provides the 
supranational EU institutions, the European Parliament and the Commission, a limited opportunity 
to influence the treaty change agenda by submitting treaty amendment proposals to the European 
Council via the Council of ministers.29 This not only challenges an EU democratic paradigm that 
predominantly reserves treaty change legitimisation to Member State processes and institutions, but 
is of particular significance for the ECI because it directly calls in to question the position adopted by 
the Commission that the ECI cannot be used by EU citizens to propose treaty amendment. By 
excluding treaty amendment from the ECI, the Commission leaves a position where EU institutions 
can propose amendments to the Treaties via Art 48(2) TEU and blur the lines of the EU democratic 
paradigm, but EU citizens cannot do the same by using the ECI to request the Commission to 
consider using the existing powers provided by Art 48(2) to make a proposal for treaty 
amendment.30 
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 Further details available at <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
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 Detailed discussion about the Commission’s decision about the Let me Vote initiative can be found above on 
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 The Commission confirmed its position that an initiative cannot rely on Art 48(2) to support its admissibility 
in the decision on the registration of the Self Determination Human Right initiative. 
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It may be arguable that it is lawful for treaty amendment to be a part of an ECI proposal, but there 
are also democratic and political arguments to be considered in relation to this argument. ECI 
campaigners wanting further democratic participation continue to press for ECI proposals to be able 
to include treaty amendment.31 They argue that if the aim of the ECI is to bring citizens closer to the 
Union through either facilitating political debate, or through enabling citizens to directly influence 
the whole of the EU political agenda, then cutting the instrument off from the EU constitutional 
order in the Treaties, and many of the most significant and fundamental issues of the Union, is 
unlikely to help achieve this. Increasing the scope of the ECI to include treaty amendment, it is 
argued, would increase the salience of the issues able to be proposed by an ECI, increase the public 
debate generated and citizen influence over the political agenda, and therefore significantly enhance 
the democratic potential of the ECI. If increasing democratic participation were the priority of the 
ECI, then including treaty amendment would be one way to maximise the extent to which it were 
met. 
Although there could be democratic value in extending the scope of the ECI, it might on the other 
hand be argued that Member State citizens already have sufficient opportunity to legitimise EU 
treaty amendments at state level. In the UK, for example, the EUA referenda give citizens a direct 
democratic means of legitimising EU treaties, which supplements the existing citizen participation 
through parliamentary elections. This raises the question of whether there are democratic benefits 
for citizens to be able to legitimise the EU treaties at supranational level as EU citizens and also as 
Member State citizens. One answer is that there could be value in having an ECI that provides a 
message from citizens about the interests of the Union as a whole to complement the presumably 
national interest expressed in a Member State level referendum.32 The ECI could give Member State 
citizens, in the UK or elsewhere, the opportunity to support a treaty amendment proposal that is not 
necessarily a strong enough national concern to trigger a national institutional response, but which 
Member State citizens may think is a significant EU issue and, when combined with support from 
other citizens in other Member States, is of enough concern for the proposal to reach the ECI 
support thresholds. Furthermore, citizens of Member States that do not hold a referendum to ratify 
treaty amendment and only have the infrequent and imprecise opportunity of electing 
representatives to indicate whether they approve of the constitutional framework of the EU, might 
benefit from a direct opportunity to support treaty change. Citizen engagement with treaty 
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 This of course assumes that UK citizens are considering supranational/EU level issues when supporting an 
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amendment through the ECI as EU rather than Member State citizens could therefore be of some 
democratic value. 
A second possible benefit of allowing the ECI to be used for treaty change is that Member State 
citizens would have an opportunity to directly influence the actual content of the treaty change 
agenda that is otherwise denied to them. Even in Member States, such as the UK, where a 
referendum is held to ratify treaty amendment, citizens are only given the opportunity to influence a 
proposed policy outcome through stating their approval, or not, of the proposal. A referendum does 
not provide an opportunity, as the ECI does, to influence the content of the EU agenda by proposing 
a new policy position for public debate because the existing institutions decide which situations and 
subject matter trigger a referendum. The distinction between influencing the policy agenda and 
having a policy veto is one of the key differences between the democratic opportunity provided by 
the ECI and that provided by the EUA. The ECI could complement the Member State use of 
referenda, therefore, by providing Member State citizens with a formal route of democratic 
participation that increases the level of public debate in relation to EU policy, influences the treaty 
amendment agenda, and which compensates for the weakness of referenda in terms of providing 
citizens with direct agenda influence. 
It may be arguable that it is lawful for treaty amendment to be part of the ECI and there may be 
democratic value in extending its scope, but the institutional framework of the EU and the political 
tensions within it mean that treaty amendment is unlikely to become part of an EU level instrument 
such as the ECI. Before commenting on this, it is worth noting that any concerns about the impact 
that extending the scope of the ECI to include treaty amendment might have on the direction of EU 
policy or its institutional or constitutional framework are unlikely to be realised, because any 
proposal from citizens for treaty amendment must pass through the existing political institutions 
during the treaty amendment process. This representative ‘filter’ starts with the control the 
Commission has over the registration of ECI proposals and the weak legal obligation imposed on it by 
citizen support for an ECI proposal. This means that even if treaty amendment is accepted as a 
subject of ECI proposals there is no obligation on the Commission to pass on such a proposal to the 
Council. Then if the Commission did decide to pass on a proposal for treaty amendment, the filter of 
issues continues through the long treaty revision process controlled by Member State governments 
so that, even if citizen deliberation and agenda influence are given a wide scope that includes treaty 
amendment, the risk of uncoordinated, unexpected or sub-optimal developments in the EU Treaties 
is significantly reduced. 
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The request by an ECI for the Commission to propose treaty amendment would be a request for the 
Commission to propose legal acts that sit outside its principal activity of initiating EU legislation in 
the ‘general interests of the Union’.33 It would increase the extent to which the Commission 
becomes involved in the treaty amendment process ordinarily legitimised via Member State 
democratic means.  If an initiative that included a request for the Commission to propose treaty 
amendment were registered, succeeded in reaching the necessary support thresholds to trigger 
consideration by the Commission, and was submitted to the Council by the Commission, then it 
would increase supranational institutional involvement in treaty amendment and open up a new 
supranational avenue for proposing treaty amendment. This would be a direct challenge to the 
current EU democratic paradigm that ordinarily provides for Member State control over treaty 
amendment through a largely intergovernmental process. It seems unlikely therefore that Member 
States would accept this incursion in to their role as ‘masters of the treaties’, something which is 
indicated by the UK government implementation of the EUA ‘referendum locks’. This highlights the 
fact that one of the difficulties of strengthening EU level democracy is that the corollary may be a 
lessening of state control over the Treaties. 
The Commission may also be reluctant to risk any damage to its reputation that might arise from the 
ECI giving it a stronger position within the Treaty amendment process than Member States think is 
legally justified. The Commission has a supranational role of promoting Union interests, but this 
authority rests on the existence of the treaties and the provisions within them. If treaty amendment 
were included in the ECI process and the Commission started regularly making treaty amendment 
proposals, the competence of the Commission could be viewed as creeping beyond its established 
boundaries and be detrimental to its political legitimacy in the long run.34 The Commission must stay 
within the bounds of the role conferred on it by the Member States; its role is not conferred directly 
by EU citizens. If the Commission starts to push beyond its treaty allocated competence, even if it 
may be doing so to extend the democratic participation of EU citizens, there is likely to be a reaction 
from the Member States. As a result the Commission could be politically damned if it does allow 
treaty amendment proposals to be part of the ECI, and democratically damned if it does not. 
Whatever the pros and cons of including treaty change in the ECI, or the likelihood of it happening, 
the underlying truth about the relative strength of the participative opportunities under analysis 
here is indicated by considering the following hypothetical consequence of allowing both EU and UK 
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 Art 17 TEU states: ‘The Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate 
initiatives to that end’. 
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 ‘Nothing has been more detrimental than the Commission overstepping its bounds’, J Weiler ‘The 
Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an emperor’, (Cambridge 1999) 353. 
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citizens to legitimise treaty change, and the possibility of a conflict between Member State and EU 
level opinion to be played out through direct democracy as a result. An ECI proposal could meet the 
necessary support thresholds, including the number needed from the UK, to trigger a proposal from 
the Commission to amend the treaties. The proposal could make it all the way through the ordinary 
revision procedure and lead to a new treaty being put to the Member States for approval in line with 
their constitutional requirements. Let us assume that in the UK a referendum vote would be 
triggered by the provisions in the EUA, and that the proposal supported by a representative number 
of EU citizens is then rejected in the referendum by a majority of UK citizens. The underlying truth is 
that EU law, as it stands, would prioritise Member State citizen opinion, as expressed in a Member 
State referendum, over EU citizen opinion as expressed through an instrument such as the ECI. 
Ratification is required by all Member States and a majority vote in a Member State will take 
precedence over the conflicting policy preference indicated by a representative number of EU 
citizens.35 This puts in stark relief one of the possible difficulties inherent in using direct democracy 
in a polity with dual citizenship, and the relative strengths of Member State and EU citizenship. 
In conclusion, there could be democratic benefits for EU legitimacy, if the decision were taken to 
extend the scope of democratic participation for EU citizens and lessen the distinction between 
constitutional and legislative legitimisation by allowing the ECI to be used to propose treaty 
amendments. It would also be a way to resolve the inconsistency between allowing supranational 
institutions, through Art 48(2), to propose treaty amendment, but at the same time not allowing EU 
citizens to include treaty amendment in an ECI proposal. However, the impact of such a change in 
the dual democracy of the EU is likely to be limited by the legislative design of the ECI itself, the 
institutional filters a proposal would have to navigate in the EU legislative process, and ultimately 
must give precedence to Member State citizen opinion. Furthermore, the current democratic 
paradigm, with Member States designated as the ‘masters of the treaties’, would be undermined by 
a supranational instrument of direct democracy that leads to EU level proposals through the 
Commission. With the Commission also seemingly wary of including treaty amendment in a 
supranational instrument of direct democracy because of possible damage to the Commission’s 
reputation and political legitimacy, this situation seems unlikely to change. 
Member state level legitimisation of EU law and policy making  
The focus for the discussion about the EUA is whether there should be Member State level 
referenda to legitimise EU law and policy decision-making that is ordinarily carried out by 
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 Art 48(4) requires ratification by all Member States. Art 48(5) TEU says that if after two years 4/5 of the 
Member States have ratified the treaty, then the matter is referred to the European Council. 
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supranational institutions. This applies to the referenda triggered by provisions in s6 EUA,36  which 
are divided between those triggered by support for a policy decision in the five areas listed in s6 
EUA, such as adoption of the Euro37 or signing up to the Schengen Agreement,38 and those referenda 
that would be triggered if the UK government want to support the removal of unanimity, consensus 
or common accord from the EU legislative procedure in the wide range of policy areas that have a 
special legislative procedure in the EU treaties.39 The treaties do not commonly accommodate the 
two step process that this requirement for Member State level referendum instigates for the 
approval of EU level institutional decision-making. 
The two level approval process introduced by s6 EUA sits uneasily in the policy legitimisation process 
of the EU democratic paradigm. This is despite the fact that policy and law making at EU level, unlike 
the legitimisation of the constitutional framework, is a mixed process that combines supranational 
and also intergovernmental elements; and despite the fact that it involves the Council, which 
contains representatives from Member States who could voice the preferences of its citizens, 
expressed in a national referendum, at EU level. This legislative process is mixed in terms of its 
legitimisation, but is supranational in decision-making terms as they are taken by EU level 
institutions. In general the Member States have agreed in the treaties that their representatives in 
the Council, once negotiations have been concluded and a sufficient level of consensus reached, will 
be able to approve the relevant policy decision: Art 16(2) TEU states that, ‘The Council shall consist 
of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the Government of 
the Member State in question and cast its vote’. The provisions of s6 EUA mean that the ministerial 
representative from the UK is not lawfully able to cast a vote for the UK Government, as part of the 
relevant special legislative procedure for the EU policy issues or voting changes indicated in s6 EUA, 
without returning to the UK to seek approval for a draft decision from the UK Parliament and from 
UK citizens in a referendum.40 This means that there must be UK/Member State level institutional 
and citizen involvement to approve a decision in a policy area that Member States had previously 
agreed in the Treaties would be an EU level competence with decisions taken at EU institutional 
level, and has led to questions being raised about whether the UK is in breach of EU law.41 
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 S6 (5)(a), (b), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (j).   
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 s6 (5)(e) EUA. 
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 s6 (5)(k) EUA. 
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 The full list of treaty articles to which this change could relate is found in Schedule 1 of EUA. 
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 s6(1) EUA. 
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 For discussion of the legality of the EUA provisions in terms of EU law see discussion on pg 134-138 in 
chapter 3. 
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For the purposes of the following comments there are three categories of legislative procedure in EU 
law:42 first, the Ordinary Legislative Procedure that does not require a unanimous vote in the 
Council; secondly, the special legislative procedures that require a unanimous vote in the Council; 
and thirdly, the less common ‘organic’ laws that differ from the previous two because they require a 
decision in the supranational institutions and also approval at Member State level in accordance 
with their constitutional requirements.43 In considering the extent of the impact on the EU 
democratic paradigm it is important to note that all of the referenda in s6 EUA relate to law and 
policy making to which a special legislative procedure is applied in EU law, and which require a 
unanimous vote in the Council, such as a decision to participate in a European Public Prosecutors 
Office,44 or they relate to a decision to change the voting procedure in a way that would remove the 
Member State veto in a wide range of policy areas.45 
It might even be argued that the enactment of the EUA has had the dramatic effect of moving 
decisions relating to the policy areas specified in s6 EUA in to the third category of organic laws, only 
for the UK. The organic laws of the EU already blurred the distinction between the legitimisation 
process for treaty amendment and for EU legislation as they are competences allocated to the EU 
level, but which nevertheless use the two stage legitimisation process of the more 
intergovernmental treaty ratification process. For the organic laws, despite not being amendments 
to the treaties, their provisions will only enter in to force ‘following their approval by the Member 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’.46 The difference between 
the provisions of s6 EUA and the existing organic laws is that the latter have been agreed by 
Member States through the ratification of the treaties and the two step process applies equally 
across the EU, whereas the provisions of s6 EUA have, in effect, unilaterally and inadvertently 
increased the numbers in this third category quite significantly, and has impliedly introduced, just for 
the UK, a phrase similar to, “these decisions shall be approved in accordance with respective 
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 For discussion of decision making procedures after Lisbon Treaty see M Dougan, ‘The treaty of Lisbon: 
winning minds, not hearts’ [2008] CML Rev 617, 637-652. There are still a number of variations in the category 
of special legislative procedures, such as different requirements for the Council to engage with the European 
Parliament or with the European Council. All the referenda of s6 fall within the category of SLPs. 
43
 The five organic laws are Art 42(2) on common security and defence policy; Art. 25 TFEU on additional rights 
for Union citizens; Art. 223(1) TFEU on a uniform electoral procedure for the EP; Art. 262 TFEU on ECJ 
jurisdiction over European IPRs; Art. 311 TFEU, third para on the initial decision on Union own resources. The 
only one not included in the Schedule 1 EUA list of articles that would require a referendum if there is a 
change in their voting process is Art 262. s6(2) EUA provides that decisions taken in accordance with Art 42(2) 
TEU must be approved by referendum. s7(2) EUA provides that decisions taken in accordance with the treaty 
articles of the other four organic laws require an Act of Parliament for their approval. 
44
 s6(3)EUA. 
45
 s6 (5)(f), (g) and (h) are three passarelle clauses in the Treaties. The passarelle clauses not included in the 
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[Member State] constitutional requirements”, in to the treaty articles specified in s6 EUA. This 
phrase has also been impliedly added to any decision to alter the voting procedure in any of the list 
of treaty articles in s6(5) EUA and Schedule 1 EUA, such as appointment of judges to the ECJ,47 
measures to combat discrimination,48 and police co-operation.49  
The changes resulting from the EUA challenge the distribution of competences between the UK and 
EU institutions in the sense that the s6 requirements repatriate, to a degree, power over certain 
areas of policy making and changes in voting arrangements to national decision-making processes in 
the UK, and increase the intergovernmental nature of the EU policy making process. It also means 
that the decision-making in relation to EU competences for the UK is different to other Member 
States that have not altered the manner in which their representatives participate in the EU 
legislative processes covered by s6 EUA. If other Member States were to follow the approach taken 
by the UK and require national referendum approval for decisions taken as part of the supranational 
EU law and policy making process, possibly to protect their own national interests or simply to 
maintain parity with the UK, then agreement in the Council would be more difficult to reach, and the 
approval of relatively minor legislative issues could end up taking far longer than at present. It could 
also leave the UK, and other Member States, potentially with a series of expensive referendum votes 
on quite specific or technical issues, such as whether to change the voting basis for decisions relating 
to ‘the protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated’,50 or in relation to the 
excessive deficit procedure,51 or for decisions of limited public interest, such as the list of military 
products exempt from internal market provisions.52 This could lead to low turnouts and results that 
are difficult to implement in full, which could then undermine the democratic value of holding 
referenda in the first place. This also means that on the one hand any decision to remove a UK veto 
over policy decisions in these policy areas, which cover almost all the SLPs in the treaties, must be 
approved in a referendum, but on the other hand the government remains free to support any 
actual Council policy decisions in these areas without needing approval in a UK referendum.53  
The binding nature of a Member State level referendum about a decision taken in the council could 
have been problematic for the UK Government, if they were unable to apply the result at EU level. 
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The difficulty of using Member State level referenda has been reduced, though, by the fact that s6 
EUA is only applicable to policy areas that use a SLP. If a referendum were held in the UK to approve 
a decision in the Council taken under OLP and this decision was rejected by UK citizens in the 
referendum vote, then this result in the referendum would be able to influence the vote of the UK 
representative in the Council, but could ultimately be ignored by the rest of the Council and the 
decision before them could be passed using the majority OLP voting procedure. If this fairly unlikely 
scenario were to occur, the UK would be subsequently obliged to implement any resulting EU 
legislation contrary to the wishes that had been expressed by its citizens in a referendum. This 
potential conflict between a Council decision and the directly expressed democratic wishes of UK 
citizens is avoided by s6 EUA policy areas all relating to an SLP, where the UK is able to veto a Council 
decision, rather than the OLP.54 
For SLP issues, s6 EUA could trigger a referendum in the UK to seek approval for a draft Council 
decision and UK citizens approve that decision, but there could be political ramifications when the 
UK government tries to apply this positive Member State level referendum result in the Council 
because they are still reliant on the political representatives from other member states for the 
decision to be passed and the referendum result to be implemented. This could be problematic, for 
example, if during the time it took to hold a referendum in the UK, economic or political changes, 
such as a new Government being voted in to another Member State, led to Member States wanting 
to veto the decision or reopen negotiations in relation to the draft decision that was voted on in a 
UK referendum. In this situation the veto of another Member State takes precedence over the UK 
referendum result, which would mean that the UK government is unable to apply a binding 
expression of the wishes of the UK electorate. These provisions for referenda in s6 EUA could, 
therefore, lead to tension between Member State level direct democracy and EU level decision-
making, and also to repeat referenda on similar issues that could lead to voter fatigue and falling 
turnout that undermines democratic participation over the longer term. The alternative of holding a 
referendum on a general policy position to inform negotiations in the Council, which might avoid 
some of these problems, would not comply with the requirement in s6(1) EUA that a ‘draft decision 
is approved by an Act of Parliament’. This is because there must be a draft Council decision agreed 
by all Member States for the UK Parliament to approve, and the referendum condition needs to be 
met not so that a Minister has a mandate to negotiate and seek agreement in the Council, but so 
that a Minister can approve an already agreed ‘decision’ in the Council after that decision has been 
put before UK citizens to vote on in a referendum. 
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 An attempt to introduce a Member State level approval process in to the OLP, even though, it could be 
ignored because of voting processes, would still be a clear, strong challenge to the agreed supranational 
processes of the EU that would move the specific policy areas from the OLP to some form of SLP for the UK. 
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Despite the challenge that the EUA makes to the EU democratic paradigm, its practical impact is 
likely to be limited. The s6 EUA referenda provisions have added to the small number of exceptions 
to the general rule that EU level institutions and EU level democratic processes control the EU 
legislative agenda and its direct legitimisation, but even this impact is qualified by a number of 
factors, such as the limited likelihood of a referendum being triggered and ultimately the ability of 
the UK Parliament to change the legislative provisions in the EUA or to repeal the legislation 
altogether.55 It is also limited by the fact that it is only one Member State needing to be 
accommodated and there are likely to be political options that can be taken to avoid any conflict 
with EU law, such as avoiding the need for a referendum through exercising the UK veto. If the issues 
in s6 EUA are accommodated on a number of occasions in other ways, though, such as providing the 
UK further opt outs in policy areas, then it could also lead to an increase in the flexibility of the EU in 
applying policy decisions unanimously, and the most significant impact could be the implications for 
any further reduction of Member State veto opportunities in legislative decision-making. 
In conclusion: the key issue in relation to the manner in which the s6 EUA referenda challenge the 
EU democratic paradigm is that the UK has in effect instigated a unilateral change to EU level 
legislative processes and that in so doing Member State level democratic processes have effectively 
been inserted, where there is no provision for them in EU law. The issues that this could bring in 
relation to Member State level legitimisation of EU level law and policy making, which are discussed 
in detail in chapter 3, are not the result of direct democracy per se, but the consequence of both the 
nature of the EU dual institutional framework and the EU legislative process,56 and also the manner 
in which direct democracy has been implemented by the UK government. For its part, the ECI raises 
questions about the supranational legitimisation of the EU treaties and challenges the existing 
democratic framework of intergovernmental legitimisation of the EU’s constitutional framework. 
The EUA and ECI together indicate where the lines of tensions are in the EU paradigm but they are 
likely to bring little change, particularly because the institutions with most influence over the 
implications they might have for the EU democratic paradigm appear to prefer the status quo. The 
Commission have highlighted the legitimacy that the ECI could provide for the EU, by bringing 
citizens closer, and the current UK Government have highlighted the increase in legitimacy that the 
EUA referenda bring for its policy of limiting further developments in EU competences. The 
Commission interpretation of the ECI, though, appears to be trying to avoid it unsettling their policy 
preferences, and the drafting of the EUA suggests that the UK government priority is re-election and 
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party politics rather than democratic participation. In their own way and from different political 
perspectives each institution would seem therefore to be protecting the EU status quo. The ECI and 
EUA are nudging the boundaries within the dichotomies of the EU democratic paradigm, but there 
appears to be little political will for them to make a significant long term impact by allowing direct 
democracy to be used beyond the bounds set by the current, largely representative process for 
democratic legitimisation. The restriction of the democratic potential of the ECI and EUA through the 
control of these institutions is discussed next in the second part of this chapter. 
Implications of the ECI and the EUA for the dual democratic legitimacy of the EU 
In the previous section we looked at the implications of the ECI and the referenda of the EUA for the 
framework for the democratic legitimisation of the EU’s constitutional order and its daily policy 
making, and the issues that challenge the EU democratic paradigm. The concluding section of this 
final chapter focuses on the following question: What is the potential influence together of the ECI 
and EUA on the democratic legitimacy of the EU? Comment on this question is informed by the 
analysis in chapters 2 and 3 of the legislative design and implementation of the ECI and EUA, and 
uses the democratic criteria of effective participative opportunity, citizen agenda influence and 
citizen outcome influence that were explained in detail in chapter one.57 I will argue that one of the 
key factors for both the ECI and EUA in limiting their democratic influence is the extent of 
institutional mediation, and that the strength of this mediation is indicated by the fact that the ECI 
and EUA provide little extra opportunity for citizens to challenge the policy preferences of the 
existing institutions. As a result they are unlikely to have a significant impact on the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy in the short term, although the possibility remains for these new instruments to open the 
way to further, more significant evolution in the EU’s democratic legitimacy through using direct 
democracy. The final section of this chapter, therefore, starts with a summary of the democratic 
criteria used to assess direct democracy. Secondly, the extent that the ECI and EUA are mediated by 
existing institutions is discussed. Thirdly, the discussion focuses on the impact that institutional 
mediation has on the ability of the ECI and EUA to facilitate a challenge to the policy preferences of 
the existing institutions at Member State and EU level. The final part of the chapter contains some 
concluding remarks about what the analysis of the ECI and EUA together tells us about the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy. 
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Democratic criteria 
Effective participative opportunity 
An effective participative opportunity is an equal and accessible opportunity to engage directly in a 
specific policy area and which acts as a gateway to facilitate the possibility of citizen impact on the 
content and outcomes of the political agenda. The ECI and EUA meet this criterion sufficiently for 
citizens to be able to use them to participate in a manner that has the potential to increase citizen 
influence over the EU policy agenda, but with some potential limitations. The legislative design of 
referenda in the EUA does not raise any specific equality issues, but there may be implications for 
the effectiveness of participation using referenda; particularly for the willingness, capacity and 
capability of citizens to engage with specific policy issues as a result of the selection of referenda 
subject matter.58 Attention was paid to making the ECI easy to use for both campaigners wishing to 
make a proposal and citizens wishing to support a proposal during the drafting of its Regulatory 
framework.59 This was relatively successful, as the high number of early ECI proposals indicated, but 
concerns have been raised about issues such as identification requirements, data security rules and 
resources, which have an impact on the willingness of citizens to organise or support an ECI 
campaign.60 One equality issue that has arisen due to the dual nature of the EU is the exclusion of 
some EU citizens from supporting an ECI because of the difference across Member States of a 
combination of franchise rules and identification requirements.61 There is increasing standardisation 
for the supranational ECI as states such as Spain and Luxembourg have modified their requirements 
for citizen identification, but without an EU level administration of the ECI, these equality issues are 
unlikely to be completely eliminated. Despite these issues that affect a relatively small number of 
citizens, the ECI and EUA in general do provide citizens with an effective participative opportunity. 
Citizen agenda influence 
Although the ECI and EUA do provide citizens with an opportunity to participate, the democratic 
potential of this opportunity depends also on the extent to which the other two criteria are met. The 
second criterion, citizen agenda influence, is met when an instrument of direct democracy provides a 
formal means for citizens to add issues to the political agenda and to influence public and 
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institutional debates connected to it. The ECI has the potential to meet this criterion by giving EU 
citizens the opportunity to propose a legal act of the Union, which can put a new policy issue on the 
agenda, as long as it is not manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers, or to 
support ECI proposals of other citizens. As discussed in chapter two, the ECI has had a high number 
of ECI proposals refused registration and this has led to a significant reduction in the number of 
issues citizens have been able to promote as part of the EU political agenda and in the amount of 
public debate that the ECI can generate.62 The legislative design of the ECI, in principle, allowed for 
wider citizen influence over the EU policy agenda than the Commission’s interpretation of the legal 
provisions has led to in practice. The EUA would need to provide frequent voting opportunities on a 
wide range of significant or salient issues, or allow citizens to propose subjects for a referendum 
vote to strongly meet this criterion. The EUA does not provide for citizen influence over the issues 
that may be voted on in a referendum as a result of the EUA, and the analysis in chapter 3 indicates 
that public debate, and therefore indirect influence over the content of the UK’s EU policy agenda, is 
likely to be infrequent and may not always be on issues of public salience. 
Citizen outcome influence 
The third criterion of citizen outcome influence is met when the democratic instrument enables 
citizens to have a direct impact on the legislative or policy outcomes of the political agenda. The ECI 
imposes some weak obligation on the Commission to act in response to citizen proposals and 
support; only requiring the Commission to consider making a proposal for a legal act. The ECI would 
need to regularly lead to legal acts of the Union to strongly meet this criterion, but the two ECIs that 
the Commission has responded to so far have not led to a legal act, with the Commission showing in 
the process that it will exercise its discretion to block a legal proposal that meets the support 
thresholds. The EUA, on the other hand, strongly meet this democratic criterion relatively strongly 
through giving citizens the opportunity of a binding vote in a referendum in relation to an area of the 
UK’s EU policy, the result of which the UK government would be expected to implement. The EUA is 
not likely to lead to frequent opportunities for citizens to influence the outcomes of the policy 
agenda, but when citizens do get the opportunity to vote in a referendum they have the opportunity 
to veto an EU decision in Council or the ratification of a treaty amendment and strongly influence 
the UK’s EU policy, and in the process influence the policy of the EU as a whole. This formal position 
reflected in the EUA, however, should be read in conjunction with the number of political factors 
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that could vitiate the opportunity given to citizens, particularly the need to consider the referendum 
result in light of the UK’s membership of the EU.63  
These two democratic instruments have been implemented at different levels in the EU and have 
the potential to influence the EU’s democratic legitimacy in very different ways. However, my 
analysis in chapters two and three of the ECI and EUA, respectively, has shown that what they have 
in common is that institutional mediation is an important factor that has limited their democratic 
potential and is likely to continue to limit it in the future. This chapter turns next to the form and 
extent of this institutional mediation in relation to the ECI and EUA. 
Institutional mediation of EU direct democracy   
Direct democracy is a political mechanism for passing influence over policy and legislation to 
citizens, but not total control. Some institutional mediation of direct democracy is inevitable in the 
liberal democratic Member States and the EU because representative institutions are central to their 
political legitimisation.64 The ECI and EUA have been introduced in this vein, so that the dual EU 
democratic framework is evolving to supplement, not replace, representative democratic 
mechanisms with direct democracy at both Member State and EU level.65 The discussion below 
focuses, therefore, not on whether there should be institutional mediation, but on the form the 
institutional mediation takes in these two examples of EU direct democracy and the extent to which 
it impacts on the potential of direct democracy to legitimise the EU. Two forms of institutional 
mediation are discussed in this section: first, the institutional control over the drafting of legislation 
introducing direct democracy, which is most clearly seen in relation to the EUA; and secondly, 
institutional control over the interpretation of the provisions for direct democracy in the legislation, 
which is clearly seen in relation to the ECI, but may also become apparent in relation to the EUA in 
the future. 
For the ECI institutional mediation clearly occurs when the Commission decides whether to register 
an ECI proposal at the start of the ECI process, and also when the Commission decides whether the 
ECI proposal is to lead to a legal act of the Union at the end of the process. At registration the 
requirement that an ECI proposal ‘not be manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s 
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powers’ has led to all of the refusals to register ECI proposals.66 At the end of the ECI process the 
Commission is only required to consider proposing a legal act of the Union.67 The analysis in chapter 
two showed that the Commission decision-making, at registration and when deciding its legal 
response, has led to significant restrictions over the frequency and scope of public debate generated 
by the ECI, and over the likelihood and strength of legal outcomes that a proposal might lead to. 
Arguably the Commission interpretation of Art 4(2)(b) is closer to requiring ECI proposals to be 
clearly inside the framework of the Commission’s powers than not manifestly outside. The 
Commission has also exercised its discretion to not propose a legal act of the Union following an ECI 
proposal being presented to them. The Commission interpretation and implementation of the ECI 
legislation has therefore had a significant impact on the ECI’s democratic potential through 
restricting citizen influence over agenda content and agenda outcomes. 
The Commission may have acted in accordance with the legal provisions of Regulation 211/2011 in 
deciding whether to register an ECI proposal or propose a legal act in response to one, certainly the 
Commission argues that it is legality that restricts the democratic impact of the ECI not their 
interpretation, but that is not the issue here.68 Although there are five legal challenges pending to 
decisions by the Commission in relation to the ECI and the European Ombudsman has called for 
more consistency in their decision making,69 the important point here is that even though the 
Commission interpretation of the ECI legislative provisions are probably lawful, it could have chosen 
an alternative lawful interpretation that places greater emphasis on democratic participation.70 The 
Commission could have proposed a legal act of the Union in response to the ECIs that successfully 
gathered support, but it chose not to, and it could have registered a number of ECI proposals that 
were on the borderline of being within the Commission’s powers, but it chose not to. A future 
Commission, therefore, could prioritise citizen participation over controlling policy preferences more 
strongly without changing the existing legislation. The new Commission under President Juncker, 
though, is not showing any more inclination to do so than the previous President and the restriction 
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on the ability of citizens to influence the policy agenda through the ECI is likely to remain limited as a 
result.71 
The institutional mediation of the EUA is different in nature to that of the ECI. One way of 
distinguishing between the two could be to refer to the type of institutional mediation exercised by 
the Commission as mediation by interpretation, and to the institutional mediation of the EUA as 
mediation by legislation because it is the actual provisions of the statute, rather than the 
interpretation of the legislation, at least so far, that have restricted the democratic impact of 
introducing referenda through the EUA. The nature of a referendum as a democratic instrument that 
gives citizens a veto over a policy proposal without approval in a referendum is, on the face of it, a 
clear promise of citizen impact on the outcomes of the policy agenda. However, as strong as the 
opportunity is at the point when citizens vote, the legislative provisions of the EUA that contain the 
referenda triggers and that give citizens this moment of influence have limited the scope of this 
opportunity and its democratic impact. First, there are no provisions to overcome the referendum’s 
inherent democratic weakness of having no citizen influence over the policy areas that require 
referendum approval.72 Secondly, there are gaps in the criteria that trigger a referendum: no 
referendum is required if the Government wants to take the UK out of the EU, for the accession of 
new Member States, or if the UK joins a group of enhanced cooperation. Thirdly, a referendum will 
only be held to approve Government decisions that would increase EU institution competences or 
remove a Member State veto in the Council. As a result there are limitations on the scope and 
frequency of the direct democratic opportunity built in to the legislative design of the EUA by the UK 
government. 
As well as the mediation through the legislative design that is already apparent, there is also the 
possibility that the EUA will give us further evidence of institutional mediation by interpretation. A 
future UK government that is pro-European, for example, may want to avoid the risk of holding a 
referendum and try to interpret the legislation accordingly to avoid needing to hold one. The 
analysis of the EUA has shown that there may be some limited opportunity to interpret the 
referenda provisions to restrict the initiation of referenda through, for example, the significance 
condition,73 interpreting the meaning of competence increase, or to avoid a referendum through 
negotiation in the Council.74 This possibility of control, though, should be considered in light of the 
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fact that the significance condition only applies to a limited number of referenda and that there has 
been an attempt to catch an extensive range of competence increases within the provisions of the 
EUA. The UK government and politicians in opposition have promised referenda on a number of 
occasions in relation to the EU, albeit ones that are not legally obliged, but they have managed to 
find circumstances that allow them to rescind the promise.75 For now though we are still waiting to 
see how the UK government will interpret the EUA provisions and respond to the possibility of a 
referendum being triggered, and whether in fact future governments are able to pick the 
‘referendum locks’ promised in the EUA and avoid a popular vote, or indeed whether they decide to 
exercise their ultimate control of amending or repealing the EUA legislation and remove the promise 
of a referendum.76 
The ECI legislation itself has not strongly shackled the democratic potential of the ECI, and allows for 
an interpretation that could give a relatively wide scope for democratic participation. The influence 
of the European Parliament is probably one reason for this as they pushed for a simpler to use 
instrument that would allow for further public debate.77 One motivation for the European 
Parliament, perhaps, is that, as an institution that relies on democratic legitimacy, they will benefit 
more strongly from an overall increase in EU democratic legitimacy. It is possible that the 
Commission and the Council were happy to allow the ECI legislation to have broad potential given 
the weakness of the legal obligations and the ease with which citizen preferences could be ignored.78 
On the other hand the Commission have stated they want strong democratic participation,79 and 
there is no indication of the Commission trying to impose significant restrictions in to the ECI 
legislation. However, given that the rhetoric of participation is not born out in practice, that as a 
technocratic institution the Commission probably have less to gain from increased democratic 
participation and legitimacy in the EU than the European Parliament, and that they have more to 
lose because the ECI, if developed, would pass influence over the Commission’s role of legislative 
initiative to citizens, it may be that the more consensual approach to legislation at EU level lends 
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itself more easily to drafting less politicised legislation to introduce direct democracy. The indication 
from the UK, albeit from just one piece of legislation, is that where the executive has a strong degree 
of control over the drafting of legislation, the introduction of direct democracy is likely to be 
qualified by the party political preferences that are written in to the legislation. 
It will be interesting to see in 2015 whether the review of the ECI that is underway will lead to 
significant reform of the ECI process and legislation to increase democratic participation and citizen 
influence, as the European Parliament seem to intend, or whether the Commission’s apparent 
reluctance to make changes will limit the development of the ECI in participative terms.80 The ECI 
legislation is developed through a three way discussion between the EU institutions, whereas any 
changes to the EUA are more strongly dependent on party political preferences and the results of 
the general election. The Conservative party is unlikely to change the EUA and its further 
commitment to an EU membership referendum has surpassed the provisions of the EUA to some 
extent. The Labour party on the other hand has committed to amend the EUA to include an extra 
referenda provision that a transfer of competence will also trigger a referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the EU.81 It seems highly likely therefore that the EUA referenda provisions will 
remain part of the approval process for the UK’s EU policy, even if some minor changes are made. 
The UK government could seek to justify its mediation of the EUA with reference to its political 
legitimacy that rests on a demos and democratic legitimisation. The Commission, however, as a 
technocratic institution, cannot justify its mediation of the ECI in these terms. The Commission is 
also not influenced by the sort of party political democratic pressure that was partially responsible 
for the implementation of the EUA and the subsequent promise of a referendum on UK 
membership.82 The Commission’s lack of democratic legitimacy means that it is in a position to allow 
the ECI to wither and fall in to desuetude through its approach to its implementation with little 
immediate impact on its legitimacy. Democracy is not the only normative justification for 
institutional mediation and the Commission is not the only difficulty the ECI faces, if it is to increase 
its democratic impact, but the analysis of the institutional mediation of the ECI and EUA highlights 
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the difficulty of having a non-democratic institution such as the Commission influencing the 
application of direct democracy in the EU.  
Institutional mediation, to some degree, is inevitable. The issue that has been highlighted by the ECI 
and the EUA, however, is that the potential for direct democracy to meet the democratic criteria of 
effective participative opportunity, citizen agenda influence and citizen outcome influence is strongly 
conditioned by the decisions taken by the existing institutions in relation to their legislative design 
and by the institutional control over the interpretation and application of the legal provisions. The 
extent of institutional mediation and the impact it has on the democratic potential of the ECI and 
EUA is indicated by the degree to which citizens can challenge established policy preferences. It is to 
a consideration of the ability of citizens to use the ECI and EUA to introduce their own policy 
preferences that this chapter turns next. 
Ability of direct democracy to challenge established policy preferences in the EU 
A crucial test of any democratic instrument, particularly those being incorporated in to a 
representative governing system, is that it provides the opportunity for citizens to challenge the 
established policy preferences of the political institutions. Without this challenge citizen 
participation through direct democracy will not have an impact and the democratic criteria of citizen 
agenda and outcome influence will not be met. The democratic value of an instrument of direct 
democracy, at least in terms of the extent to which it reinforces popular sovereignty, correlates to 
the extent that it allows for challenge to the existing policy choices of the institutions it addresses, 
and the increased citizen influence that this reflects.83 This is because an instrument of direct 
democracy that is only able to support existing policy preferences, and confirm policy and legislative 
decisions already taken by another political actor, may provide some extra legitimacy to decisions 
already taken, but it will have little impact in changing the degree to which these decisions are 
aligned with citizen preferences. From a citizen perspective there is little incentive in participating 
through a democratic instrument that does not strengthen their influence over the political direction 
of the polity. Therefore, if the challenge to established policy preferences through the ECI and EUA is 
weak, the levels of democratic participation they instigate and their democratic potential are likely 
to be reduced. 
Direct democracy potentially leads to a challenge to established policy preferences through 
providing a formal opportunity to place items on the political agenda, through generating public 
debate that can indirectly increase citizen influence over policy decisions, and through the 
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obligations to act in response to public support that are included in the legislative design of the 
instrument. The ECI should be strong in the first area by offering citizens a formal opportunity to 
influence the political agenda and to generate debate about a wide range of policy issues that would 
not otherwise be debated as part of the EU agenda.84 The EUA should be strong in the second area 
because of the strong legal obligation on the existing institutions to implement the policy preference 
expressed by citizens in a referenda, irrespective of whether it supports established policy 
preferences or not. Next there is discussion about the indirect challenge to established policy 
preferences from public debate, and secondly from the obligation to implement citizen opinion 
expressed in a vote. 
Challenge to policy preferences from citizen initiated public debate 
Despite the possibility of public debate provided by the ECI legislation, there appears to be a 
tendency developing for the Commission to restrict it by being more likely to register an ECI proposal 
the less it challenges policy preferences. It is too early for this tendency to register ECI proposals that 
support current Commission policy to be clearly demonstrated, but the majority of the ECI proposals 
registered so far have been affirming or extending the Commission’s existing legislative programme 
or policy preferences, such as initiatives relating to the ERASMUS programme,85 the environment,86 
or speed limits.87 The most striking registration refusal that limits challenge to existing policy 
preferences is the decision of the Commission in October 2014 to refuse registration of the TTIP 
initiative, on the grounds that the ECI process cannot be used to request the Commission to not do 
something, which excludes some of the most important areas of Union activity.88  
The TTIP decision means that once a course of action is initiated by the Commission, citizens are not 
able to use the ECI to challenge the policy preference inherent in this action, in this case it was 
transatlantic trade negotiations whose negotiation parameters citizens wanted to challenge and 
whose ratification they wanted to stop.89 If this position of the Commission in relation to registering 
ECI proposals is maintained, citizens can only use the ECI process to propose that a concluded EU 
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trade agreement does go on to be ratified. An ECI proposal that seeks support for ratifying a treaty 
would be a largely empty gesture that is unlikely to generate high levels of citizen support because 
of the likelihood that the treaty will be ratified anyway, with or without direct citizen participation. 
One of the most important policy areas of the EU institutions, and one in which the non-democratic 
Commission has an important role to play, has therefore been removed from the ECI process 
through the Commission’s questionable interpretation of the ECI regulation and restricted the ability 
of citizens to challenge EU policy preferences as a result.  
Although the majority of initiatives do not challenge existing policy preferences, there are a small 
number registered that have evidenced some challenge to EU policy, such as the proposal to 
suspend the EU climate and energy package.90 Most notably the two initiatives, the One of Us and 
Right to Water initiatives, which achieved the levels of support needed to ask the Commission to 
consider a legal act of the Union, were a challenge to the EU policy on embryo research and the 
commercialisation of utilities, respectively.91 As a result the ECI has led to some public debate about 
policies generally unsupported by the Commission, despite the number of initiatives refused 
registration by the Commission. The Commission has also demonstrated the ECI’s weakness in 
challenging policy preferences by being willing to use its veto at the end of the ECI process, when it 
refused to initiate a legal act of the Union in response to the One of Us and Right to Water initiatives 
despite their levels of public support.92 For its part, the EUA does little to formally extend public 
debate, and challenge established policy preferences as a result, because it does not give citizens the 
choice of what subjects to hold a referendum on and the Government is able to exercise a degree of 
control over whether they are initiated. However, on the probably rare occasions that a referendum 
is triggered as a result of the EUA there will be public debate about the EU and there will be an 
opportunity for a citizen veto of established government policy. The UK government might try to 
minimise the risk of an EU policy or a treaty it has negotiated being rejected in a referendum, but the 
legal provisions of the EUA have increased the chance of a referendum being held and UK citizens 
will control their approval once a referendum is triggered. 
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Challenge to policy preferences from citizen initiated outcomes 
Previous experience in the EU indicates that the consequences of an EU policy or treaty being 
rejected at Member State level are not clear cut. A referendum vote in a member state has rejected 
an EU treaty five times. After the ‘no’ votes on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the 
Netherlands,93 the Constitutional Treaty was abandoned and after renegotiation all member states 
ratified the Lisbon Treaty, with only Ireland holding a referendum (twice).94 After the Danish 
rejection of the Maastricht treaty and Irish rejection of the Nice and Lisbon Treaties there were 
periods of analysis and reflection, and then declarations and assurances were made by the EU 
institutions and the member states to address the concerns of voters.95 Each treaty was then 
presented without change for a vote in another referendum and on each of the three occasions the 
referendum result approved ratification of the treaty.96 There has been some policy response, 
therefore, to referendum results, but three times the treaty rejected has not been changed and 
although the Constitutional Treaty was abandoned the Lisbon Treaty was quickly agreed and 
retained much of what had been contained in the Constitutional treaty.97  
The response so far to the rejection of EU treaties seems to imply that when a challenge comes from 
citizens in a referendum, as happened in Denmark, Ireland, France and the Netherlands, the political 
elites of the members states and the EU institutions will join together to ‘resolve’ the challenge to 
their policy preferences from citizens of a particular state. This response to rejection of treaties in 
popular votes indicates the difficulty in the EU context of a citizen challenge to decisions that reflect 
the policy preferences of not only their own governments, but also other Member State 
governments and the EU institutions. It also exemplifies the tension between Member State level 
democracy and democracy viewed from an EU level perspective. For the Member State government 
concerned it exacerbates the pressure of having to respond to both the wishes of other Member 
State governments and the EU as a whole, and to the wishes of their citizens as expressed in a 
popular vote. An EUA triggered referenda that rejects an EU treaty is likely to be responded to in the 
same way by the political institutions, and the EUA has extended these political difficulties in to 
areas of EU policy as well. It will be interesting to see how the institutional response to a challenge 
to established policy preferences in relation to the constitutional framework of the EU differs from 
the response to a challenge to the established policy preferences in relation to legislative and policy 
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decision-making of the EU. It will also be interesting to see what impact the expected political 
pressure might have on decision-making by the UK Government. 
Notwithstanding the qualifications above, the EUA will give citizens influence over the outcomes 
from the UK’s EU policy agenda, albeit on infrequent occasions. For its part, the ECI provides far less 
opportunity for citizen influence over the outcomes of the EU policy agenda because there is no 
obligation on the Commission to initiate a legal act in response to an initiative that is presented to it, 
and the extent to which it meets the democratic criteria of citizen outcome influence is almost 
entirely in the hands of the Commission. The final part of this section on the ability of citizens to 
challenge policy preferences comments on the impact of the EU framework on how strongly citizens 
are able to use direct democracy to meet the two democratic criteria of citizen agenda influence and 
citizen outcome influence. 
Impact of EU political structure on citizen ability to challenge policy preferences 
In the national context the challenge to established policy preferences can be viewed as being 
between citizens through direct democracy and the political institutions that these same citizens 
have legitimised through indirect, representative democracy. However, this characterisation of the 
direct democratic challenge to policy preferences as a bilateral one between citizens and a political 
elite only partially explains the institutional mediation and protection of policy preferences in the 
dual democracy of the EU. The ECI gives citizens the potential to challenge the policy preferences of 
the Commission and the other EU institutions, but it may also challenge the policy preferences of 
any one, or several, of the EU Member States. The EUA may facilitate UK citizen challenge of future 
UK government policy preferences, but in doing so it may also lead to a challenge to the preferences 
of the EU level institutions, and also other Member States. As well as the multiple institutions in 
different, but overlapping, polities that may resist citizen initiated policy preferences, there is also 
contestation between the institutions of the EU and its Member States that may reinforce the policy 
status quo and add to the difficulties for citizens to use the ECI or EUA to influence the agenda 
content or its outcomes and the established policy preferences that they reflect. These challenges to 
the ability of citizens to use the ECI and EUA to challenge policy preferences in the dual EU 
democracy are commented on further in the next paragraphs, first from a UK and then an EU 
perspective. 
First from a UK perspective, the contestation between the EU and its Member States is reflected in 
the EUA referendum provisions and reduces their democratic potential because they are 
underpinned by a desire to reinforce the traditional sovereignty of the state and restricted to 
decisions that transfer powers or sovereignty to the EU level institutions. This is indicated by the 
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provisions that require referendum approval for decisions at EU level that would remove the UK’s 
veto in that policy area, and the fact that referendum approval is not required when EU 
competences are being reduced.98 Future governments may be cautious towards triggering 
referenda to avoid possible loss of political capital resulting from a no vote in a referendum, but 
when a referendum is triggered it creates the possibility of a clash between UK sovereignty and the 
consensual approach to decision making at EU level.99 If UK citizens vote to not approve a treaty or a 
decision taken in the Council and there is significant pressure from other Member States and the EU 
institutions on the UK Government to identify and address the concerns of UK citizens and hold 
another referendum, when necessary, it will be interesting to see how the UK responds to the 
demands of being a member of an EU polity that must accommodate the democratic wishes of each 
individual Member State, including the UK, and also the democratic wishes of the Member States as 
a whole. 
The UK government might have had one eye on the EU institutions when drafting the EUA, but they 
also had one eye on future UK governments that might have a different policy position to theirs. 
Having written in to the legislation an increased resistance to a UK policy position that wishes to 
extend EU competences, the extent to which this limits citizen ability to challenge policy preferences 
depends on the position of the government of the time. The EUA referenda cannot lead to a citizen 
vote that vetoes the EU policy preference of the current government or a future government with 
the same policy position, but it does provide the possibility of a citizen vote that could veto differing 
policy preferences of a future government. The ability of citizens to challenge policy therefore 
appears to be incidental to the political motivations behind the enactment of the EUA, which are a 
desire to protect the policy preferences of the current Government against future institutional 
challenge, to stop an increase in powers of the EU institutions, and also to resolve party political 
difficulties.100 
Secondly from an EU perspective, the ECI allows for formal democratic deliberation on any issues 
‘not manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s powers’, and wide discretion in terms of 
legal outcomes, but the possible wide scope that this allows has been restricted by the Commission’s 
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application of the ECI legislation. The Commission’s limitation of the ability of EU citizens to 
challenge existing policy preferences does not appear to be a consequence of trying to strengthen 
the supranational institutional powers in contestation against Member State interests, as the UK 
Government has done from the opposite perspective. Instead, the Commission’s limitation of public 
debate by registering only those ECI proposals that are clearly inside the competences of the 
Commission appears more likely to be a defensive reaction to avoid the risk of contestation with 
Member State institutions.101 If this is the case then protection of the political position of the 
Commission would be being prioritised over giving citizens an enhanced opportunity to influence the 
EU policy agenda. Furthermore, if the Commission is taking a restrictive approach to ECI registration 
because of concerns over an appearance of competence creep and to protect its position, this might 
in fact be counter-productive in terms of protecting the status quo, if the repeated refusal to allow 
democratic engagement through the ECI, or to initiate legal outcomes as a result of ECIs, comes to 
be viewed as an example of an institution that is adverse to democratic legitimacy and needs further 
democratic reform. 
It is possible that the requirement in EU law for the Commission to protect the ‘general interests of 
the Union’ has also influenced the Commission’s restriction of the number and impact of citizen 
initiated policy preferences.102 It could be argued that the protection of the general interests of the 
Union requires the Commission to consider initiatives from a supranational perspective of the Union 
population as a whole, and that this legal obligation is not superseded by a proposal backed by one 
million or so EU citizens. An indication of this position and that it will be difficult for even a well 
supported ECI proposal to shift the Commission’s policy preferences was given by the previous 
Commission President Manuel Barroso when he said in relation to the TTIP ECI in interview that 
there is no obligation to accept a petition (sic) because “two or three million petitioners does not 
mean a position of a majority”.103 This argument, though, is undermined by having an EU political 
environment where the need for stronger democratic legitimisation is recognised and where the 
Commission itself is not democratically legitimised.104 It is too early to make a claim that the 
Commission is deliberately prioritising its own perceived Union interests over those of EU citizens 
and there is no clear statement to that effect, but the tendency to prioritise institutional preferences 
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over citizen preferences does seem to be developing.105 This discussion of the difficulties facing 
EU/UK citizens in using direct democracy to influence the EU policy agenda and its outcomes and to 
challenge a wide range of institutional policy preferences highlights an inherent difficulty in 
introducing direct democracy in to EU democracy at both EU and Member State level.  
Direct democracy is principally a step towards increased popular sovereignty and increased influence 
of citizens over the law and policy decisions that institutions take. The next step in the political 
typology that was outlined in chapter one would be directly mediated representative government,106 
where political representatives facilitate political debate and continue to take policy decisions, but 
citizens have frequent opportunities to influence the agenda policy and its outcomes, and to impose 
their own policy preferences through instruments of direct democracy.107 This is a long way off as 
party politics and institutional mediation based on established policy preferences still have a strong 
influence over the impact of direct democracy and the possibility of citizen influence on the policy 
agenda and its outcomes. The existence of supranational and Member State level institutions in the 
dual EU democracy means that this institutional mediation brought to bear on citizen participation 
through direct democracy is not just bilateral, but a more complex contestation between citizens 
and the interests of Member State level and EU level institutions. Moreover, it means that the 
contestation between these sets of institutions strengthens the institutional reluctance to reduce 
their control and allow a corresponding increase in citizen influence over the EU for fear of the other 
institutions strengthening their position. Paradoxically, however, the political motivations that 
reflect these same concerns about institutional weaknesses and strengths have led to the 
introduction of the ECI and EUA. 
The impact of contestation with and between different sets of institutions is not the only difficulty 
for direct democracy in the EU that the ECI and EUA indicate. It is also conditioned by the 
institutional and democratic framework. The legitimisation of the constitutional framework remains 
anchored in the Member States, but, as was found in chapter 3, it is difficult for Member State level 
direct democracy to have an impact on decision making in the EU institutions. Conversely, 
supranational direct democracy can be used to provide citizen influence over EU level law and policy 
making, but, as was demonstrated in chapter 2, it is unlikely that citizens will be able to use direct 
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democracy to influence treaty amendment. These are limitations on the scope of direct democracy 
that are inherent to the structure of the EU’s dual democracy.  
A further limitation on direct democracy due to the EU’s duality is the distance of citizens from the 
impact of their specific policy vote through direct democracy. For EU level instruments there is the 
geographic distance of the EU and its status as a partially independent polity, and there is also the 
distance an initiative has to travel through the legislative process to achieve a legal outcome. At 
Member State level there is the political distance of voting to influence national policy in relation to 
the EU that is then negotiated with the Member States before final decisions are taken. Both 
instruments are also affected by the need to take the interests of all Member States in to 
consideration. The ECI has unusual triple support thresholds that reflect a need for a representative 
number of citizens and also a representative number of Member States, which add to the complexity 
of collecting support.108 The initiation of an EUA referendum will be influenced by the UK’s 
negotiations with other Member States in the Council, and the implementation of a citizen veto 
given through an EUA referendum will be influenced by UK membership of the EU. As a result, even 
if the political institutions were to more strongly prioritise democratic participation of the ECI and 
EUA, there will still be limitations on their ability to enhance EU democratic legitimacy as a result of 
the current institutional framework and democratic paradigm of the EU. 
Conclusion 
The ECI and EUA are notable steps in the gradual, piecemeal evolution of the dual EU democracy, 
potentially moving it towards stronger popular sovereignty and enhanced democratic legitimacy 
through increased citizen influence over EU treaties, law and policy making. The rhetoric from the 
political institutions of ‘bringing citizens closer to the Union’ and ‘giving citizens the final say over the 
most important decisions’ promises such an impact, and it implies that EU democracy will continue 
to evolve a legitimacy that is less reliant on representative democracy or, for the Commission, on 
performance legitimacy and outputs. The ECI is the first supranational instrument of direct 
democracy and part of a move towards a seemingly more participatory democratic approach in the 
EU, which has been described as being “of potentially enormous significance”.109 The EUA referenda 
are the first instruments of direct democracy provided for in UK legislation on an ongoing basis and 
give citizens the opportunity to veto government policy when a referendum is held. However, 
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looking behind these headlines, my analysis of the ECI and EUA has shown significant limitations on 
their potential to have an impact on the democratic paradigm and legitimacy of the EU. 
The limited democratic potential of the ECI and EUA is reflected in the degree to which they meet 
the democratic criteria of effective participative opportunity, citizen agenda influence and citizen 
outcome influence. There is a new opportunity for citizens to engage directly in specific policy 
matters rather than through the selection of representatives, but the influence citizens exert from 
participating through the ECI or EUA has been qualified on a number of fronts, so that control of the 
EU agenda and its outcomes remains largely with the existing political institutions. It is possible that 
the institutions that drafted the ECI and EUA and that are responsible for their implementation did 
so to move towards a form of directly mediated representative government through increasing the 
effective participation of citizens; but it seems more likely that, having introduced direct democracy 
to resolve party political difficulties and to reinforce their authority in the contested EU polity, 
democratic participation is not the priority in the design or implementation of the ECI and EUA. This 
is most clearly demonstrated through the choice of referenda triggers by the UK government in the 
EUA and the control exerted over the ECI by the Commission at registration. As a result of this 
institutional mediation, the impact of direct democracy on the ability of citizens to influence EU 
related policy preferences and therefore EU democratic legitimacy has been significantly diminished.  
Despite their limited impact so far on the dual democratic legitimacy of the EU, the ECI and EUA may 
in the long run be more than just interesting democratic experiments. The principal objective for the 
institutions that have drafted and implemented the ECI and EUA may be their own self preservation, 
but in defending their own position they could have inadvertently taken a step towards significant 
institutional change. The EUA may still lead to referenda that have an impact on the UK’s EU policy 
or the EU political framework itself, and strengthen citizen influence over the political agenda in the 
process, but the frequency, significance and government attitude to implementing the EUA 
legislation will be crucial in this respect. The ECI is in greater need of resuscitation, if it is to become 
a well-used means of democratic participation that strengthens citizen influence over EU decision 
making. With the 3 year review of the ECI underway and the first challenges to Commission decision 
making in relation to the ECI due to be heard by the ECJ,110 2015 could be a crucial year for this 
innovative democratic instrument. Any revival, though, will depend mainly on the outcome of 
discussions between a cautious Commission and a European Parliament that is pushing to effect 
significant change to the ECI process and legislation. Direct democracy in the dual democratisation 
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of the EU therefore remains in an embryonic stage, with the scope and impact of citizen 
participation still heavily dependent on future decisions of Member State and EU level institutions. 
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